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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Aus theoretischer und empirischer Sicht ist zu diskutieren, ob die Genossenschaften positive 
Auswirkungen für ihre Mitglieder haben. Unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen der 
ökonomischen Globalisierung und der modernen Agrarmärkte, die die Genossenschaften vor 
neue Herausforderungen stellen und gleichzeitig ein neues Interesse an deren Förderung als 
Entwicklungsinstrument wecken, ist ein besseres Verständnis und eine Analyse der Effekte von 
Genossenschaften im Kontext von Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern erforderlich. 
Das übergeordnete Forschungsziel dieser Dissertation ist die Erklärung und Bewertung der 
Auswirkungen, die landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaften auf ihre Mitglieder in diesen 
Kontexten haben. Die zwei Leitfragen lauten: (1) welches sind die sozioökonomischen 
Merkmale der Landwirte, die Mitglieder von Genossenschaften sind? und (2) welche 
spezifischen Auswirkungen haben landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaften auf ihre Mitglieder? 
Die erste Frage zielt darauf ab, ob ärmere oder benachteiligte Landwirte tatsächlich Mitglieder 
von Genossenschaften sind, während die zweite Frage untersucht, welche Vorteile 
Genossenschaften ihren Mitgliedern bieten. Die Fragen werden in einer systematischen 
Literaturarbeit und drei empirischen Artikeln behandelt, die sich mit den spezifischen 
Auswirkungen von Genossenschaften auf Preise und Inklusion befassen. 
Die systematische Literaturrecherche (erster Artikel) zeigt, dass das, welches beruhend auf den 
untersuchten Artikeln über Genossenschaften bekannt ist, auf einer sehr begrenzten Anzahl von 
Fällen beruht, da viele Artikel hinsichtlich des Veröffentlichungsdatums, der geografischen 
Standorte und der untersuchten landwirtschaftlichen Sektoren stark konzentriert sind. 
Bezüglich der Eigenschaften von Mitgliedern und Nichtmitgliedern kann die These, dass 
wohlhabendere Landwirte mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit Genossenschaftsmitglieder sind, 
nicht schlüssig belegt werden. Die deutlichsten empirischen Belege für positive Effekte von 
Genossenschaften finden sich in den Kategorien ‚Zugang zu und Nutzung von 
landwirtschaftlichen Betriebsmitteln‘, ‚Einkommen‘, ‚Preise‘ sowie ‚Status und 
Entscheidungsmacht von Frauen‘. Unabhängig von den Wirkungskategorien gibt es einen 
relevanten Anteil an Ergebnissen, für die nicht genügend Belege vorliegen, um sie abschließend 
zu bewerten. Positive Effekte sind daher wahrscheinlich, müssen jedoch weiterhin bestätigt 
werden.  
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Im zweiten und dritten Artikel werden die Eigenschaften der Mitglieder und Preiswirkungen 
von Genossenschaften und anlegerorientierten Unternehmen im argentinischen Wein- und 
Milchsektor untersucht. Landwirte, die an Genossenschaften verkaufen, erhalten in den 
untersuchten Fällen niedrigere Preise für ihre Produkte als Landwirte, die an anlegerorientierte 
Unternehmen verkaufen. Da Genossenschaftsmitglieder sich hinsichtlich Größe, Vermögen und 
Kosten des Marktzugangs von anderen Landwirten unterscheiden, lässt sich sagen, dass 
Genossenschaften mit diesen benachteiligten Landwirten handeln und dafür niedrigere Preisen 
zahlen. Dennoch bieten Genossenschaften andere Vorteile wie politische Repräsentanz und 
unbegrenzte Lieferrechte, die die Landwirte für die niedrigeren Preise kompensieren können. 
Das vierte Papier analysiert Mechanismen, die zur Inklusion benachteiligter Haushalte in 
sambischen Maisgenossenschaften beitragen. Inklusion entwickelt sich in Genossenschaften, 
die Engagement zeigen und entweder vulnerable Mitglieder mit Finanzdienstleistungen 
versorgen, soziale Identität fördern oder benachteiligte Mitglieder dafür entschädigen, dass sie 
keinen Zugang zu subventionierten Betriebsmitteln haben. 
Die Gesamtergebnisse zeigen, dass Genossenschaften im Allgemeinen mit den am stärksten 
benachteiligten Landwirten zusammenarbeiten. Sie erzielen verschiedene positive Wirkungen 
für ihre Mitglieder. Dennoch gibt es auch einen relevanten Anteil von Fällen, in denen es nicht 
genügend empirische Belege für ihre Auswirkungen gibt. Deswegen sollten Regierungen und 
Geber optimistisch, aber vorsichtig auf die Eignung und Wirksamkeit von Genossenschaften 
zur Erreichung bestimmter Ziele blicken. Da es einen Publikationsbias geben kann, können 
negative Auswirkungen, obwohl selten veröffentlicht, nicht ausgeschlossen werden. 
Basierend auf meinen empirischen Untersuchungen schlage ich erstens vor, dass 
Genossenschaften als Organisationen mit vielfältigen Funktionen und Wirkungen entsprechend 
dieser Komplexität und Vielfalt bewertet werden sollten und nicht nur durch die Analyse 
einzelner Auswirkungen. Zweitens sollte die Genossenschaft anhand der besonderen 
Charakteristika ihrer Mitglieder beurteilt werden. Dies bedeutet, dass ihre Effekte 
möglicherweise die Bedürfnisse oder Eigenschaften der Mitglieder und nicht die 
organisatorischen Merkmale an sich widerspiegeln. 
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ABSTRACT 
From both theoretical and empirical perspectives, whether cooperatives provide their members 
with benefits remains open to debate. Under the present conditions of economic globalisation 
and modern agricultural markets, which are simultaneously imposing new challenges on 
cooperatives as well as prompting renewed interest in promoting them as a development tool, 
better understanding and analysis of cooperative effects in developing contexts is needed.  
The overarching research objective of this thesis is to explain and assess the effects agricultural 
cooperatives have on their members in developing contexts. The two guiding questions are: (1) 
what are the socio-economic characteristics of farmers who participate in cooperatives? and (2) 
what are the specific effects of agricultural cooperatives on their farmer members? The first 
question examines whether the poorer or more disadvantaged farmers actually participate in 
cooperatives, whereas the second question analyses what kinds of benefits cooperatives 
provide. The questions are addressed in a systematic literature review and three empirical 
papers focusing on the specific cooperative effects on prices and inclusion.  
The systematic literature review (Paper One) finds that what is known about cooperatives 
through the articles examined is based upon a very limited set of cases, since many of the 
articles are highly concentrated in terms of publication date, geographical locations and 
agricultural sectors investigated. Regarding member and non-member characteristics, the 
empirical evidence concerning claims that better-off farmers are more likely to be members 
appears to remain inconclusive. The most conclusive evidence of positive effects corresponds 
to the categories access to and use of inputs, income, prices and women’s status and agency. 
Regardless of the effect categories, there is a meaningful share of results for which there is not 
enough evidence of effects; therefore, positive effects are probable, but they have to be further 
confirmed.  
The Paper Two and Three explore member characteristics and price effects of cooperatives and 
Investor-Oriented Firms in the Argentinean non-varietal wine and dairy sector, respectively. 
Farmers selling to cooperatives receive lower prices than farmers selling to Investor-Oriented 
Firms in the studied cases. Since cooperative members differ from other farmers in terms of 
size, assets and the cost of accessing the market, it can be concluded that cooperatives deal with 
more disadvantaged farmers at the expense of lower prices. Nevertheless, cooperatives offer 
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other benefits such as political representation and unlimited delivery rights, which may 
compensate farmers for lower prices.  
The Paper Four analyses the mechanisms that contribute towards inclusion of disadvantaged 
households in Zambian maize cooperatives. Inclusion develops in cooperatives that show 
commitment and either provide financial services to vulnerable members, promote social 
identities or compensate disadvantaged members for not being able to access subsidised inputs.  
The overall results show that cooperatives generally work with the most disadvantaged farmers. 
They create multiple positive effects for their members. However, there is also a meaningful 
share of cases with a lack of sufficient evidence of effects. Therefore, governments and donors 
should remain optimistic but cautious about the suitability and efficacy of cooperatives in all 
cases. Since there can be a publication bias, negative effects, though rarely reported, cannot be 
ruled out.  
Based on my empirical research, I suggest that, first, cooperatives, as organisations with 
multiple functions and effects, should be assessed according to that complexity and variety and 
not by analysing each effect isolated. Second, cooperatives should be assessed in the light of 
the particularities of their farmer members, meaning that their effects may reflect farmer needs 
or characteristics and not organisational features per se.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem statement  
Historically, agricultural cooperatives have been born out of adverse economic circumstances 
(Sargent, 1982) and various schools of thought explain their existence as a means for achieving 
economic growth and development. From a neoclassical perspective, cooperatives may help to 
counter the negative effects of market failure (Cook, 1995). They may also compensate for 
missing market institutions or limited competition by preventing opportunism and holdup 
situations (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999). In imbalanced markets, they may enable farmers to pool 
produce and exercise countervailing power (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002; Sykuta and Cook, 
2001) and, thereby, improve producer prices and overall market efficiency (Cotterill, 1987; 
Nourse, 1945)  
Apart from overcoming market failure, studies from new institutional economics highlight how 
cooperatives may help to reduce transaction costs related to gathering and processing 
information needed for carrying out transactions, reaching decisions, signing contracts and 
enforcing them (Staatz, 1987). Finally, during times of rapid structural change, cooperatives 
may become buyers of last resort for otherwise disconnected small- and medium-scale farmers 
and can, thus, be understood as a means for trying to insure farmers against the hardships of 
structural change (Nilsson et al., 2016). 
In addition, there are socio-political reasons for the existence of cooperatives. From a policy 
perspective, the dispersion and remoteness of farmers may exclude them from obtaining proper 
political representation (Borda-Rodriguez et al., 2016; Staatz, 1987; World Bank, 2008) or 
benefitting from instruments of public policy, such as farm credit subsidies and development 
projects. Therefore, cooperatives can fulfil the function of better linking farmers to political 
spheres (Landini et al., 2017). Lastly, cooperatives may also support channelling of the social 
needs of farmers for participation, integration and community development, especially in 
otherwise marginalised rural areas (Centner, 1988; Christy, 1987).  
Despite these relatively commonly held views, the literature also provides a variety of 
arguments seeking to explain why cooperatives can be less economically efficient than Investor-
Oriented Firms (IOFs). Property rights and agency theory proponents indicate that the vaguely 
defined property rights of members in the realm of the cooperative may lead to conflicts over 
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residual claims and decision control, leading to economic inefficiencies (Nilsson, 2001). 
Moreover, cooperatives can follow multiple and even quite different objectives – from self-help 
and grassroots participation to economies of scale and social control over resources (Lele, 1981) 
– and be prone to rent-seeking behaviour (Banerjee et al., 2001), which may also be detrimental 
to their economic efficiency. From a governance perspective, cooperatives can experience 
human capital problems, since the democratic model underlying cooperative decision making 
assures that any members can be elected for the board, even though they may not bring along 
the necessary expertise for the position (Cornforth, 2004).  
In developing and transition countries, governmental interference has affected cooperative 
performance. Since the 1950s, most developing-country governments have conceived of and 
supported the cooperative as a tool for delivering economic growth (Vicari, 2014) and 
development (Coque Martínez, 2002) as well as a means for creating political support in rural 
areas and attenuating potential social unrest or revolutionary aspirations (Mora, 2012). 
Cooperatives have, consequently, been subject to political and ideological influence. For 
instance, in socialist countries, cooperatives became instruments seeking to establish a socialist, 
collectivised and centralised mode of agricultural production (Holmén, 1990). As extensions of 
the state, cooperatives were not necessarily aimed at improving their members’ collective 
interests (Okem and Stanton, 2016). Consequently, many of them ended up becoming corrupt 
and inefficient.  
Beside such political reasons, lack of infrastructure, and physical and human capital as well as 
elite capture may impede the progress of cooperatives (Braverman et al., 1991). Entrenched 
leadership dominated by a few members – generally the better-off or community leaders – 
during long periods of time may orient cooperative benefit streams towards those few members 
and lead to absence of vigorous monitoring of their actions (Tendler, 1983). 
Although in 2014 there were more than one million agricultural cooperatives worldwide, with 
around 120 million beneficiaries (United Nations, 2014a), cooperative effects on economic 
growth and development remains contested. From an empirical perspective, many of the 
positively evaluated examples are located in developed countries. Even though cooperative data 
at the global level is scarce, the 2014 Global Census of Cooperatives did manage to collect data 
from 145 countries (United Nations, 2014a). Three ratios were used for that census to assess 
the vitality of the cooperative sector at the country level: cooperative membership penetration 
relative to the population, cooperative employment relative to the population and annual gross 
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revenue or turnover of all cooperatives relative to the respective country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Yet only developed countries made up each ratio’s top-ten ranking (United 
Nations, 2014b). As Wanyama et al. (2009) suggest for Africa, for developing countries the list 
of unsuccessful examples may, in the best-case scenario, be just as long as the list of successful 
ones.  
In addition, economic globalisation presents new challenges to cooperative performance. 
Economic globalisation, as a process that fosters regional economic integration, exposes the 
national productive structure to foreign competition due to the flexibility and mobility of capital 
(Dicken, 2011). In order to remain competitive, cooperatives may increase their size in domestic 
or international markets to an extent that may not be compatible with their principles and values, 
leading, for instance, to a decrease in member involvement in decision making (Bretos and 
Marcuello, 2017).  
Economic globalisation also transforms agricultural markets. Sexton (2013) highlights three 
distinctive characteristics of modern agricultural markets. First, from a supply perspective, 
there is an increasing concentration in the number of firms in each step of the value chain: input 
provision (Fuglie et al., 2011), manufacturing or processing (Ollinger et al., 2005) and retailing 
(McCorriston, 2002). Second, from a demand perspective, consumers, due to increasing 
disposable income for food consumption and health concerns, have higher expectations 
regarding product quality and differentiation (Saitone and Sexton, 2010). Third, to fulfil 
consumer expectations and avoid uncertainties associated with agricultural production, such as 
unstable production volumes, processors and farmers are increasingly using agricultural 
contracts (Goodhue, 2011). Since most agricultural marketing cooperatives provide members 
unrestricted delivery rights in terms of quantity and quality, they can have difficulties in meeting 
downstream buyer needs and, therefore, performing in such modern agricultural markets (Mérel 
et al., 2009).  
The effects of economic globalisation and its associated updating of agricultural markets, 
though more evident in developed countries, are increasingly present in developing countries 
in which liberalisation processes have triggered structural changes. Since the 1980s, many 
developing countries have undergone processes of structural adjustment that have deregulated 
and liberalised agricultural markets by reducing state intervention or support such as subsidies, 
commercialisation boards and external trade restrictions. As a consequence, cooperatives that 
were inefficient or highly dependent on state intervention collapsed (Vicari, 2014). Since the 
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1990s, within a context of increasing scale of production and competition among processors, 
and introduction of new technologies, cooperatives have been struggling to implement bottom-
up models, hoping to enhance farmer participation and commitment to overcome their negative 
past experiences with cooperatives.  
Since this globalised and changing context can be particularly hard for small farmers, in recent 
decades a renewed interest in promoting cooperatives for rural development has arisen among 
governments and donors. Due to their size, small farmers are disadvantaged compared to larger 
farmers in terms of their ability to reach economies of scale, exercise bargaining power, and 
gain access to capital, markets, information and infrastructure (Trebbin and Hassler, 2012). 
Governments have enacted new cooperative laws to confirm their status as independent, 
autonomous, and member-owned businesses (Birchall, 2003). They are also supportive of 
cooperatives as core elements of national policy agendas for poverty reduction and more 
inclusive rural development (Francesconi and Heerink, 2011). Donors see cooperatives as 
potential partners when other players, such as public services providers, are absent (Mercoiret 
et al., 2001). Meanwhile, some international organisations, such as the United Nations (2013), 
claim that cooperatives promote the fullest possible participation in economic and social 
development for all people.  
Although cooperatives are expected to facilitate market participation for small farmers, increase 
farm incomes, enhance crop productivity and lower production costs (Ma and Abdulai, 2017), 
there is still no clear and conclusive evidence of what smallholders actually achieve by 
participating in them (Fałkowski and Ciaian, 2016; Francesconi and Wouterse, 2015). Some 
studies claim that the positive effects of cooperatives may be unequally distributed among 
members of different farm sizes (Grashuis and Su, 2019). Bernard and Spielman (2009) suggest 
that cooperative coordination costs (financial contributions, time for meetings, etc) maybe be 
higher than the benefits gained from participation for poor farmers, therefore resulting in their 
de facto exclusion. According to Münkner (2012), the real poor – meaning those living in 
absolute poverty, having nothing to pool and depending on external aid to survive – lack 
cooperative capacity; therefore, there is little they can achieve by joining a self-help 
organisation.   
To sum up, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, whether cooperatives provide their 
members with benefits remains open to debate. Under the present conditions of economic 
globalisation and modern agricultural markets, which are simultaneously imposing new 
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challenges on cooperatives as well as renewed interest in promoting them as a development 
tool, better understanding and analysis of cooperative effects in developing contexts is needed.  
1.2 Research purpose and scope 
The overarching research objective of this thesis is to explain and assess the effects agricultural 
cooperatives have on their members in developing contexts. The two guiding questions pursued 
here are:  
1. What are the socio-economic characteristics of farmers who participate in cooperatives?  
2. What are the specific effects of agricultural cooperatives on their farmer members?  
The first question aims to provide a basis for examining whether the poorer or more 
disadvantaged farmers actually participate in cooperatives, whereas the second question 
emphasises the need to analyse what kinds of benefits cooperatives provide their members. 
Concerning the particular effects to be analysed in my own empirical research, in Argentina and 
Zambia, the thesis addresses has two sub questions which follow on from the guiding questions:  
2.1. From an economic perspective, do cooperatives affect prices received by members and 
how can such effects be explained?  
2.2. From a governance perspective, do cooperatives seek to foster inclusion of 
disadvantaged farmers and, when they do so, what kinds of mechanisms do they 
employ?  
The present thesis seeks to make three primary contributions. First, by applying novel and 
rigorous methods that, to the best of my knowledge, have not yet been used in the cooperative 
research field, this thesis contributes towards the more systematic study of cooperative effects. 
Second, whereas most studies tend to discuss the questions regarding member characteristics 
and cooperative effects separately, by discussing them simultaneously, this thesis adds to the 
literature by stressing the particular roles cooperatives may play for particular groups of 
farmers. Third, this thesis makes available policy-relevant knowledge regarding to what extent 
and by what means agricultural cooperatives can support development processes.  
This thesis is composed by a systematic literature review of cooperative effects and empirical 
research in two developing countries. Each case offers a different contextual background and 
perspective for the analysis of cooperative effects in two particular domains: prices received by 
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farmers in Argentina (first sub question) and inclusion in cooperatives of disadvantaged farmers 
in Zambia (second sub question).  
Regarding the differences between these contexts, whereas Argentina represents a case of 
absence of governmental support for cooperatives, the Zambian government has relied on 
cooperatives as a development tool. In Argentina, a structural change and liberalisation process 
turned markets highly competitive, exacerbated differences in size, and technology among 
farmers, leading to the absence of specific governmental support for cooperatives. Meanwhile, 
in Zambia, although reforms introduced in the early 1990s ended governmental cooperative 
support, since 2002/03 cooperatives have been highlighted as a policy tool for development in 
the implementation of a large-scale input subsidy program. These two remarkably contrasting 
cases allow me to analyse and discuss the effects of cooperatives in different institutional 
contexts. The following paragraphs outline how these empirical cases fit into the research 
program pursued in this thesis. 
First, in the Argentinean case, the agricultural cooperative system has a long tradition, 
beginning with European immigrants in 1904 (Ressel and Silva, 2008). The system experienced 
periods of expansion and contraction through much of the 20th century (Coque Martínez, 2002) 
and, by 1988, around 25% of Argentinean farmers were members of cooperatives (Vargas 
Sánchez, 1997). However, in 1990, the Argentinean government set in motion a profound 
economic liberalisation process, which included deregulating and opening markets (Gutman et 
al., 2003). The resulting and still-existing context has become extremely challenging for 
cooperatives, since they have to perform in highly concentrated markets, compete with 
international firms and constantly adapt themselves to international markets. Since agriculture 
is the main or only economic activity for most farmers, the prices they get for their produce are 
crucial for their incomes and survival as farmers. 
Relevant here is that the literature is not conclusive regarding the effects of cooperatives on 
prices. On the one hand, the neoclassical literature argues that, because of their different 
objective function (which is typically assumed to be some version of a service at cost or 
breaking even), cooperatives operate as a “competitive yardstick” and provide better prices in 
oligopsonistic environments (Cotterill, 1987; Nourse, 1945). On the other hand, the new 
institutional economics literature stresses that property rights and governance/management 
problems may impede the ability of cooperatives to operate efficiently and, consequently, pay 
competitive prices (Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Cook, 1995; Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002; 
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Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001; Staatz, 1987; Vitaliano, 1983). Therefore, cooperative effects 
on prices remains an interesting topic.  
Second, in the Zambian case, the earliest cooperative experience derives from 1914, when 
European settlers formed the first agricultural marketing cooperative there. After achieving 
independence from Great Britain in 1964, Zambia’s first elected government conceived and 
supported cooperatives as an economic tool for development, and as a means to implement 
public policies. Yet in 1991, similar to the Argentinean case, the economy was liberalised and, 
consequently, cooperative development once sponsored and controlled by the government was 
ended, leading to the collapse of many cooperatives (Lolojh, 2009). Since the agricultural 
season of 2002/03, however, Zambia has been executing a large-scale input subsidy program, 
mainly for small but viable maize farmers (cultivating between 0.5 and 5 hectares), which is 
implemented through cooperatives and other farmer groups (Mason et al., 2013). Whereas other 
sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Nigeria and Kenya organise access to subsidised inputs 
via voucher systems (Jayne and Rashid, 2013), Zambia relies on cooperatives to perform this 
function.  
In many developing countries, cooperatives face a conflict between efficiency and equity. They 
are subject to norms and values of social inclusion, and solidarity which may clash with the 
economic need of dealing with more business-oriented or better-performing members to survive 
(Lutz and Tadesse, 2017; World Bank, 2008). Therefore, the degree to which cooperatives can 
be inclusive of disadvantaged farmers – without jeopardising their own survival – remains 
crucial for governments or donors who rely on cooperatives to implement development policies 
or projects.  
1.3 A framework for analysing cooperative effects  
A conceptual framework – as an analytical device that offers a logical structure of connected 
concepts to display the approach of a research study (Grant and Osanloo, 2014) – articulates a 
structure assumed to best explain the processes involved in phenomena under investigation 
(Camp, 2001). With this in mind, to analyse cooperative effects, in the following I first 
conceptualise cooperatives, then refer to the factors that may influence their performance and, 
lastly, characterise the functions and effects they may have.   
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In 1844, the English Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers founded a consumer cooperative 
and, with its Principles, set out ideals for the operation of cooperatives. Since then, various 
definitions of cooperatives and schools of cooperative thought have developed (Laidlaw, 1974), 
with different combinations of normative, ideological, theoretical or pragmatic perspectives. In 
1966, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), an independent non-governmental 
organisation that brings together, represents and serves cooperatives all over the world, 
proposed a renewed version of the Rochdale Principles. In 1995, the ICA established one of the 
most widely agreed upon definitions of a cooperative as “an autonomous association of persons 
united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.” (International Cooperative 
Alliance, 1995, no page). The ICA poses this definition as a minimal guideline. In other words, 
it set the minimum requirements for an organisation to be considered a cooperative. 
Nevertheless, there are deviations or different interpretations of this definition. For instance, as 
mentioned above, the democratic control of cooperatives in developing countries has been 
undermined or even suppressed many times due to state intervention, influence of donor 
agendas, or elite capture. Therefore, I agree with Münkner (2012) that the ICA definition can 
best be seen as an ideal towards which cooperative organisations should orient themselves. 
In the agricultural field, Barton (1989) proposed three principles that should characterise all agricultural 
cooperatives:  
• The user-owner principle: the people who own and finance the cooperative are those 
that use it as well;  
• The user-control principle: the cooperative is controlled by those who use it; and  
• The user-benefits principle: benefits of the cooperative are distributed to its users on the 
basis of their use.  
Cooperative principles can also be understood as a set of rules that provide guidance on what 
members and cooperative organisations are to do for each other (Nilsson, 1996). This would 
represent a more pragmatic way of discerning what a cooperative is from what a cooperative is 
not than the ICA definition.  
Cooperatives do not operate in a vacuum, so they have to be explicitly oriented towards a wider 
context that is likely to affect them (Holmén, 1990). An overarching factor that influence 
cooperative roles and effects is the institutional environment, which includes the social, cultural, 
political and legal contexts in which cooperatives are embedded (Bijman, 2012). For instance, 
cooperative legislation, market regulation, and competition policies together with incentive 
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policies and technical assistance provision may create very different contexts for cooperatives 
in different countries (Sexton and Iskow (1992) as cited in Brusselaers et al., 2012). The 
institutional environment in turn affects two other important factors for cooperative 
performance: markets and consequent industry structure, and internal cooperative governance. 
Cooperatives operating in markets characterised by large transaction costs may have better 
chances of reaping benefits for their members by decreasing such costs. For instance, 
transaction costs in non-perishable staple food sectors may be lower than in higher-value 
perishable food sectors (Alene et al., 2008). Therefore, cooperatives may be more likely to be 
found in sectors like horticulture than in maize (Hellin et al., 2009). Moreover, shorter supplies 
chains, meaning for products that are mostly locally sold, may offer fewer potential benefits of 
integration than larger supplies chain focusing on international markets, in which cooperatives 
can decrease the higher transaction costs to comply with food standards (Verhofstadt and 
Maertens, 2014).  
Industry structure can be characterised by levels of industry rivalry, supplier and buyer power, 
and threats of entry and substitution (Porter, 1979). Rivalry here refers to the number of firms 
competing within a sector. If there is only a small number of firms buying produce in a particular 
area, they may exercise market power over farmers and pay them unfair prices, in which case 
a cooperative may pay better prices, since its objective is not usually to maximise profits 
(Nourse, 1945). In general terms, any situation in which there is supplier- or buyer-side market 
power, unfavourable conditions may be imposed on farmers, potentially spurring the creation 
of a cooperative. Threats of entry of competitors or product substitution may condition the 
strategies of cooperatives regarding prices, advertisement, investment and quality of produce 
traded, among other potential issues.  
Governance defines the system of authority, direction and control within and outside the firm, 
which seeks to ensure that management works in the best interests of its owners and enables 
them to obtain the greatest possible benefits from their contributions or investments (Hanisch 
and Rommel, 2012). For cooperatives, there is no external control (for instance through stock 
markets); therefore, their internal governance refers to their organisational structure, decision-
making processes adopted, roles of governing bodies, and allocation of control rights to 
members and professional management (Bijman, 2012). A crucial factor influencing 
cooperative governance relates to the membership. A cooperative with a larger and 
heterogeneous membership may have higher transaction costs in the process of collective 
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decision making because members may try to form coalitions to shift benefits in their direction 
(Hansmann, 1988). On the other hand, this cooperative may reach economies of scale more 
easily than a cooperative with fewer members.  
In sum, institutional environments, market and industry structures, and internal governance 
influence cooperative performance. Understanding cooperatives as self-help organisations that 
farmers join to solve their pressing problems, cooperative functions can be described as the 
tasks they perform to enable their members to solve such problems (Münkner, 1995). Following 
Cropp and Ingalsbe (1989) as cited in Krivokapic-Skoko (2002), cooperatives can be 
categorised according to their primary functions into production cooperatives (common 
ownership, planning and production), marketing cooperatives (bargain for, process or 
manufacture and sell products), supply cooperatives (deal in farm production supplies and 
equipment) and service cooperatives (credit, insurance, technical assistance, etc.). To these, I 
add a transversal policy-advocacy function (Thorp et al., 2005) because, especially in 
developing contexts, during periods of strong government intervention in the economy, national 
or regional cooperatives can advocate for better farm prices, subsidies or other favourable 
interventions for their members. In more recent periods of less direct government intervention, 
cooperatives are being invited to represent farmer interests in the design of development 
strategies and even to participate in their implementation (Stockbridge et al., 2003). 
Consequently, this function should not be ignored.  
While functions refer to the activities that cooperatives undertake, effects refer to the resulting 
changes cooperatives bring about for their members. With the aim of providing a categorisation 
of effects for analytical purposes but not an exhaustive enumeration of all potential cooperative 
effects, and recognising that the boundaries of each category may be flexible, I propose that, 
from a member perspective, cooperatives can have economic effects, such as increases in yield 
and income; social effects, such as increases in social and human capital; political effects, such 
as building more favourable policy contexts; and environmental effects, such as the 
implementation of more sustainable production technologies. Figure 1 provides a graphic 
representation of the structural relationships between the categories explained above, 
constituting the conceptual framework I have used to understand and analyse agricultural 
cooperative effects on the wellbeing of their members. The next section explains how each 
research paper submitted as part of this thesis contributes to its overall objective.  
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Figure 1: Framework for analysing agricultural cooperative effects on members 
Source: own graphic, based on Bijman (2012) and Mazzarol et al. (2014) 
1.4 Contributions of the papers to the thesis and its organisation  
All the papers constituting the body of this thesis are intended to contribute towards reaching 
its overarching research objective – regarding the effects that cooperatives have on their 
members in developing contexts – and answering its two guiding questions, concerned with the 
characteristics of cooperative farmers and effects. Broadly speaking, Paper One presents a 
systematic literature review of cooperative effects at the member level. The Paper Two and 
Three analyse the price effects of cooperatives in the non-varietal wine and dairy sectors in 
Argentina, respectively, both of which are sectors with high value added and a functioning 
cooperative system (Obschatko et al., 2011). The Paper Four analyses inclusion mechanisms in 
maize cooperatives in Zambia, where maize is the main commercial and staple crop (Mason et 
al., 2013). Below, I frame the papers more precisely and specify their contributions towards 
answering my research questions. 
The Paper One presents a systematic literature review of cooperative effects on members. To 
the best of my knowledge, thus far, no systematic literature review of cooperative effects – in 
the sense of an appraisal and synthesis of primary research papers using a rigorous and clearly 
documented method regarding search strategy and selection of papers, with the aim of 
minimising bias in the results (Green et al., 2011) – has been conducted. My review analyses 
70 primary research articles that study cooperative effects in developing countries and have 
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been published in peer-review journals in English during the period 1997–2017. It provides a 
descriptive analysis of countries and sectors studies, along with the functions of cooperatives 
and sources of support. Then, it analyses member versus non-member characteristics. Finally, 
after having applied an ad-hoc methodology to categorise articles according to their scientific 
rigour, it analyses cooperative effects found in articles considered most rigorous. By studying 
if there are differences in the characteristics between members and non-members, and what 
kinds of cooperative effects good-quality scientific articles have found, the paper contributes 
towards answering both of my guiding questions.  
The Paper Two specifically analyses cooperatives in the Argentinean non-varietal wine sector. 
In 2013, Argentina was the eighth largest grape-producing country in the world, the fifth largest 
wine producer and the ninth largest wine exporter (International Organisation of Vine and Wine, 
2015). The province of Mendoza, which accounts for 66% of all of Argentina’s vineyards and 
for 76% of its national wine production, is characterised by the coexistence of small-scale 
vineyards (minifundios) and large-scale vineyards. From the 1950s until the mid-1970s, the 
state supported the organisation of wine cooperatives (Fabre, 2005; Richard-Jorba, 2008). In 
1990, the state-owned winery Bodegas y Viñedos Giol, known as the largest winery worldwide, 
was privatised and taken over by the Argentinean Federation of Wine Making Cooperatives 
(FeCoVitA). In 2010, cooperatives processed 20% of the province’s grape production through 
41 cooperatives and, overall, grape producers linked to the cooperative system represented 33% 
of the total grape producers in the province.  
The Paper Two initially presents and discusses the theoretical and empirical literature regarding 
cooperative effects on prices at the farmer level and market structure. Then, it analyses 5,042 
records of the sale of bulk non-varietal wine, using a multi-level regression model to explain 
prices according to delivery decision (cooperative or not) and department, controlling for 
factors such as farm structure and wine colour.1 It also analyses and discusses the effects of 
cooperatives as policy advocates. The paper contributes towards answering my first sub 
question by analysing whether cooperatives pay higher or lower prices than IOFs and if they 
induce higher prices in markets where they have greater market strength. It also contributes 
towards answering the guiding question related to member characteristics, by considering 
whether there are differences in farmer size corresponding to their delivery decisions and 
department. 
 
1 Departments here refer to political subdivisions within a province.  
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The Paper Three studies the dairy-processing sector in Argentina. In 2015, the country produced 
more than 11,000 million litres of milk, and it was the third largest exporter of whole-milk 
powder in the world (Ministry of Treasury and Public Finances, 2016). As in most other milk-
producing countries, beginning in 1930, Argentina developed a strong cooperative system that 
introduced modern processing technologies and spread implementation of new agricultural 
practices among farmers. However, since the structural reforms in the 1990s, the cooperative 
system has been struggling to adapt to the changing scenarios and, as a result, between 1996 
and 2014, the number of farmers delivering their milk to cooperatives sharply decreased – from 
8,000 to 1,400 – meaning in practice that many farmers left milk production altogether, with 
some who continued milk production leaving their cooperatives, while others retained 
membership (Ministry of Agroindustry, 2014). 
Given this context, the Paper Three aims to understand the role of Argentinean dairy processing 
cooperatives and their effects on farmers by exploring why some of them stayed with their 
cooperatives, while others decided to leave. First, a data set with 917 records at farmer level is 
used to estimate a probit model regarding members and non-members characteristics. A 
complementary data set, with 46,400 monthly records of milk sales, enables detailed analysis 
of the size and heterogeneity of farmers with reference to their delivery decisions. Both analyses 
contribute towards answering the guiding question concerned with cooperative member 
characteristics. Second, a data set with 9,720 monthly records of milk sales between farmers 
and firms is used to estimate a multilevel regression model to analyse the determinants of milk 
prices at the farmgate level and calculate price volatility according to different kinds of buyers. 
Both of these last analyses contribute towards answering the first sub question concerning 
cooperative price effects. 
Both the Paper Two and Three are based on unique large data sets of prices paid to farmers by 
cooperatives and IOFs at the transaction level for a range of agricultural years and geographical 
regions, which would not generally be easy to access or collect on such a scale in other contexts. 
Consequently, both papers are able to perform diverse analyses that go beyond simple price 
differentials among cooperatives and IOFs. The wine-sector paper elaborates on the different 
potential directions cooperative effects can have on prices, according to regions and market 
structures, whereas the dairy paper includes an assessment of price volatility according to kinds 
of buyer.  
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The Paper Four focuses on the maize sector in Zambia, where the Farmer Input Support 
Programme (FISP) relies on cooperatives to organise farmer access to subsidised inputs. This 
is a rationed program, meaning that subsidies are insufficient to fully serve all eligible farmers. 
Thus, whether cooperatives are inclusive of the most disadvantaged farmers is crucial for them 
being able to access FISP benefits. Consequently, this paper presents, discusses and 
operationalises the concept of inclusion in cooperatives, which has remained difficult to grasp 
in the development literature. Moreover, thus far, the majority of empirical studies on this issue 
have conceptualised inclusion in the realm of market access or value chains and, only to a lesser 
extent, within the context of public policies (Lutz and Tadesse, 2017; Markelova and Mwangi, 
2010).  
The Paper Four uses primary data collected in 2015 from 15 cooperatives and applies the 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method to identify all necessary and/or sufficient 
factors, and their combinations that can lead to inclusion of female widows. Based on 
discussions with government representatives and members of selected organisations, for the 
purposes of this study, female widows are considered to be the most disadvantaged group of 
Zambian maize farmers. Based on the literature and case knowledge, four factors that may 
foster inclusion are conceptualised and operationalised: participation cost, organisational 
commitment, presence of wealthier farmers and pro-poor distribution of benefits. This paper 
addressed my second sub question by analysing which cooperatives are more inclusive and the 
mechanisms for inclusion they implement. It also contributes towards answering the guiding 
question regarding member characteristics by analysing whether disadvantaged farmers tend to 
become members of cooperatives or not. 
Each of the papers presented here emphasises different aspects of the conceptual framework 
articulated in Figure 1. The Paper One, the systematic literature review, presents the cooperative 
effects that have been found in research articles that comply with specific criteria for selection 
and scientific rigour. This paper conducts its analysis across countries and sectors; therefore, 
individual factors influencing cooperative performance (institutional environment, market and 
industry structure, and internal governance) are not considered. By contrast, the empirical 
papers, two through four, focus on specific countries, sectors and effects; therefore, it is 
important within each of them to consider the particular factors influencing cooperative effects. 
For instance, they all examine how structural adjustment programs have changed the given 
institutional environments for cooperatives. However, the second and third papers take a more 
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economics-oriented perspective and, thus, analyse in detail the respective industries and market 
structures. Meanwhile, the fourth paper emphasises the internal governance dimension of 
cooperatives, since the strategies that they apply to foster inclusion are part of their forms of 
organisational structure and management.  
Following the main body of this thesis, comprised of the four papers described above, the final 
chapter summarises its main results and contributions. Then, policy implications and 
recommendations are suggested. Lastly, limitations and areas for further research are proposed. 
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Abstract 
Renewed interest among governments and donors in promoting agricultural cooperatives as 
tools for rural development has been complemented by an increase in empirical studies 
measuring their effects on farmer members. However, literature reviews of cooperative effects 
have been incomplete and, in some cases, subject to bias. Consequently, there is still no clear 
and conclusive evidence regarding what smallholders achieve by participating in them. 
Considering articles focused on developing countries published between 1997 and 2017, we 
conduct a systematic literature review of cooperative effects on their members, finding that 
cooperatives perform a wide variety of functions in diverse sectors. The evidence regarding 
claims that better-off farmers are more likely to be cooperative members than poorer farmers 
remains inconclusive, though, in terms of size, cooperative members with very small farms 
tend to be the norm. Concerning cooperative effects, the most conclusive evidence is associated 
with the categories access to and use of inputs, income, prices, and women’s status and agency, 
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which are studied by a significant number of articles and present the greatest shares of positive 
effects.  
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives; Smallholder farmers; Developing countries 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, governments and donors have been showing a renewed interest in promoting 
cooperatives as drivers for rural development (Bretos and Marcuello, 2017; World Bank, 2008). 
Due to their size, small farmers are disadvantaged compared to larger farmers in terms of their 
ability to reach economies of scale, exercise bargaining power, and access to capital, markets, 
information and infrastructure (Trebbin and Hassler, 2012). Cooperatives are expected to 
facilitate market participation of smallholder farmers, increase farm incomes, enhance 
productivity, and lower production costs (Ma and Abdulai, 2017). However, there is still no 
clear and conclusive evidence regarding what smallholders actually achieve by participating in 
them (Fałkowski and Ciaian, 2016; Francesconi and Wouterse, 2015).  
Despite a growing body of research investigating cooperative effects on their farmer members, 
efforts to review this literature have not been comprehensive. For instance, Tefera et al. (2017) 
focus on a particular country (Ethiopia), Kwapong and Hanisch (2013) focus only on poverty 
or van Herck (2014) on efficiency, and Grashuis and Su (2019) focus only on studies using 
quantitative methods. Other reviews do not specifically cover only cooperatives but, rather, a 
larger group of organisations (Berkhout et al., 2018; Gugerty et al., 2019). Moreover, most of 
these studies provide little explanation of the review methods applied; therefore, they may not 
be exhaustive of the literature or subject to different biases (Durach et al., 2017). 
The objective of the present article is to provide, to our best knowledge, the first systematic 
literature review of the effects of cooperatives on their members by addressing two questions: 
(1) what are the socio-economic characteristics of farmers who participate in cooperatives? and 
(2) what are the specific effects of agricultural cooperatives on their farmer members? The first 
question aims to provide a basis for examining whether the poorer or more disadvantaged 
farmers actually participate in cooperatives, whereas the second question emphasises the need 
to analyse what kinds of benefits cooperatives provide their members. 
Our review seeks to contribute to the literature by providing a comprehensive summation and 
evaluation of 70 primary research articles studying the effects of cooperatives in developing 
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countries that have been published between 1997–2017 in peer-review journals in English. Our 
descriptive analysis is complemented by an assessment of the scientific rigour of the articles 
and synthesis of the cooperative effects they indicate by using the vote-counting procedure. 
Subsequently, we highlight important areas for future research and provide key information for 
policymakers regarding the state of art of knowledge about cooperative effects.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: First, section 2.2 presents a framework to 
analyse cooperative effects. Section 2.3 then describes the systematic review process, 
highlighting the inclusion criteria for selecting studies and the procedure for critical appraisal 
of their scientific rigour. Section 2.4 presents our results and, finally, section 2.5 contains the 
discussion and conclusions. 
2.2 A framework for analysing cooperative effects  
Cooperatives as user-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited organisations (Barton, 1989), 
do not operate in a vacuum, so they have to be explicitly oriented towards a wider context that 
is likely to affect them (Holmén, 1990). An overarching factor that influence cooperative roles 
and effects is the institutional environment, which includes the social, cultural, political and 
legal contexts in which cooperatives are embedded (Bijman, 2012). For instance, cooperative 
legislation, market regulation, and competition policies together with incentive policies and 
technical assistance provision may create very different contexts for cooperatives in different 
countries (Sexton and Iskow 1992 as cited in Brusselaers et al., 2012). The institutional 
environment in turn affects two other important factors for cooperative performance: markets 
and consequent industry structure and internal cooperative governance. 
Cooperatives operating in markets characterised by large transaction costs may have better 
chances of reaping benefits for their members by decreasing such costs. For instance, 
transaction costs in non-perishable staple food sectors may be lower than in higher-value 
perishable food sectors (Alene et al., 2008). Therefore, cooperatives may be more likely to be 
found in sectors like horticulture than in maize (Hellin et al., 2009). Moreover, shorter supplies 
chains, meaning for products that are mostly locally sold, may offer fewer potential benefits of 
integration than larger supplies chain focusing on international markets, in which cooperatives 
can decrease the higher transaction costs to comply with food standards (Verhofstadt and 
Maertens, 2014).  
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Industry structure can be characterised by levels of industry rivalry, supplier and buyer power, 
and threats of entry and substitution (Porter, 1979). Rivalry here refers to the number of firms 
competing within a sector. If there is only a small number of firms buying produce in a 
particular area, they may exercise market power over farmers and pay them unfair prices, in 
which case a cooperative may pay better prices, since its objective is not usually to maximise 
profits (Nourse, 1945). In general terms, any situation in which there is supplier- or buyer-side 
market power, unfavourable conditions may be imposed on farmers, potentially spurring the 
creation of a cooperative. Threats of entry of competitors or product substitution may condition 
the strategies of cooperatives regarding prices, advertisement, investment and quality of 
produce traded, among other potential issues.  
Governance defines the system of authority direction and control within and outside the firm, 
which seeks to ensure that management works in the best interests of its owners and enables 
them to obtain the greatest possible benefits from their contributions or investments (Hanisch 
and Rommel, 2012). For cooperatives, there is no external control (for instance through stock 
markets); therefore, their internal governance refers to their organisational structure, decision-
making processes adopted, roles of governing bodies, and allocation of control rights to 
members and professional management (Bijman, 2012). A crucial factor influencing 
cooperative governance relates to the membership. A cooperative with a larger and more 
heterogeneous membership may have higher transaction costs in the process of collective 
decision making because members may try to form coalitions to shift benefits in their direction 
(Hansmann, 1988). On the other hand, this cooperative may reach economies of scale more 
easily than a cooperative with fewer members.  
In sum, institutional environments, markets and industry structures, and internal governance 
influence cooperative performance. Understanding cooperatives as self-help organisations that 
farmers join to solve their pressing problems, cooperative functions can be described as the 
tasks they perform to enable their members to solve such problems (Münkner, 1995). 
Following Cropp and Ingalsbe (1989), as cited in Krivokapic-Skoko (2002), cooperatives can 
be categorised according to their primary functions into production cooperatives (common 
ownership, planning and production), marketing cooperatives (bargain for, process or 
manufacture and sell products), supply cooperatives (deal in farm production supplies and 
equipment) and service cooperatives (credit, insurance, technical assistance, etc.). To these, I 
add a transversal policy-advocacy function (Thorp et al., 2005) because, especially in 
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developing contexts, during periods of strong government intervention in the economy, 
national or regional cooperatives can advocate for better farm prices, subsidies or other 
favourable interventions for their members. In more recent periods of less direct government 
intervention, cooperatives are being invited to represent farmer interests in the design of 
development strategies and even to participate in their implementation (Stockbridge et al., 
2003). Consequently, this function should not be ignored.  
While functions refer to the activities that cooperatives undertake, effects refer to the resulting 
changes cooperatives bring about for their members. With the aim of providing a categorisation 
of effects for analytical purposes but not an exhaustive enumeration of all potential cooperative 
effects, and recognising that the boundaries of each category may be flexible, I propose that, 
from a member perspective, cooperatives can have economic effects, such as increases in yield 
and income; social effects, such as increases in social and human capital; political effects, such 
as building more favourable policy contexts; and environmental effects, such as the 
implementation of more sustainable production technologies. Figure 2 provides the conceptual 
framework to explain and assess cooperative effects.  
 
Figure 2: Framework for analysing agricultural cooperative effects on members 
Source: own graphic, based on Bijman (2012) and Mazzarol et al. (2014) 
2.3 Method 
Most literature reviews are based on expert criteria and knowledge (Oxman, 1993). However, 
due to the increasing amount of published research today, the reviews of that research may not 
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always properly reflect the actual diversity and breadth of the phenomena under study. 
Moreover, each step of creating a review may be prone to biases (Durach et al., 2017). To cite 
one common example, articles retrieved for a review based on inadequate or incomplete search 
strategies can lead to sampling bias. With the aim of minimising such biases, a systematic 
literature review is an appraisal and synthesis of primary research articles using rigorous, and 
clearly documented methods for the search strategy, selection and analysis of articles (Higgins 
and Green, 2011; Waddington et al., 2012). The steps taken for our own search and analysis 
process for this review are summarised in Figure 3 and then explained in detail in subsequent 
sections. 
 
Figure 3: Flow diagram of article search and analysis process for the review 
Source: own graphic 
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2.3.1 Identification and screening  
Initially, we identified 6,719 articles and then performed a two-stage sequential screening 
process. The identification was conducted using 10 databases: Agecon, British Library, De 
Gruyter, Jstor, Oxford Academics, Sciencedirect, Springer, Taylor and Francis Online, and 
Wiley, which were split among the three authors of this article. 
Because the present study aims to provide an overview of all available evidence, we did not 
limit our search strategy to specific effects or dimensions. Rather, our search algorithm 
included combinations and permutations of keywords (‘farmer organisation’, ‘agricultural 
cooperative’, ‘farmer group’, ‘producer organisation’, ‘producer group’, ‘association’). Where 
possible, Boolean operators (‘and’, ‘or’), wild cards (?) and truncation (*) operators were used. 
Additional keywords (‘impact’, ‘effect’) were introduced if the initial search rendered more 
than 300 results.  
In the first stage of the screening process, the researchers screened the titles and abstracts of 
the identified articles, seeking empirical articles that fulfilled the following inclusion criteria:  
• They analysed the effects of cooperatives on members and their production systems 
(excluding cooperatives operating in fishery or collected non-timber forest product 
sectors); 
• They were published between 1997 and 2017, in English and by a peer-reviewed journal, 
as indexed in SCImago Journal and Country Rank (2016) or in a journal specialised in 
the topic, such as Journal of Rural Cooperation or Journal of Cooperative Studies; and  
• They were framed within one or more countries categorised as ‘developing’, according 
to the United Nations (2018) country classification table. 
Where possible, search filters were modified to reflect our inclusion criteria. See Appendix 1 
for details of the search parameters and algorithms.   
In the second stage of the screening process, potentially relevant articles were retained for 
assessment, after duplicate articles and those not meeting the inclusion criteria were excluded, 
amounting to 6,575 articles. Since not all the inclusion criteria could always be observed in the 
titles and abstracts, the remaining 144 articles were reassessed using a peer-review screening 
process via full text to confirm that they met the criteria. From this step on, the online software 
DistillerSR was used to manage articles and their content.  
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2.3.2 Refinement 
We then used the following supplementary inclusion criteria and the full-text information of 
the remaining articles to refine our selection process: 
• The main research objective of the articles was the agricultural cooperatives. 
Quantitative articles that merely considered membership in cooperatives as an 
explanatory variable in regression analyses were excluded; and 
• The quantitative articles included counterfactuals in the analysis, meaning that they 
compared members and non-members or a sub group thereof (e.g., female members 
against female non-members) with each other. 
2.3.3 Critical appraisal  
Following the refinement step, we then performed a critical appraisal of the remaining 70 
studies, in order to identify those with high-enough levels of methodological rigour to qualify 
for our subsequent vote-counting procedure.2 A critical appraisal evaluates how consistently a 
study has been designed and executed (Ryan et al., 2013). With this goal in mind, we adapted 
a variety of framework-assessment indicators to the specificities of our research field.  
For articles using quantitative methods, we assessed their reliability and internal and external 
validity (Heale and Twycross, 2015; Waddington et al., 2012). We associated higher levels of 
rigour with, for example, studies controlling for selection bias (reliability), spelling out clear 
hypotheses and causal mechanisms for their findings (internal validity) and/or applying random 
sampling of cooperatives or members and non-members (external validity).  
For articles using qualitative methods, we considered the credibility, transferability and 
dependability of their research approaches (Hannes et al., 2011). Among other indicators of 
rigour, we checked whether articles used corroborating evidence to cross-validate their findings 
(dependability), clearly laid out their sampling strategy (credibility) or discussed the limitations 
of drawing wider inference from their results (transferability). See Appendix 1 for details of 
the rigour-assessment framework.  
 
2 Due to space limitations, the titles of these 70 articles are not included in the references but are available upon 
request. 
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2.3.4 Vote-counting procedure 
To synthesise member characteristics and cooperative effects from articles using quantitative 
methods, we used the vote-counting procedure, which classifies effects according to their 
statistical significance into significant positive, significant negative and non-significant 
(Bushman and Wang, 2009). We recorded the statistical significance of studies applying 
quantitative methods at the 0.1 level. For articles applying qualitative methods, effects were 
categorised into positive, negative or no effects, when they reported the absence of an effect.  
For analytical purposes, we combined continuous and dichotomic variables measuring similar 
membership characteristics or effects into categories and further classified effects into 
dimensions. For instance, the membership category education brings together variables such 
as number of years of education and literacy levels, whereas the effect category income, 
belonging to the dimension of economic effects on members, includes variables such as farm 
income, women’s income, share of agricultural income on total income, and the like. Lastly, 
we reversed the positive and negative votes to ensure consistency in the direction of effects; 
for instance, a negative effect from cooperatives on poverty levels was reversed to indicate a 
positive effect on poverty reduction (Lewis and Pattanayak, 2012). See Appendix 1 for an 
overview of our effect classification.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Cooperative characteristics 
The 70 articles that meet our inclusion criteria, though highly concentrated in terms of year of 
publication – with around 75% having been published between 2012 and 2017 – come from a 
wide variety of authors (N=163) and journals (N=42). Below we go into detail about which 
countries, sectors and cooperative functions, among others, were analysed in the articles.  
Regarding organisational form, cooperatives were the most frequently studied (58%), followed 
by farmer groups (15%) and associations (12.5%). Most of these organisations tend to orientate 
themselves according to cooperative principles but differ in terms of their legal status, with 
most countries recognising cooperatives as legal entities but not necessarily the other 
organisational forms. In some cases, the word cooperative has been associated with previous 
periods of socialist regimes; therefore, a different name is now used to create a sense of distance 
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from them. For the purposes of our review, we use the word cooperative to refer to all 
organisations studied by the articles discussed here. 
In terms of geographical location, the articles are highly concentrated. Whereas 4 articles focus 
on more than one country, the vast majority focuses on a single one. At the continent level, 
56% of the articles concentrate on Africa, 31% on Asia and the remaining 13% on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, although these articles are spread across 30 different 
countries, their concentration at the country level is considerable, with 7 countries accounting 
for 63% of all studies: Ethiopia (13), India (10), Rwanda (5), Kenya (4), Nigeria (4), Uganda 
(4) and Vietnam (4).  
Most cooperatives are focused on one agricultural sector. Among our articles, 56 explicitly 
mention the agricultural sector, with only 9 of these focusing on more than one agricultural 
sector. The remaining 14 articles do not provide any sector-specific information, with many of 
them analysing data from national agricultural surveys and reporting on agricultural 
cooperative effects. Even though the articles refer to 32 different agricultural sectors overall, 
concentration among a few sectors is high, with 64% of them concentrating on 6 sectors: coffee 
(14), maize (6), cassava (4), green beans (4), horticulture (4) and rice (4). Of these, only coffee 
and horticulture are generally considered high-value products. Thus, we do not see enough 
evidence to support claims in the literature of cooperatives generally focusing on high-value 
products.  
Most cooperatives combine multiple functions. Of the 52 (75%) articles describing cooperative 
functions, 46 mention marketing, and 34 of these combine it with other functions, with supply 
of inputs being the most cited (13), followed by access to technical assistance (11). Of the 6 
remaining cooperatives studied, most provide access to technical assistance and training (5), 
and some combine it with other services (2). Overall, it is important to highlight that only 6 of 
the cooperatives studied offer access to credit and another 6 to processing services. Considering 
that most farmers in developing countries lack financial capital and have limited possibilities 
for increasing their participation in value chains, cooperatives do not appear to be offering 
much in that direction, at least according to the results of the reviewed articles.  
A large number of cooperatives receive external support, mainly from governmental sources, 
sometimes from more than one organisation. Of the 45 (64%) studies mentioning external 
support, 10 of them indicate that it comes from multiple sources. Governments provide support 
32 
 
in 22 (50%) cases, followed by non-governmental organisations (11 cases) and international 
organisations (6 cases). In 16 cases, governments supported the establishment of cooperatives, 
while in 6 of them support is continued as access to subsidies for cooperatives (3) or subsidised 
inputs for their members (3). In 4 of the 6 remaining cases, governments provide access to 
training. Since none of the articles refer explicitly to the public advocacy function of 
cooperatives, but they do acknowledge governmental support, we assume that most of these 
organisations are still seen merely as policy tools rather than partners in policy development. 
It is important to note that not all articles explicitly mention the presence or absence of external 
support. For instance, only 3 out of the 13 articles on Ethiopia acknowledge the government’s 
strong promotion and organisation of cooperatives throughout the country. Therefore, the real 
number of cases showing governmental support is probably larger. Figure 4 sums up the key 
characteristics of cooperatives mentioned in the literature we have reviewed.  
 
Figure 4: Cooperative characteristics 
Source: own graphic 
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Moving on from cooperative characteristics identified by the articles to the main methods they 
used, 52 (75%) relied on quantitative and the remaining 18 (25%) on qualitative methods.3 
Around 25% of the quantitative studies combined different techniques, with the most 
mentioned being propensity score matching (24 studies), difference in means (10), ordinary 
least squares regressions (8) and two-stage regression models (8). All qualitative studies 
applied the case study method, combining focus group discussions and/or expert interviews 
with cooperative leaders and members.  
Summing up, what is known about cooperatives through the articles examined here is based 
upon a very limited set of cases, since many of the articles are highly concentrated in terms of 
publication date and geographical locations and agricultural sectors investigated. Yet, there are 
very few articles analysing the same country and sector, limiting the possibility of 
corroborating, comparing or complementing their results. Nevertheless, in terms of agricultural 
functions and sources of external support, we can say that cooperatives exhibit a wide variety, 
with many of them having multiple functions and sources of support. Lastly, around 25% of 
the articles reviewed do not provide any information on the agricultural sectors or cooperative 
functions they investigated, which may hinder their ability to explain the effects of cooperatives 
beyond theoretical formulations.  
2.4.2 Member characteristics  
Aiming to find out if relatively more-disadvantaged farmers tend to become cooperative 
members, we have analysed member and non-member characteristics. One perspective within 
the literature holds that farmers who are better off, in terms of human and physical capital and 
access to infrastructure, are more likely to join cooperatives than the most disadvantaged 
farmers, who may lack cooperative capacity due to having nothing to pool into a cooperative 
(Münkner, 2012). Meanwhile, another perspective claims that the most disadvantaged farmers 
may be intentionally excluded by cooperatives so they can diminish the transaction costs 
involved in dealing with numerous and very small-scale farmers (Dries et al., 2009; Ito et al., 
2012). 
 
3 Only 8 studies combined quantitative and qualitative methods.  
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In our selection, 38 articles (54%) have analysed member and non-member characteristics. The 
most frequent techniques of analysis used include probit regressions (20 articles), difference in 
means (11) and logit or logistic regressions (5).  
As mentioned in the previous section, for analytical purposes, we have grouped variables into 
categories and then done vote counting, only focusing on categories studied in at least 5 
articles. Then, we classified categories according to whether they seem to have had a positive 
effect on membership, if more than 50% of the available data indicated an effect in that 
direction; the same applied for categories with negative effects. This classification system has 
yielded 18 categories, as detailed in Table 1. While farmers who are better off in terms of 
education, farm size, access to credit and income level are more likely to be cooperative 
members, this does not seem to hold for variables such as farm equipment, information and 
communication technology assets or access to extension services. Therefore, we do not see 
enough evidence to support claims in the literature of better-off farmers being more likely to 
participate in cooperatives.  
Table 1: Agricultural cooperative member and non-member characteristics mentioned in reviewed 
articles (N=38) 
Feature Category 
Influence on membership 
Total number 
of articles Positive Negative Non-significant 
Farmer 
Age 15 (50%) 5 (17%) 10 (33%) 30 (100%) 
Education 19 (59%) 1 (3%) 12 (38%) 32 (100%) 
Farming experience 3 (50%) 0 3 (50%) 6 (100%) 
Household 
Child-dependency ratio 3 (60%) 0 2 (40%) 5 (100%) 
Household size 9 (39%) 1 (4%) 13 (57%) 23 (100%) 
Male head 6 (32%) 4 (21%) 9 (47%) 19 (100%) 
Farm 
Access to credit 3 (60%) 0 2 (40%) 5 (100%) 
Farm size 19 (60%) 6 (20%) 6 (20%) 31 (100%) 
Number of animals 9 (64%) 0 5 (36%) 14 (100%) 
Farm equipment 4 (50%) 1 (12%) 3 (38%) 8 (100%) 
Information and 
communication technology 
assets 4 (44%) 1 (12%) 4 (44%) 9 (100%) 
Crop diversity 0 1 (20%) 4 (80%) 5 (100%) 
Distance 
Proximity to roads or 
markets 8 (50%) 2 (12%) 6 (38%) 16 (100%) 
Proximity to urban 
settlements 2 (40%) 0 3 (60%) 5 (100%) 
Income Farm or total income 5 (56%) 1 (11%) 3 (33%) 9 (100%) 
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Off-farm income 4 (29%) 4 (32%) 5 (39%) 13 (100%) 
Extension 
service 
Access to or contact with 
extension service 2 (33%) 0 4 (67%) 6 (100%) 
Number of contacts with 
Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 0 2 (100%) 
Source: own compilation 
Of the 38 articles analysing farmer characteristics, 24 provide information about differences in 
mean farm size and their statistical significance. While 6 articles find non-significant 
differences in mean farm size, 17 out of the 18 remaining articles find that cooperative 
members have significantly larger farmers than non-members (at the 0.1 level). However, when 
categorising farmers regardless of their membership status, in 9 (59%) cases members and non-
members have less than 1 hectare. Worldwide, farmers with less than 2 hectares are defined as 
small farmers (Lowder et al., 2016). This means that, even though from a statistical perspective 
members’ farms are relatively larger than those of non-members, from a socio-economic 
perspective they should all be considered very small or subsistence farmers. Moreover, only in 
2 cases do farmers have more than 4 hectares of land. Figure 5 shows the complete distribution 
of farm sizes across cases.  
 
Figure 5: Average farm size in articles indicating that cooperative-member farms were on average 
significantly larger than those of non-members (N=17) 
*Some articles were not clearly categorisable when members and non-members belonged to different interval 
classes (e.g., members had more than 1 hectare and non-members had less than 1 hectare). 
Source: own graphic 
36 
 
Summing up, even though a slight majority of the reviewed articles (55%) analyse member 
characteristics, most of their results seem to be inconclusive. In 5 out of the 18 categories 
assessed, the proportion of non-significant results is 50% or larger. This absence of evidence 
inhibits the formulation of further claims (Leppink et al., 2017), suggesting a need for further 
research to define variables differently or use other measurement techniques that may render a 
larger share of significant effects.  
2.4.3 Cooperative effects 
As already mentioned above, we have classified the reviewed articles according to their main 
mode of analysis (quantitative or qualitative methods) and in terms of the effects of 
cooperatives they have found, organised into 3 overarching dimensions (i.e., environmental, 
social, economic) and 17 categories (e.g., income, food security). Quantitative methods (75% 
of articles) were more frequently employed than qualitative (25%). Regarding dimensions 
covered, whereas effects in the quantitative articles are largely focused on one particular 
dimension (39 of 52 articles), two-thirds of the qualitative ones combine effects from multiple 
dimensions (12 of 18 articles). Across methods, the most common combination of effect 
categories is social and economic, accounting for 14 of the 25 articles registering multiple-
dimension effects. Table 2 provides the full breakdown of methods used and dimensions 
covered by the reviewed articles.  
Table 2: Dimensions covered and methods of analysis employed by reviewed articles (N=70) 
Number of 
dimensions Dimensions 
Method Total 
Qualitative Quantitative 
One 
dimension 
Economic 3 (17%) 29 (56%) 32 
Environmental 1 (5%) 4 (8%) 5 
Social 2 (11%) 6 (11%) 8 
Multiple 
dimensions 
Economic and social 8 (44%) 6 (11%) 14 
Economic and environmental 3 (17%) 4 (8%) 7 
Social and environmental  (0%) 3 (6%) 3 
Economic, environmental and 
social 1 (6%)  (0%) 1 
  Total 18 (100%) 52 (100%) 70 
Source: own compilation 
Regarding the direction of effects, quantitative articles are more likely to combine positive, 
negative and/or non-significant effects and report the absence of positive effects than qualitative 
articles. While 38.5% of the quantitative articles report only positive effects, this share reaches 
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61.1% in qualitative articles. Around 50% of the quantitative articles combine positive, negative 
and/or non-significant effects, as compared to 38% of the qualitative ones. See Figure 6 for 
more details.  
 
Figure 6: Reviewed articles classified according to methods employed and direction of cooperative 
effects (N=70) 
Source: own graphic 
Classifying the reviewed articles according to their levels of methodological rigour, as 
explained in section 2.3.3, we find that, although the shares of articles with low levels of rigour 
is similar between quantitative and qualitative articles (35% and 39%, respectively), the share 
of quantitative articles having higher levels of rigour is over double that of the qualitative ones 
(23% versus 11%). Consequently, the share of moderately rigorous studies is smaller among 
quantitative than qualitative articles (42% versus 50%). See Table 3 for the overview.   
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Table 3: Methodological rigour of reviewed articles, categorised by research method (N=70) 
Rigour Qualitative Quantitative Total 
Low 7 (39%) 18 (35%) 25 (36%) 
Moderate 9 (50%) 22 (42%) 31 (44%) 
High 2 (11%) 12 (23%) 14 (20%) 
Total 18 (100%) 52 (100%) 70 (100%) 
Source: own compilation 
Focusing on articles with high and moderate levels of rigour, we find that, on average, 75% of 
all effects analysed in the 11 relevant qualitative articles are positive, 6% are negative and the 
remaining 19% correspond to situations where no effect was perceived by the members 
interviewed or included in focus groups. The most frequently analysed effects belong to the 
categories market participation, women’s status and agency, and human capital. Table 4 details 
this information.  
Table 4: Cooperative effects identified by qualitative articles reviewed exhibiting high and moderate 
levels of rigour (N=11) 
Dimension Effect category 
Effects Total effects 
Number 
of articles 
Positive Negative No effect   
Environmental 
effects 
Environmental 
performance 2 (50%) 0 2 (50%) 4 (100%) 3 
Economic effects 
on members 
Financial services 1 (50%)  0 1 (50%) 2 (100%) 1 
Income 2 (100%)  0 0  2 (100%) 2 
Market 
participation 8 (80%) 0 2 (20%) 10 (100%) 5 
Prices 1 (100%) 0  0 1 (100%) 1 
Economic effects 
on production 
system 
Access to and use 
of inputs 3 (43%) 1 (14%) 3 (43%) 7 (100%) 3 
Access to and use 
of technology 1 (100%) 0 0 1 (100%) 1 
Yield and quantity 1 (100%) 0 0 1 (100%) 1 
Social effects 
Food security 1 (100%) 0 0 1 (100%) 1 
Health  0  0 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 1 
Human capital 5 (100%)  0 0 5 (100%) 4 
Social capital 1 (100%) 0 0 1 (100%) 1 
Women's status and 
agency 9 (82%) 2 (18%) 0 11 (100%) 5 
Total   35 3 9 47   
Source: own compilation 
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On average, the 34 quantitative articles with high and moderate levels of rigour find 67% 
positive cooperative effects, which is 8% less than for the qualitative articles. Although the 
average share of negative effects does not differ much between qualitative and quantitative 
articles (4.6% vs 6.4%), the latter present a considerably greater share of non-significant effects 
(29% vs 19%). The most studied effect categories are income and access to and use of inputs. 
Table 5 details this information.  
Table 5: Cooperative effects identified by quantitative articles reviewed exhibiting high and moderate 
levels of rigour (N=34) 
Dimension Effect category 
Effects Total effects 
Number 
of 
articles 
Positive Negative Non-significant 
 
 
Environmental 
effects 
Environmental 
performance 3 (50%) 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 6 (100%) 5 
Economic effects 
on members 
Financial services 3 (100%) 0 0 3 (100%) 2 
Income 26 (72%) 0 10 (28%) 36 (100%) 18 
Market participation 3 (30%) 2 (20%) 5 (50%) 10 (100%) 7 
Prices 6 (67%) 1 (11%) 2 (22%) 9 (100%) 8 
Wealth 4 (80%) 0 1 (20%) 5 (100%) 4 
Economic effects 
on production 
system 
Access to and use of 
inputs 14 (82%) 0 3 (18%) 17 (100%) 10 
Access to and use of 
technology 2 (40%) 0 3 (60%) 5 (100%) 1 
Labour 3 (75%) 0 1 (25%) 4 (100%) 3 
Technical efficiency 4 (80%) 0 1 (20%) 5 (100%) 4 
Yield and quantity 5 (46%) 2 (18%) 4 (36%) 11 (100%) 7 
Social effects 
Food security 2 (50%) 0 2 (50%) 4 (100%) 3 
Human capital 4 (100%) 0 0  4 (100%) 4 
Social capital 3 (75%) 0 1 (25%) 4 (100%) 4 
Women's status and 
agency 4 (67%) 0 2 (33%) 6 (100%) 4 
Total 86 6 38 130   
Source: own compilation 
Most effects can be grouped according to the number of articles reporting them and the share 
of times they were categorised as being positive. In this vein, the group of effect categories 
“more known” are those studied by many articles and showing a large share of positive effects 
condenses the state of art of knowledge in the field. This group is composed by the categories: 
access to and use of inputs, income, price, and women’s status and agency. 
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There are two particularly interesting groups for future research. The first consists of “more 
probable” effects, referring to categories only studied by a few articles but with a relatively high 
share of positive findings: financial services, profits, social capital and technical efficiency. The 
second notable group consists of “less known” effects, referring to those that were also studied 
by only a few articles but with low shares of positive findings: access to and use of technology 
and food security.  
Lastly, the group of the “less probable” effects refers to categories studied by many articles but 
with a relatively low share of positive findings: environmental performance, market 
participation, and yield and quantity. It is interesting to mention that even most cooperatives 
provide marketing services, they do not seem to be particularly successful in increasing the 
quantities commercialised by members. Figure 7 completes this information.  
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Figure 7: Cooperative effect categories, grouped according to number of reviewed articles reporting 
each effect and percentage of positive findings regarding them among articles exhibiting high and 
moderate levels of rigour (N=45)  
Source: own graphic 
In order to assess which of the identified factors can best explain cooperative effects, we 
contrasted the explanations for positive effects given by quantitative articles we deemed to have 
high levels of rigour (N=12) with our own conceptual framework: 
• Effects found in 2 articles relate to the given institutional environment, more 
specifically, to access of cooperatives to governmental support programs, such as 
subsidised inputs or technological upgrades;  
• Effects found in 5 articles relate to market and industry structure, with 2 articles 
highlighting how cooperatives increase farmer bargaining power and reduce transaction 
costs and the remaining 3 articles indicating that cooperatives enable farmer 
participation in value chains;  
• Effects found in 3 articles relate to the governance model specific to cooperatives. In 2 
articles, this model is said to enhance women’s participation and leadership. In the 
remaining article, the model leads to higher levels of trust and trustworthiness; and  
• Effects found in 3 articles relate to cooperative functions, with 2 of them specifying 
access to information and knowledge and the possibility of learning from peers being 
of importance. The remaining article highlights access to and use of inputs and 
technology provided by cooperatives.  
2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
In a context of renewed interest in promoting agricultural cooperatives as drivers for rural 
development and, simultaneously, a lack of conclusive evidence regarding what smallholders 
actually achieve by participating in them, we have undertaken a systemic literature review of 
70 articles focused on cooperative effects on their members in developing countries. Although 
the articles analysed a wide variety of countries and agricultural sectors, we have found that a 
large share concentrated on a small set of countries and sectors. We have also found that 
cooperatives perform multiple functions – most including marketing – and many articles report 
that cooperatives receive external support, some from multiple organisations. Governments are 
the main support providers, generally initiating cooperatives and, to a lesser extent, supporting 
their regular activities as well.  
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Regarding differences between member and non-members characteristics, the evidence appears 
to remain inconclusive. While better-off farmers in terms of education, farm size, access to 
credit and income level are more likely to be cooperative members, this is not reported to hold 
for variables such as farm equipment, information and communication technology assets and 
access to extension services. Moreover, regardless of their membership, in most cases where 
analysis of clear data was possible for us, the farmers under study possessed less than 1 hectare 
of land. This means that, even though from a statistical perspective members’ farms are 
relatively larger than those of non-members, from a socio-economic perspective they should all 
be considered very small or subsistence farmers. Lastly, concerning positive cooperative 
effects, for us the most conclusive evidence consists of the categories studied by at least 9 of 
the 43 most rigorous articles having positive effects and showing the greatest shares of positive 
results: access to and use of inputs, income, prices, and women’s status and agency.  
One limitation of the results presented here derives from our use of the vote-counting procedure. 
This procedure has been mainly criticised for only considering the direction of effects and not 
their magnitude while also failing to consider sampling error, with effects from smaller samples 
deviating more from population effects than those from larger samples (Haddaway et al., 2015; 
Waddington et al., 2012).  
With the aim of building a comprehensive overview of the spectrum of cooperatives effects, 
we set up our review by posing a number of general research questions. Now, on the basis of 
our results, we believe that more sophisticated analysis could be plausible for specific effects 
but not for general effect categories that end up grouping different variables measured in 
different units, sometimes not easily homogenised.  
Another possible limitation comes from the potential presence of publication bias, which 
usually derives from journal editors and researchers being reluctant to publish statistically non-
significant results (Iyengar and Greenhouse, 1988). Consequently, significant results, both 
positive and negative, may be overrepresented. However, our review reports more statistically 
non-significant than negative results. Since donors support research and local universities or 
governments provide access to their data or collect the needed data, we believe that, in this 
field, there may be a greater bias towards not publishing negative results, which might deter 
further support, as compared to non-significant ones.   
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We conclude by first acknowledging that knowledge regarding cooperative effects has 
particularly increased in the last decade. However, it is still based upon only a relatively few 
examples. By addressing the wide variety among cooperatives in terms of sectors, functions 
and effects, among other potential areas of interest, researchers can now strive towards 
generating more detailed information about those items while also being more explicit about 
key factors such as external support. This would hopefully improve understanding of each case 
as well as add to our knowledge of the general mechanisms behind the effects. Furthermore, 
researchers could consider applying more dynamic approaches, such as panel analysis, and 
methodologically rigorous approaches. Lastly, the diversity of cooperative objectives and 
functions could be better addressed if researchers were to use a participatory approach when 
deciding upon their research focus (Bergold and Thomas, 2012); cooperative members and 
managers, for example, could help them establish what effects are most important for them. So 
far, articles in this field seem to have only pursued researchers’ interests, which may not 
necessarily coincide with the preferences of those that are directly involved in cooperatives.  
Since there are many theoretical reasons for cooperative failure – and cooperatives have failed 
many times – governments and donors should encourage analysis of negative results in order 
to better understand what can be improved. Moreover, the fact that cooperatives are less 
involved in activities such as providing access to credit and processing agricultural produce 
than they could be may indicate to governments that such services may need support by other 
means than through cooperatives themselves. All things considered, the evidence presented here 
recognises the positive effects of cooperatives, even though in some categories more than in 
others, which should give governments and donors reasons to be optimistic. Meanwhile, there 
are still meaningful shares of results where absence of evidence regarding cooperative effects 
should also lead them to be cautious.   
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Abstract 
In this paper, we use a unique data set of the prices paid to farmers in Argentina for grapes to 
examine the prices paid by non-varietal wine processing cooperatives and investor-oriented 
firms (IOFs). Motivated by contrasting theoretical predictions of cooperative price effects 
generated by the yardstick of competition and property rights theories, we apply a multilevel 
regression model to identify price differences at the transaction level and the departmental level. 
On average, farmers selling to cooperatives receive a 3.4% lower price than farmers selling to 
IOFs. However, we find cooperatives pay approximately 2.4% more in departments where 
cooperatives have larger market shares. We suggest that the inability of cooperatives to pay a 
price equal to or greater than the one paid by IOFs can be explained by the market structure for 
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non-varietal wine in Argentina. Specifically, there is evidence that cooperative members differ 
from other farmers in terms of size, assets and the cost of accessing the market. We conclude 
that the analysis of cooperative pricing cannot solely focus on the price differential between 
cooperatives and IOFs, but instead must consider other factors that are important to the 
members.  
Keywords: Competitive yardstick; Pricing policies; Non-varietal wine; Mendoza; 
Argentina 
3.1 Introduction 
The difference in the ownership structure between a cooperative and an investor-oriented firm 
(IOF) has led to contrasting theoretical conclusions about the relative efficiency and 
competitiveness of cooperatives. On the one hand, it is argued that, because of their different 
objective function (which is typically assumed to be some version of service at cost or break 
even), cooperatives operate as a “competitive yardstick” and provide better prices in 
oligopsonistic environments. By operating without a margin, cooperatives force IOFs to 
increase their prices in order to retain business; the result is that prices increase for all farmers 
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2013; Giannakas and Fulton, 2005; Sexton, 1990). On the other hand, 
it is pointed out that cooperatives suffer from a series of property rights and 
governance/management problems that impede their efficiency and ability to operate efficiently 
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Cook, 1995; Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002; Hendrikse and Veerman, 
2001; Staatz, 1987; Vitaliano, 1983). Cooperatives suffer from underinvestment caused by 
horizon problems that result from residual return rights that are non-transferable (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979; Rey and Tirole, 2007; Vitaliano, 1983), and from free rider problems that result 
from residual returns being assigned to member-patrons and not investors (Caves and Petersen, 
1986; Knoeber and Baumer, 1983). Unlimited delivery rights and the freedom to side-sell result 
in members treating their cooperatives as “markets of last resort” (Hart and Moore, 1996; 
Sexton and Iskow, 1988), while conflicting interests between members result in costly decision-
making processes (Hansmann, 2009).  
Taken together these two literatures suggest that if the problems related to collective ownership 
and management dominate, cooperatives may be unable to offer better prices. However, if 
advantages stemming from an alternative objective function dominate, cooperatives may 
acquire considerable market share and drive the market towards more competitive equilibria. 
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Viewed across space, the implication is that cooperative size and strength should be positively 
linked to higher relative prices offered by cooperatives vis-à-vis IOFs, and both features should 
be negatively associated with the degree to which cooperatives play the role of market of last 
resort.  
In this paper, we use a unique data set of the prices paid to farmers by non-varietal wine 
processing cooperatives and IOFs in Argentina for grapes to examine three questions: (1) do 
cooperatives offer higher or lower prices to farmers compared to IOFs?, (2) do cooperatives 
induce higher prices for farmers in markets where they have greater market strength? and (3) 
do cooperatives offer lower prices when they play the role of market of last resort?  
In the rest of the paper we review the pricing effects literature (section 3.2), explain the features 
of the Argentina case (section 3.3), describe our data set and introduce a multilevel regression 
model analysing various pricing effects (section 3.4), present the results (section 3.5), discuss 
the findings (section 3.6), and draw conclusions (section 3.7).  
3.2 Literature on pricing effects  
There are numerous factors that determine the prices paid by IOFs and cooperatives for 
agricultural products. Some relate to the decisions made by farmers when they sell their output, 
while others relate to the decisions made by the downstream purchasing firms. Due to imperfect 
information, producers may accept lower prices from one purchaser than another because they 
do not know the other buyers’ willingness to pay (Sauer et al., 2012). When production is 
spatially distributed, producers may sell to the closest processor, even if the price is lower. This 
is particularly relevant for products that are highly perishable and costly to transport (Graubner 
et al., 2011). Farmers may also include other factors besides price in their sales decisions (Wills, 
1985). For instance, when choosing a cooperative, farmers may take into account political 
representation (Staatz, 1987), market access or the right to unlimited delivery (i.e., a market of 
last resort). In times of rapid structural change, cooperative membership may secure delivery 
rights and be seen as a small farmer’s way of ensuring against the hardships of structural change 
(Nilsson et al., 2016). 
For processing firms, ownership structure may matter for pricing because farmer-owned 
processors are believed to have different objectives than IOFs. While IOFs are typically 
assumed to pursue profit maximisation, cooperatives, as user-owned organisations, may pursue 
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different objectives – one of the more common objectives is service at cost or break even.5 
Different objectives lead to different pricing policies and, depending on the market structure, to 
different market equilibria (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). 
Modern agricultural markets are increasingly characterised by a few concentrated input 
suppliers and a few buyers of agricultural products, which in turn can lead to less competitive 
prices (Sexton, 2013). For instance, an oligopsonistic market structure can be expected to lead 
to lower prices paid to farmers (McCorriston et al., 1998; Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Wann and 
Sexton, 1992). In this situation, it is argued that a cooperative buyer would offer producers more 
favourable prices because an objective to provide its members with service at cost. Competing 
IOFs must match the cooperative’s price to avoid losing customers. The resulting equilibrium 
prices and quantities will depend on the relative average cost and marginal cost of the 
cooperative and IOF, respectively, with lower costs mapping onto higher prices and larger 
market shares (Fulton and Giannakas, 2013). This price enhancing effect is termed the 
competitive yardstick effect (Cotterill, 1987, 1997; Giannakas and Fulton, 2005; Liang and 
Hendrikse, 2015; Nourse, 1945; Sexton, 1990; Staatz, 1989). The yardstick effect may also be 
the consequence of strategic pricing and entry deterrence by IOFs as they raise prices to deter 
cooperative formation and market entry (Sexton and Sexton, 1987). 
Several factors have been identified that may restrict the yardstick effect. For instance, a closed 
membership policy or the presence of large membership fees may mean that producers who are 
not cooperative members are unable to switch to the cooperative and benefit from the better 
prices it offers; in this situation, IOFs will not be under the same pressure to raise their prices 
(Cotterill, 1987; Sexton, 1990). Internal agency problems within the cooperative may also limit 
the yardstick effect (Fulton and Giannakas, 2013). In addition, because the yardstick effect 
affects all farmers, and not just cooperative members, it resembles a public good with the 
 
5 There is a substantial literature on the objective function of the cooperative. In-depth examinations of the various 
objective functions are found in Bateman et al., (1979), Levay (1983) and Sexton (1984). Among the objectives 
examined are the maximization of net earnings (similar to IOFs), the maximization of per-unit returns to farmers 
for product sold or the minimization of the per-unit price paid by members for goods or services purchased, the 
maximization of overall member returns (return from the cooperative plus farm-level profits), or the maximization 
of the volume transacted (inputs sold or produce purchased) to achieve economies of scale, reduce excess capacity, 
or increase market share. Sexton et al., (1989) provide evidence the cotton ginning cooperatives in California 
operate on a break-even basis that generates the greatest returns to farmers. Featherstone and Rahman (1996) 
provide support for the view that supply and marketing cooperatives in the U.S. midwest operate on a cost 
minimization basis; their results do not support the proposition that the cooperatives adhered to profit 
maximization. In contrast, Boyle (2004) finds that dairy cooperatives in Ireland operated as if they were profit 
maximizing. 
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accompanying free-rider problems that discourage farmers from becoming members or 
patronising the cooperative (Cotterill, 1987; Staatz, 1989).  
The basic yardstick result is predicated on the cooperative and the IOF having similar costs. 
Yet, this may not be the case. There are at least two reasons why cooperatives might have higher 
costs than IOFs. First, it may cost cooperatives more to deal with their members than it does 
IOFs to deal with their suppliers – as Holloway (2000) note, the relative cost of carrying out a 
transaction depends on the producers from which a processing firm purchases, with different 
types of buyers giving rise to different costs and hence different prices. For example, the 
transaction costs of purchasing a given quantity and quality of product is generally lower for 
purchases from a small number of large-scale producers than from a large number of small-
scale producers. Thus, cooperatives or IOFs serving small farmers may incur higher costs than 
if they were to purchase from larger farmers.  
Second, costs are typically assumed to be higher in cooperatives because of the lack of well-
defined property rights and the corresponding free rider problems, horizon problems, and 
portfolio problems. Weaker governance structures, due to the volunteer nature of boards, 
increased agency problems because of the inability to offer managers financial incentives that 
are linked closely to performance, and more costly decision making processes due to member 
heterogeneity may also lead to lower performance of cooperatives relative to IOFs (Chaddad 
and Cook, 2004; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Cook, 1995; Fulton and Pohler, 2015; 
Hansmann, 2009; Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002; Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001; Vitaliano, 
1983). To provide one example, differences in the expected membership period among 
members have been argued to give rise to the horizon problem in which only investments with 
short-term pay-offs are financed by the members (Giannakas et al., 2016), which in turn lowers 
the efficiency of the cooperative and raises its cost.  
It should be noted that many if not most of the higher costs outlined above are the result of the 
specific ownership structure of the cooperative, which, in turn, is the source of the different 
objective function that the cooperative possesses. As a result, it is not possible to separate the 
cost issue from the yardstick effect – the structure required to generate a benefit (more 
competitive prices, the existence of a market of last resort) also creates a cost (higher operating 
expenditures).  
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The empirical evidence on the effect of cooperatives on prices is mixed. Milford (2012) and 
Hanisch et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between cooperative strength and farm gate 
prices, while Zavelberg and Storm (2016) find a partially positive relationship. In terms of 
comparative prices, some studies find that cooperatives pay more than IOFs (Cazzuffi, 2012; 
Shiferaw et al., 2008; Wollni and Zeller, 2007), some show that cooperatives pay less than IOFs 
(Hanisch et al., 2012), and other studies provide inconclusive results (Sauer et al., 2012). Table 
6 summarises the main findings from the literature. 
In this paper, the goal is to better understand the factors that influence cooperative pricing 
behaviour. To do this we examine the prices paid to individual farmers by cooperatives and 
IOFs in the wine industry in Argentina to determine if cooperatives offer higher or lower prices. 
We also investigate what happens to the price differential across different geographical regions 
and how the spatial price differences are linked to cooperative strength. 
Table 6: Empirical literature on cooperative pricing in agricultural markets 
Theoretical 
strand 
Authors
/Year 
Main assessment Level Data Key result 
Price 
dispersion: 
Access to 
information 
Courtois 
and 
Subervie 
(2015) 
Seeks to understand 
how Market 
Information Service 
can lead to farmers 
receiving higher 
prices for their 
agricultural products 
Individual 
(Farmer) 
Survey of 400 
beneficiaries of 
Market 
Information 
Service and 200 
non beneficiaries 
in Ghana 
Farmers who 
benefited from the 
Market Information 
Service received 
significantly higher 
prices for maize 
(10%) and 
groundnuts (7%) than 
farmers that did not 
benefit from the 
service 
Price 
dispersion: 
Transaction 
costs 
Royer 
(2011) 
Assesses whether 
marketing boards and 
bilateral contracts 
decrease transaction 
costs faced by milk 
producers 
Individual 
(Farmer) 
Interviews and 62 
surveys in 
Canada, England 
and Wales 
The relative 
magnitude of 
transaction costs 
incurred by producers 
across settings is low, 
indicating that hybrid 
coordination 
mechanisms 
minimise transaction 
costs in the dairy 
sector 
Price 
dispersion 
Uneven 
competition 
Lewis 
(2008) 
Examines price 
dispersion in the retail 
gasoline market 
Individual 
(Consume
r) 
Recorded retail 
prices for 327 
stations in the San 
Diego area 
(United States) 
Price dispersion is 
prevalent after 
controlling for 
differences in 
stations’ average 
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price levels and is 
sensitive to the 
number and nature of 
local competitors 
Price 
dispersion: 
Access to 
information 
and Firm 
ownership 
Wollni 
and 
Zeller 
(2007) 
Determines the 
factors that influence 
participation in 
specialised markets 
and whether 
participation in these 
markets and in 
cooperatives leads to 
higher prices for 
coffee farmers 
Individual 
(Househol
d) 
Survey of 216 
randomly sampled 
households in two 
major coffee 
regions in Costa 
Rica 
Access to 
information about 
world market prices 
leads to an increase of 
0.03 US$/lb in 
producer prices on 
average. Marketing 
through cooperatives 
increases the average 
price obtained by 
0.05 US$/lb 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
Shiferaw 
et al. 
(2008) 
Identifies the 
potential and 
limitations of rural 
institutions in 
providing market 
services for small 
scale producers 
Individual 
(Househol
d) 
Survey of 400 
households 
comprising 250 
members and 150 
non-members of 
Producer 
Marketing Groups 
in Kenya  
Prices paid by 
Producer Marketing 
Groups to the 
member farmers are 
22 to 24% higher than 
the prices paid by 
middlemen. This gain 
comes at a cost of 
delayed payments to 
grain sellers 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
Sauer et 
al. 
(2012) 
Identifies the 
determinants of 
variations in farm gate 
milk prices 
Individual 
(Farmer) 
300 responses per 
country in 
Armenia, Ukraine 
and Moldova  
A 1% rise in the 
quantity of milk sold 
through a marketing 
cooperative is 
associated with 
increases of 0.2% and 
0.1% in farm-gate 
milk prices in 
Armenia and 
Ukraine. No 
significant effect in 
Moldova 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
Cazzuffi 
(2012) 
 
Assesses if the 
organisational form 
has an effect on farm 
gate price 
Individual 
(Farmer) 
Survey of 313 
farmers in 3 
regions of Italy  
Cooperative 
members receive 
5.5% higher prices 
than prices paid by 
IOFs 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
Hanisch 
et al. 
(2012) 
Provides a 
comprehensive 
description of the 
current level of 
development of 
cooperatives and 
other producer 
organisations in the 
dairy sector 
National Data from 498 
producer prices 
for large Western 
European Dairies 
from 2008 to 2012 
provided by EMB 
and Eurostat 
In 75% of the 
observations the 
cooperative-IOF 
price difference is 
negative. When 
standardised by 
country, and 
assuming a milk 
price of 30 Euros/100 
kg, cooperatives pay 
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on average 10% less 
than IOFs 
Yardstick 
effect  
Hanisch 
et al. 
(2013) 
Estimates the effect of 
cooperatives’ market 
share on farm gate 
milk prices  
National Eurostat panel 
data on farm gate 
milk prices, maize 
fodder prices, per 
capita GDP, and 
trade balances 
from 2000 to 2010 
for the EU-27 
A 1% increase in the 
market share of 
cooperatives leads to 
a rise in the farm gate 
milk price of 2.5 
Eurocents cents per 
100 kg milk 
Yardstick 
effect 
Milford 
(2012) 
Investigates if 
Fairtrade and 
organically certified 
coffee cooperatives 
have a pro-
competitive effect 
Municipal 50 semi-
structured 
interviews with 
cooperative 
members and 
managers, coffee 
purchasers, 
government 
officials, 
researchers and 
other 
stakeholders, plus 
coffee price data 
for 75 
municipalities in 
Mexico 
Most cooperatives 
(74%) think they 
have a stronger effect 
on the cheating 
behaviour than on the 
pricing behaviour of 
the intermediaries 
(50%). An increase 
in cooperative 
presence by one 
cooperative for every 
100 farmers leads to 
a 5.3% increase in 
the local price 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
and 
yardstick 
effect 
Zavelber
g and 
Storm 
(2016) 
Evaluates the effects 
of space and legal 
form on pricing 
behaviour of dairy 
processors 
Individual 
(Buyer) 
Data from all 
German dairies 
from 2001 to 2012 
provides 
information on 
raw milk prices, 
processing 
quantities, legal 
and production 
form (N = 1645, 
divided by north 
and south region) 
Cooperatives pay 
0.65 Euro cent per 
kilo less than IOFs in 
the north. In the 
south the effect is 
statistically not 
significantly different 
form zero. There is 
little evidence of the 
competitive yardstick 
effect (only in the 
south) 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
Cazzuffi 
(2012) 
 
Assesses if the 
organisational form 
has an effect on farm 
gate price 
Individual 
(Farmer) 
Survey of 313 
farmers in 3 
regions of Italy  
Cooperative 
members receive 
5.5% higher prices 
than prices paid by 
IOFs 
Price 
dispersion: 
Firm 
ownership 
Hanisch 
et al. 
(2012) 
Provides a 
comprehensive 
description of the 
current level of 
development of 
cooperatives and 
other producer 
organisations in the 
dairy sector 
National Data from 498 
producer prices 
for large Western 
European Dairies 
from 2008 to 2012 
provided by EMB 
and Eurostat 
In 75% of the 
observations the 
cooperative-IOF 
price difference is 
negative. When 
standardised by 
country, and 
assuming a milk 
price of 30 Euros/100 
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Source: own compilation 
3.3 The non-varietal wine market in Mendoza 
Argentina has a long tradition of grape production and wine making. In 2013, Argentina was 
the eighth largest grape producing country in the world, the fifth largest wine producer, and the 
ninth largest exporter (International Organisation of Vine and Wine, 2015). The province of 
Mendoza accounts for 66% of all the vineyards and for 76% of Argentina’s national wine 
production.  
Mendoza is characterised by the coexistence of small-scale vineyards (minifundios) and large-
scale vineyards. In 2011, 77% of the province’s vineyards (12,634) had 10 or less hectares and 
accounted for 31% of the area. At the other extreme, 2.6% of all vineyards (427) had 50 hectares 
or more and represented 26% of the provincial planted surface (National Institute of Viticulture, 
2011). This farm size distribution is the result of, on the one hand, the subdivision of vineyards 
due to inheritance and, on the other hand, the consolidation of farms as larger producers buy 
out smaller producers. 
The distribution of vineyard size has also been affected by the trend to produce higher 
oenological quality grapes for varietal wines; indeed, the structural adjustment policies 
introduced since the 1990s to deal with this shift have resulted in the loss of 11,200 vineyards 
since 1980 (National Institute of Viticulture, 2011).6 Nevertheless, while domestic per capita 
consumption of non-varietal wine (or generic/table wine) has decreased over the past 30 years, 
it is still popular and the cooperative system plays a significant role in this market segment.  
From the 1950s until the mid-1970s, the state supported the organisation of cooperatives (Fabre, 
2005; Richard-Jorba, 2008). National policies sought to professionalise cooperative 
management and develop the technical capabilities of cooperative managers. In 1990, the state-
owned winery Bodegas y Viñedos Giol was privatised and taken over by the Argentinean 
 
6 The main fine grapes constituted 49% of total grape production in 2012, compared to 36% for the main common 
grapes. 
kg, cooperatives pay 
on average 10% less 
than IOFs 
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Federation of Wine Making Cooperatives (FeCoVitA). In 2010, cooperatives processed 20% of 
the province’s grape production through 41 first level cooperatives, with 29 of them associated 
with FeCoVitA. Around 3,000 members and 2,000 non-members deliver grapes to cooperatives 
to produce non-varietal wine. Overall, grape producers linked to the cooperative system 
represent 33% of the total grape producers in the province.  
Non-varietal wine is regarded as a homogenous good, with little price and quality differentiation 
(Day; Fielden, 2003). Its supply chain in Mendoza is structured as follows. At the first stage, 
grape producers sell their produce to wineries, which then often trade wine among themselves 
to later sell to bottling and wholesale firms. These firms, in turn, sell the wine to the retailers. 
Besides cooperatives, there are other integration structures – some wineries own vineyards, 
while some bottling firms own wineries and buy directly from grape producers. In 2004, there 
were over 500 wineries; of these approximately 40 medium size wineries bottled wine, while 
more than 450 delivered the wine to either medium size wineries or to the five largest firms 
which control 75% of the non-varietal wine (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2003; Musri Arias, 2018). 
Since it is a mature industry, there are no significant technological differences among wineries. 
However, the scale of the winery may be a differentiating factor, with larger wineries having 
lower costs per litre transacted. Over time, concentration levels in the bottling phase have 
increased. In 2014, the three largest firms were: Peñaflor (25% of the market), FeCoVitA 
(23%), and RPB (15%) (El Sol, 2014). Each firm has its own labels; they also produce must 
and varietal wine. 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
In our analysis of the prices received by growers from cooperatives and IOFs, we consider 
5,042 records of the sale of bulk non-varietal wine registered with the Chamber of Commerce 
of Mendoza during the period 2007–2012. The volume of all the transactions registered 
represented 25.5% of the total wine produced in the province in the studied period. Although 
the registration of operations and sales is mandatory by law, and despite penalties for non-
compliance, not all transactions are registered. The transactions cover the sale of grapes by a 
grape producer (seller) and a cooperative or IOF (buyer) in the first stage of the supply chain. 
Although producers deliver grapes, price and quantity are recorded in terms of the type and 
quantity of the wine that is produced.  
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Wine cooperatives in Mendoza generally retain any surplus that is earned and consider it as 
members’ contributions or symbolic fees that can be used to finance investments. Thus, there 
is no refund in cash distributed to members, and the prices paid by IOFs and cooperatives are 
comparable. In Mendoza, members are not obliged to deliver their production to the cooperative 
or to remain members of the cooperative for a specific period. Thus, farmers may use the 
cooperative as the market channel of last resort, and they may choose to deliver to whichever 
firm (cooperative or IOF) offers the best deal (however that is defined for each producer).  
Each transaction is characterised by its departmental location (the department is a political 
division of the province) and year. As will be discussed later, organising the data in this way 
allows the use of a multilevel empirical model to account for different levels of aggregation in 
the data. According to the location of the wineries (buyers), transactions are distributed over 11 
departments, which accounted for 72% of the provincial grape production in 2012.7 Agricultural 
production in Mendoza is concentrated in a very small portion of the province (4% of the 
province’s surface area or 148,827 square kilometres). This area contains a well-established 
irrigation system and is where most of the province’s population and economic activities are 
concentrated. Given the geographical proximity of grape production, transportation costs play 
a limited role.  
Grouping transactions by departments allows for a consideration of differences in prices that 
may be explained by departmental characteristics such as micro-climatic conditions, local 
weather variations or local patterns of behaviour. Grouping transactions by year controls for 
inter-temporal changes such as weather.  
Producer prices were deflated using the Wholesale Price Index for wine and cider provided by 
the Argentinean Ministry of Economics. Real prices were transformed to logarithms to improve 
distributional properties. December 2006 was used as the baseline when price changes were 
calculated.  
At the transaction level, a number of factors can influence the price paid. Colour is important, 
with red non-varietal wine sold at higher prices than white wine. The presence of substitutes is 
a significant factor. Grapes can be used to produce must or wine. Must is the freshly pressed 
grape juice and can be used to produce grape juice or as a sweetener of other fruit juices. If 
 
7 Mendoza is divided into 18 departments; 14 of these produce grape and wine. Departments with a very small 
number of registered transactions were excluded from the analysis.  
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must is fermented it becomes wine. Although must can also be stocked and later used to produce 
wine, this is forbidden by law in Argentina. Therefore, since it acts as a substitute market, the 
price for must can be expected to affect the price of wine.  
Buyer characteristics may also affect the price. For instance, buyers with a brand could be more 
likely to bottle the wine and sell it to consumers; they may be willing to pay higher prices 
because they bear less intermediation costs. The volume handed by the winery may also affect 
the cost of production and hence the price that is paid. To capture this effect, we included a 
dummy variable to account for different sizes of the wineries (large, medium and small). We 
estimated the winery size according to its average volume purchased per year of non-varietal 
wine. Since not all volume transacted is registered, we used a dummy and not a continuous 
variable for size to control for the potential bias of non-registered transactions in estimating the 
size of a winery.  
The scale of grape production can be expected to affect the price paid for grapes, with the 
presence of smaller producers associated with higher costs and hence a lower price paid. The 
presence of smaller producers would lead to higher costs if it were assumed that the cost of 
arranging a transaction is roughly the same regardless of the size of the transaction; in this case 
dealing with lots of smaller producers results in higher overall costs. This grape production 
scale factor was captured by a variable representing the share of farmers in each department 
with less than 5 hectares.  
The number of wineries in a department may also affect the price paid through competition. To 
capture this factor, the number of wineries per department was included as an explanatory 
variable.  
In addition, the price paid by cooperatives in a department is expected to be associated 
positively with cooperative strength in that department. Larger cooperatives may have lower 
costs because of economies of scale, and thus are able to offer better prices. And, as discussed 
above, larger cooperatives emerge when farmers find their prices and services relatively 
attractive. The cooperative strength at the department level was calculated in three different 
ways – as the share of the surface area cultivated by members of the cooperatives, as the share 
of the grapes handled by cooperatives, and as the share of the wine handled by cooperatives. 
These statistics were computed using provincial statistics and cooperative balance sheet 
information for 39 out of the 49 cooperatives registered in 2012 (General Department of 
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Cooperatives, 2016). As Table 7 indicates, the strength of cooperatives shows significant 
variability; cooperatives are absent in some departments whereas in others they handle around 
50% of the market. Moreover, the number of firms that engaged in transactions also show 
significant variability across departments (from 3 to 59). Although the average number of firms 
performing transactions per department (21.2) suggests the presence of many buyers, the 
percentage of transactions accounted for by the top five buyers (from 59% to 100%) indicates 
a high degree of concentration in many departments.8  
 
8 San Carlos department shows a much higher share of grapes and wine handled by cooperatives than the share of 
the surface of the cooperatives’ members. This difference is a reflection of the fact that cooperatives in this 
department buy large quantities of grapes and wine from non-members.  
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Table 7: IOFs and cooperative strength, number of transactions and firms by department 
Departmen
t 
Average Cooperative 
Share  Transactions  Number Firms   
Transaction
s top 5 
Firms (%) 
Surface Grapes Wine 
 
IOFs Coop Total  IOF Coop Total   
(%)   (Number)   (Number)    
General 
Alvear 37.8 44 53.2 
 
43 97 140  5 3 8  98 
Junín 8.5 17.8 8.5 
 
324 179 503  18 3 21  73 
Luján de 
Cuyo 0 0 0 
 
91  91  19 0 19  66 
Maipú 4.1 3 2.7 
 
779 5 784  34 1 35  72 
Rivadavia 4.3 8.3 3.7 
 
504 64 568  32 1 33  64 
San Carlos 9.7 33.5 50.9 
 
15 101 116  3 1 4  100 
San Martín 9.5 10.9 10.6 
 
1,65
2 115 
1,76
7  56 3 59  45 
San Rafael 34.4 29.9 26.3 
 
677 59 736  31 2 33  57 
Santa Rosa 3.6 5.7 5.5 
 
233 51 284  10 1 11  92 
Tunuyán 3.5 6.3 8.5 
 
16 12 28  2 1 3  100 
Tupungato 0 0 0   23 2 25   7 1 8   88 
Total         
4,35
7 685 
5,04
2   217 17 234     
Source: own calculations, based on General Department of Cooperatives and National Institute of Vititculture 
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Table 8 provides a summary of the variables discussed above. Since the last three variables in 
the table correlate strongly (the Pearson correlation coefficients between COOPSHARE 
SURFACE and COOPSHARE GRAPES, COOPSHARE SURFACE and COOPSHARE WINE, 
and COOPSHARE GRAPES and COOPSHARE WINE are 0.83, 0.72, and 0.92, respectively), 
we introduce each of them separately into the regressions.  
Since departments and years are overlapping groups, the crossed-effects multilevel regression 
model for a transaction i in year t and department k can be written as: 
itktkkttkitktk
itkkkk
kitkitktkitk
εζζζCOOPSHARECOOPBUYERβCOOPSHAREβ
COOPBUYERβSMALLFIRMβMEDIUMFIRMβSMALLFARMSβ
WINERIESβBRANDβREDβMUSTPRICEββLNPRICE
+++++
++++
+++++=
3211110
9876
54321
*
           (1) 
where the betas are the coefficients to be estimated. The terms ζ1t, ζ2k and ζ3tk are random 
intercepts for year, department, and the interaction between year and department; they are 
assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean, variance ψt, ψk and ψtk, respectively, and 
each of them is assumed to be uncorrelated across groups. The term εitk is the residual at the 
transaction level, with a zero population mean, constant variance θ, interpretable as the within 
transaction variance, and is uncorrelated across transactions, years and departments.  
By introducing a dummy variable (COOPBUYER), the price difference between cooperatives 
and IOFs can be examined; the coefficient on this variable will be positive if the cooperative 
offers a higher price than the IOF. In addition, to test the existence of a yardstick effect, the 
strength of cooperatives in each department (COOPSHARE) is introduced. The coefficient of 
this variable is positive when a larger cooperative share (of surface, grapes, or wine, depending 
on the specification) is associated with higher prices paid in the department. An interaction term 
between COOPBUYER and COOPSHARE is included to examine if the price differential 
between the cooperative and the IOF is influenced by cooperative strength.   
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Table 8: Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable Description N Mean SD Min Max 
Ln price Natural logarithm of real producer 
price of non-varietal wine per 
hectolitre 
5,042 4.43 0.42 2.59 5.91 
Must price Average real monthly producer price 
of must per hectolitre 
66 41.5 6.87 30.5
5 
57.04 
Red  = 1 if wine colour is red  5,042 0.49 n.a. 0 1 
Brand  = 1 if buyer has a brand  5,042 0.78 n.a. 0 1 
Wineries Number of wineries in the 
department 
11 75.54 50.99 22 165 
Small farms Percentage of vineyards with 5 or 
less hectares in the department 
11 16.41 15.19 3.26 55.46 
Medium firm  = 1 if the firm size is medium  5,042 0.47 n.a. 0 1 
Small firm  = 1 if the firm size is small 5,042 0.14 n.a. 0 1 
Coop buyer  = 1 if the buyer of the transaction is 
a cooperative 
5,042  0.13 n.a. 0 1 
Coop share 
surface 
Cooperatives’ departmental share of 
surface  
66 10.5 12.71 0 46.96 
Coop share 
grapes 
Cooperatives’ departmental share of 
grapes 
66 14.49 14.7 0 50.58 
Coop share 
wine 
Cooperatives’ departmental share of 
wine 
66 15.45 19.03 0 60.76 
Source: own calculations 
3.5 Results 
The analysis begins with an examination of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; this is 
then followed by an examination of a crossed-effects multilevel (ML) regression with random 
intercepts for 6 years and 11 departments. We use OLS regressions as a benchmark to see how 
ML regressions improve the analysis by considering the different levels of data aggregation 
(Robson and Pevalin, 2016). Running a multilevel regression without covariates and year as 
the only level variable explains 21.43% of the variance encountered in the dependent variable 
(natural logarithm of the real price of wine), while department as the only level variable 
explains 17.12%. Since both variables explain significant shares of the variance, they are 
suitable as levels. Table 9 shows estimates for the OLS and the multilevel regressions, each 
with the three different specifications of cooperative strength: the share of surface cultivated, 
the share of grapes produced, and the share of wine produced by cooperatives, respectively.  
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Table 9: Estimation results of OLS and ML crossed-effects regressions 
Variable 
Cooperative Strength – 
Surface 
 Cooperative Strength – 
Grapes 
 Cooperative Strength – 
Wine 
OLS ML  OLS ML  OLS ML 
Must price -0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0010) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0121*** 
(0.0010) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0010) 
Red 0.4579*** 
(0.0097) 
0.4429*** 
(0.0078) 
 0.4609*** 
(0.0097) 
0.4430*** 
(0.0078) 
 0.4616*** 
(0.0097) 
0.4433*** 
(0.0078) 
Brand 0.0910*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0644*** 
(0.0100) 
 0.1033*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0652*** 
(0.0100) 
 0.0997*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0643*** 
(0.0100) 
Wineries -0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009 
(0.0006) 
 -0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009 
(0.0006) 
 -0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0009 
(0.0007) 
Small farms  -0.0118*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0059 
(0.0043) 
 -0.0077*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0029) 
 -0.0047*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0063** 
(0.0027) 
Medium firm  -0.0656*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0093) 
 -
0.0611***(
0.0105) 
-0.0370*** 
(0.0093) 
 -0.0573*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0093) 
Small firm -0.1000*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.0958*** 
(0.0129) 
 -
0.0768***(
0.0172) 
-0.0921*** 
(0.0130) 
 -0.0785*** 
(0.0173) 
-0.0940*** 
(0.0130) 
Coop buyer -0.1054*** 
(0.0211) 
-0.0748*** 
(0.0200) 
 -
0.1595***(
0.0242) 
-0.1064*** 
(0.0239) 
 -0.0980*** 
(0.0201) 
-0.0636*** 
(0.0192) 
Coop share surface 0.0060*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0020 
(0.0047) 
      
Coop buyer x Coop 
share surface 
0.0048*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0027** 
(0.0011) 
      
Coop share grapes    0.0028**(0
.0011) 
-0.0016 
(0.0027) 
   
Coop buyer x Coop 
share grapes 
   0.0048*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0039*** 
(0.0011) 
   
Coop share wine       0.0001 
(0.0010) 
-0.0011 
(0.0022) 
Coop buyer x Coop 
share wine 
      0.0021** 
(0.0010) 
0.0016* 
(0.0009) 
Constant  4.4317*** 
(0.0422) 
3.9620*** 
(0.1269) 
 4.3352*** 
(0.0384) 
3.9611*** 
(0.1253) 
 4.3223*** 
(0.0389) 
3.9559*** 
(0.1282) 
Random intercept 
year (ζ1t) 
 0.2285*** 
(0.0672) 
  0.2288*** 
(0.0672) 
  0.2290*** 
(0.0673) 
Random intercept 
department (ζ2k) 
 0.0938*** 
(0.0272) 
  0.0860*** 
(0.0244) 
  0.0896*** 
(0.0291) 
Interaction between 
year & department 
(ζ3tk) 
 0.0799*** 
(0.0153) 
  0.0794*** 
(0.0149) 
  0.0823*** 
(0.0161) 
εitk  0.2662*** 
(0.0027) 
  0.2661*** 
(0.0027) 
  0.2662*** 
(0.0027) 
N 5,042 5,042  5,042 5,042  5,042 5,042 
R2 0.353   0.351   0.348  
Χ2  2262.8   2280.1   2297.5 
Log likelihood -1688.6 -557.2  -1694.4 -554.4  -1707.3 -558.5 
AIC 3399.2 1144.4  3410.9 1138.8  3436.6 1147.0 
BIC 3471.0 1242.2  3482.7 1236.6  3508.4 1244.9 
* Significant at= 0.10, ** significant at=0.05, *** significant at= 0.01  
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: own calculations  
The Χ2 indicates that a likelihood ratio test comparing the ML with its respective OLS 
regression confirms the existence of level effects in the data. Hence, the ML regression model 
is preferred over the OLS. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) values for the ML regressions are less than those for the OLS 
regressions, indicating that the ML model has a better fit.9 The Intra Class Correlation (ICC), 
which is the percentage of the variance in each ML regression that is explained by the levels, 
confirms that the use of levels is appropriate. Table 10 shows the values for each ML regression 
and level, with differences between years explaining around 38% of the variance in each ML 
specification.  
Following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), we calculated the coefficient of determination 
(R2) between the null ML (including no covariates) and the full ML (including all covariates). 
The coefficient indicates that 31.5% of the variance is explained by the covariates in the ML 
regression considering the share of surface, and 32.1% and 31.5% in the cases of the share of 
grapes and wine, respectively.10 
The estimated coefficients of the control variables in the ML regressions have the expected 
signs: a one-unit increase in the price of must causes a 1.2% increase in the price of wine. A 
 
9 The analysis of the residuals indicates that the error term is normally distributed and homoscedastic. Regarding 
spatial autocorrelation, we calculated the Moran I test to see if prices paid in one location are related to prices paid 
in another location. We can only localize our data in 11 departments. Because we do not have geographical 
information for each transaction, the tests are rather limited in their applicability. Running a spatial regression 
would require geo references for the data. Correlation of errors between neighbouring departments will not bias 
estimates in the multilevel regression which introduces random intercepts for each department. 
10 The subscript 0 indicates the null ML regression (without covariates) and the subscript 1 indicates the full ML 
regression (with covariates).  
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one-unit increase in the percentage of farmers with 5 or less hectares causes a 0.63% decrease 
in the price of wine (in two out of the three specifications). Red wine is approximately 55% 
more expensive than white wine. Lastly, as expected, large wineries pay higher prices than 
medium and small wineries, and wineries with a brand pay higher prices than wineries without 
a brand.  
Table 10: Intra Class Correlation for each level variable for different cooperative strength measures 
Level 
Cooperative strength measure 
Surface Grapes Wine 
Shared of the variance explained by differences 
between years 
37.7% 38.2% 38% 
Shared of the variance explained by differences 
between departments 
6.3% 5.4% 5.8% 
Shared of the variance explained by differences 
between years and departments 
4.6% 4.6% 4.9% 
Source: own calculations 
The coefficient on the variable COOPBUYER is negative and statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 0.01 significance level, indicating that on average the price offered by 
cooperatives is less than that offered by IOFs. The coefficient on the variable COOPSHARE in 
the ML regressions is negative, but not statistically significant, suggesting the increased 
presence of cooperatives in a department does not have an effect on the price paid in that 
department. The interaction term COOPBUYER x COOPSHARE is positive and statistically 
significant in the three specifications.  
Taken together, these results indicate that on average cooperatives pay a lower price than IOFs, 
but that the size of this discount falls as cooperative strength increases. As Table 11 shows, the 
predicted average price differential in 2007 for the three measures of cooperative strength 
(surface, grapes and wine) are -3.85%, -3.54% and -2.99%, respectively.11 The average, 
however, masks considerable variance across departments. Using the cooperative share of grape 
production as the measure of cooperative strength, and examining the case in 2007, the 
predicted price differential ranges from a low of -9.27% for Santa Rosa where cooperative 
strength is 2.49% to 7.74% for the department of General Alvear where cooperative strength is 
45.55%. When the other two measures of cooperative strength are used, the results are 
qualitatively similar. The results are also qualitatively similar for the other years. When 
 
11 Calculations are available from the authors upon request. 
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averaged over all years and departments, as well as across the three cooperative strength 
measures, the predicted price differential between cooperatives and IOFs is -3.37%. In the case 
of San Rafael and General Alvear, the only departments with a positive price differential 
between cooperatives and IOFs, the predicted average price difference is 2.4%.  
Table 11: Predicted average net price differentials by department using different cooperative strength 
measures, 2007 
Department  
Cooperative 
Strength–Surface   
Cooperative 
Strength–Grapes   
Cooperative 
Strength–Wine 
Share 
in 
2007 
Estimated 
price 
differential 
  
Share 
in 
2007 
Estimated 
price 
differential 
  
Share 
in 
2007 
Estimated 
price 
differential 
(%) 
Luján de 
Cuyo 0 - 
 0 -  0 - 
Tupungato 0 -  0 -  0 - 
Santa Rosa 3.21 -6.49  2.49 -9.27  3.13 -5.8 
Tunuyán 3.33 -6.36  9.28 -6.51  10.45 -4.54 
Maipú 4 -6.07  4.14 -8.42  4.01 -5.46 
Rivadavia 4.19 -6.17  6.28 -7.73  4.17 -5.58 
Junín 6.85 -5.42  14.22 -4.59  7.94 -4.95 
San Martín 9.52 -4.65  14.11 -4.6  15.46 -3.7 
San Carlos 11.61 -4.05  25.84 0  56.15 2.82 
San Rafael 34.5 2.18  29.53 1.5  27.94 -1.65 
General 
Alvear 35.2 2.34   45.55 7.74   50.37 1.95 
Average  -3.85  
 
-3.54  
 
-2.99 
Minimum  -6.49  
 
-9.27  
 
-5.8 
Maximum   2.34     7.74     2.82 
Source: own calculations 
It is important to note that the recorded transaction data does not include information on the 
level of sugar or acidity, which means it is not possible to determine if these factors influence 
the price that is paid. However, as was discussed earlier, non-varietal wine is an inexpensive 
wine made with low oenological quality grapes. Therefore, it can be considered a homogenous 
good for which quality differentials do not play an important role. 
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3.6 Discussion 
The results of the analysis show that, first, cooperatives on average pay lower prices than IOFs 
and, second, the price differential between cooperatives and IOFs in a department depends 
importantly on the strength of the cooperatives. Regardless of how cooperative strength is 
measured, the larger is the presence of cooperatives in a department, the more likely it is that 
cooperatives pay a higher price than IOFs. These results have implications for understanding 
why growers sell to cooperatives and whether cooperatives offer a yardstick of competition. We 
examine the second of these two points first. 
As shown in Table 11, the stronger is the presence and strength of cooperatives in a department, 
the smaller is the discount in the price paid by cooperatives. In fact, when the cooperative 
strength is large enough (the data suggest a dividing line at about 30%), the cooperative offers 
a premium over the IOF. One of the inferences from this result is that cooperatives can provide 
a positive price differential compared to IOFs, as long as they are able to overcome their 
property rights and governance problems sufficiently to lower costs, thus allowing them to 
operate more competitively and to expand their operations.  
It is important to note that the regression results indicate that while a sufficiently high 
cooperative strength will lead to a premium over the IOF price, it does not lead to higher IOF 
prices. Thus, cooperatives effectively only offer a price premium to the growers that sell them 
their produce; this premium does not extend to the growers that sell their product to the IOFs.  
Regarding the first point, although cooperatives offer lower prices than IOFs in many of the 
departments, it does not follow that removing cooperatives from these markets would result in 
better prices for all farmers. Two remarks are relevant here. First, even if cooperatives do not 
offer prices as high as those offered by IOFs, their presence can nevertheless enhance 
competition and result in prices higher than what would otherwise be the case. This outcome 
can be observed in the data presented in Table 11, where decreasing shares of cooperatives’ 
strength result in even larger price discounts relative to IOFs. More data and analysis, however, 
would be required to analyse prices paid in the total absence of cooperatives in detail.  
Second, it is clear that, even though cooperatives are offering lower prices than the IOFs, 
growers are still patronising them. Thus, cooperatives must be offering some value to producers. 
As mentioned earlier, producers’ selling decisions may be influenced by other factors besides 
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price, such as the services offered by cooperatives. In the case of Mendoza province, these 
services might include political representation through FeCoVitA and access to extension 
services.  
There is also evidence that cooperatives fulfil different functions and serve different producers 
than their IOF counterparts. In particular, there is some support in the data for the argument that 
wine cooperatives serve as the market of last resort for many producers. In ten out of the eleven 
departments analysed, the vineyard size of the cooperatives’ members is considerably smaller 
than the average size of producers in the department. On average, a cooperative member’s 
vineyard size is 6.8 hectares, while an average producer’s vineyard is 10.2 hectares. In addition, 
the average volume of a cooperative’s purchase is 25% smaller than the average firm’s 
purchase.  
Wine cooperatives in Mendoza may help farmers withstand rapid structural change. One of the 
pieces of evidence for this conclusion is that cooperatives are more prominent in zones where 
production is declining. Specifically, cooperatives’ share of the surface area is greatest in 
departments that have seen the largest drops in grape production. Between 1985 and 2012, San 
Rafael and General Alvear, two of the departments with the highest cooperative strength, have 
decreased their share of the provincial planted surface by 48% and 57%, respectively (National 
Institute of Viticulture, 2016). In addition, both departments have the smallest average farm size 
in the province (National Institute of Viticulture, 2016). In contrast, cooperative strength is very 
small in the two departments (Tunuyán and Tupungato) that have nearly tripled their planted 
surface over the same period.  
Cooperatives may also be the markets of last resort for low capital, part-time farmers or farmers 
close to retirement. In 2009, a survey of 663 members of the cooperatives associated with 
FeCoVitA indicated that 38% were older than 60 years and 42% had trellises (productive 
infrastructure) in regular or bad state; aging vineyards were also mentioned as a major problem 
(Neiman et al., 2009). This data suggests that many of the members cannot afford to maintain 
their productive infrastructure; one reason might be the comparatively high maintenance costs 
relative to vineyard scale. Small-scale grower operations that use the cooperative as the market 
of last resort directly affect the performance of the cooperative, making it costlier to run. 
Moreover, the unlimited delivery rights enjoyed by members may lead cooperatives to handle 
higher volumes than optimal from time to time, or to be subject to large production swings, 
making their operations less efficient. For these reasons, cooperatives may not fulfil the same 
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functions as their investor-oriented counterparts, which in turn could at least partly explain their 
persistence despite the lower prices they pay.  
If cooperatives have higher costs, due to the smaller size of the producers with which they deal, 
it limits their ability to pay a higher price. In such a situation, it might be expected that in 
equilibrium only those farmers that are willing to accept a lower price would deal with 
cooperatives, which in turn results in higher costs for the cooperative and less ability to pay 
higher prices. The finding in the regressions that an increase in the percentage of small-scale 
farmers in a department is associated with lower prices is consistent with this argument. 
Acknowledging that a third of the producers in the province continue to deliver to cooperatives 
even though they pay lower prices leads us to reconsider the role of the cooperative system in 
Mendoza. Our findings, for instance, shed light on the role of cooperatives as a defensive means 
for small scale-farmers to deal with the hardships of ongoing structural change in the wine 
sector. In this vein, cooperatives may represent a way to stay in the non-varietal wine market 
and provide farmers with political representation, albeit at the cost of a lower price received.  
3.7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we analysed cooperative pricing in the Argentinean wine industry. Motivated by 
contrasting theoretical predictions of cooperative price effects, we applied a multilevel 
regression model to identify price differences at the transaction level and the departmental level. 
We found that across most of the departments in Mendoza, cooperatives pay less to farmers 
than IOFs. Cooperatives have larger market shares in departments with declining grape 
production, and cooperative members have smaller farms than the average. 
We suggest that the inability of cooperatives to pay a price equal to or greater than that paid by 
the IOFs can be explained by the market structure for non-varietal wine in Argentina. 
Specifically, there is evidence that cooperative members differ from other farmers in terms of 
size, assets and the cost of accessing the market. For instance, our findings indicate cooperative 
members are smaller and have older and less efficient technology, which means they may have 
fewer options when it comes to marketing their output and hence less ability to access higher 
price buyers. These structural features can be expected to result in higher costs for the 
cooperative, which reduces its ability to pay a higher price for grapes. The lack of a higher price 
paid by cooperatives does not necessarily mean that they are not exerting a yardstick effect. If 
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the cooperative presence increases competition for non-varietal wine, prices may be higher than 
in a situation without cooperatives.  
Worldwide, farmers are confronted with rapid structural change, increasing quality 
requirements, and powerful downstream actors. Understanding the role of cooperatives on farm 
incomes and market access in this environment is important. As has been argued in this paper, 
it is essential that the analysis focus on more than just pricing, since if cooperatives fulfil other 
functions not accounted for in standard treatments of cooperative behaviour, then the true role 
of cooperatives in the market will not be understood unless the frame of analysis is widened to 
include these additional elements.   
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Abstract 
Since the 1990s, Argentinean dairy-processing cooperatives have lost considerable amounts of 
members and market share. We analyse their current role by investigating the characteristics of 
farmers who continue delivering to them and price differentials between cooperatives and 
Investor-Oriented Firms (IOFs). A probit regression model applied to 917 farmers suggests that 
cooperative farmers are more disadvantaged than farmers delivering to IOFs in terms of 
education, farm size and productive technology. Moreover, t-tests applied to data representing 
70% of national volume indicate that farmers delivering to cooperatives are between 11% and 
29% smaller than those delivering to IOFs, depending on province. A hierarchical multilevel 
regression model applied to 9,720 transactions among farmers and processors shows that, after 
controlling for quantity and quality, cooperatives pay lower (3.5%) but more stable prices than 
IOFs. In a context of rapid structural change, we observe a market in which larger farmers 
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deliver to IOFs and smaller farmers deliver to cooperatives and conclude that, at the expense of 
paying lower prices, cooperatives may act as buyers of last resort for otherwise disadvantaged 
farmers.  
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives; Smallholder farmers; Structural change 
4.1 Introduction  
Milk has unique features among agricultural products, which have led to the emergence of dairy 
processing cooperatives (United States Department of Agriculture). Milk’s storage is only 
feasible after being processed. Processing facilities are expensive and show substantial 
economies of scale. Transportation costs are considerable due to milk’s weight and perishability 
concerns, making local farmers and processors interdependent. Therefore, in order to avoid the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour from private processors, farmers form or join dairy processing 
cooperatives (Bijman, 2018; Bonus, 1986).  
Dairy processing cooperatives in Argentina have developed in a peculiar path. Worldwide, dairy 
processing cooperatives have played historically important roles as drivers of new technologies 
and market developers (Cunningham, 2009; Le Cren et al., 2009). In most milk producing 
countries, cooperatives continue to operate as important actors in the processing and marketing 
of dairy products (Depetris de Guiguet and López, 2017; Hanisch et al., 2012). Argentina also 
had a strong cooperative system (Cappellini, 2011). However, since 1990, with the introduction 
of structural reforms, dairy processing cooperative membership bases started to decrease 
sharply, even more so than the dwindling number of dairy farmers. Between 1996 and 2008, 
the number of dairy farmers decreased by 65%, whereas the number of farmers delivering to 
cooperatives decreased by 76%. Consequently, between 1996 and 2014, the share of the total 
number of farmers delivering their produce to cooperatives decreased from 38 to 20% (Ministry 
of Agroindustry, 2014). 
This paper aims to better understand the role of Argentinean cooperatives in the process of rapid 
structural change and their effects on farmers by exploring why some of them have stayed with 
their cooperatives, while others have decided to leave. The decrease in cooperative membership 
bases may indicate either that many members have stopped farming or that cooperative services 
have not been able to keep up with those of Investor-Oriented Firms (IOFs) – or both. In this 
paper we seek to answer two seemingly interrelated research questions: (1) what are the 
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characteristics of farmers who continue supplying dairy cooperatives? and (2) what role do 
price differences between cooperatives and IOFs’ actually play for farmers membership 
choices? The first question explores if cooperatives, due to their open membership policy, are 
dealing with a particular group of farmers. The second question explores to what extent price 
differences between cooperatives and IOFs may drive farmer membership decisions.  
Empirical literature on member characteristics and cooperative price effects has produced 
mixed results. We contribute to the empirical literature with a research perspective that aims at 
integrating both aspects in one analysis. After analysing two extensive and unique data sets, we 
find that Argentinean dairy processing cooperatives deal with the more disadvantaged and 
smaller farmers, paying them lower but more stable prices. These findings challenge and 
complement theoretical claims regarding member characteristics and cooperative price effects; 
therefore, they highlight the need for future theoretical research considering both aspects 
simultaneously.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews and discusses theoretical and 
quantitative empirical literature on developing countries regarding member characteristics and 
cooperative price effects. Section 4.3 outlines the context of our study: the characteristics of the 
Argentinean dairy sector. Section 4.4 describes the data and methods used, while section 4.5 
presents the results. Finally, section 4.6 discusses the findings and presents the conclusions.  
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Member characteristics  
As member-owned organisations, cooperatives have different characteristics than profit-
oriented ones; as a consequence, members are also likely to have different characteristics than 
non-members (Staatz, 1987b). One perspective within the literature holds that farmers who are 
better off, in terms of human and physical capital and access to infrastructure, are more likely 
to be members of cooperatives. However, the empirical evidence for this is inconclusive. 
Farmers with more human capital may be more likely to join, as they may better understand 
cooperative benefits. For example, Matchaya and Perotin (2013) corroborate that number of 
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years of schooling has a positive effect on membership in agricultural cooperatives in Malawi. 
Yet Francesconi and Heerink (2011) find no such effect in Ethiopian agricultural cooperatives.13  
Wealth – estimated by farm size and asset endowment – may determine a farmer’s capacity to 
pool resources in a cooperative and, therefore, to join it. Mojo et al. (2015) find that Ethiopian 
coffee farmers with relatively larger farm sizes are more likely than those with smaller farms to 
participate in cooperatives, and Fischer and Qaim (2012) provide similar evidence for Kenyan 
banana farmers possessing relatively greater farm assets. To the contrary, however, Chagwiza 
et al. (2016) claim that smaller Kenyan grain farmers are more likely to participate than larger 
ones. Lastly, Schöll et al. (2016) find that farm size has no effect on participation.  
Infrastructure availability, including access to roads, information and extension services, may 
increase the likelihood of farmers participating in a cooperative. For instance, shorter distances 
to roads can increase their probability of delivering their produce to a cooperative or attending 
meetings and trainings. Nevertheless, although Verhofstadt and Maertens (2015) find evidence 
of a positive effect due to infrastructure in Rwandan horticulture and maize cooperatives, 
Abebaw and Haile (2013) find no evidence of such an effect in Ethiopian agricultural 
cooperatives.  
Meanwhile, another strand within the literature suggests that middle-sized farmers have a 
higher likelihood of being members of cooperatives. Bernard and Spielman (2009) propose a 
middle-class effect: very small and very large farmers may not derive sufficient benefits from 
cooperatives to cover the constant costs of participation (financial contributions, time dedicated 
to meetings, etc). Consequently, middle-sized farmers may be more likely to participate. To our 
knowledge, however, no study has yet empirically analysed the middle-class effect.  
Lastly, in recent years several authors have proposed that farmers participating in cooperatives 
are becoming increasingly heterogeneous in size, attitudes and objectives. Explaining his 
lifecycle framework, Cook (2018) states that, in order to grow, cooperatives are trying to attract 
new members who may have different preferences than those of original members. Structural 
changes in the farming sector and expansion of cooperative activities in agribusiness contexts 
may also intensify differences between members (Bijman 2005 as cited in Höhler and Kühl, 
2018). Further, in order to meet the requirements of high-quality market segments, cooperatives 
 
13 Some of the studies considered in this section are mentioned more than once. For reasons of space, the sector 
and country studied are only provided the first time the study is referenced.  
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may foster farm-level differentiation to obtain access to differentiated products (Bogetoft and 
Ballebye Olesen, 2006). 
We have not found any empirical literature specifically analysing degrees of member of 
heterogeneity, but there are a few studies regarding how member heterogeneity affects 
cooperative decision-making processes and their results. For Brazilian agricultural 
cooperatives, Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn (2013) find that member heterogeneity increases their 
democratic costs. Meanwhile, Banerjee et al. (2001) find that larger members in Indian 
sugarcane cooperatives use their power to depress sugarcane prices, leading cooperatives to 
retain gains that profit larger members disproportionately. 
Summing up, existing empirical studies exploring cooperative member characteristics do not 
always corroborate theoretical claims and, unfortunately, generally do not provide much 
explanation for their results. Apart from the mixed results discussed above, most studies refer 
to different countries, institutional settings and products, preventing further comparative 
analysis of their findings. 
4.2.2 Cooperative price effects as member incentives  
From a neoclassical economics perspective, different firms, such as IOFs and cooperatives, may 
pay different prices for agricultural products due to ownership structure, imperfect information, 
or product characteristics. First, ownership structure means that farmer-owned organisations 
most likely have different objectives than IOFs (Sukhtankar, 2016).14 Different objectives may 
lead to different price policies and, according to the structure of the market, to a particular 
market equilibrium (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). Second, if farmers have imperfect information, 
they may accept lower prices from one purchaser, since they do not know the prices paid by all 
other buyers (Sauer et al., 2012). Third, highly perishable, costly to transport, and spatially 
distributed products, such as milk and vegetables, may be sold to the closest buyer, even at 
lower prices (Graubner et al., 2011).  
 
14 While IOFs are typically assumed to pursue profit maximization, user-owned organisations such as cooperatives 
may pursue diverse objectives, including maximization of net earnings (similar to IOFs), maximization of per-unit 
returns to farmers for product sold or minimization of the per-unit price paid by members for goods or services 
purchased, maximization of overall member returns (from cooperative plus farm-level profits), or maximization 
of volume transacted (inputs sold or produce purchased) to achieve economies of scale, reduce excess capacity, or 
increase market share (Levay, 1983). 
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Concerning the empirical literature, we have only found studies analysing ownership structure, 
with mixed results. Some of the previously mentioned studies find that cooperatives pay higher 
prices than their competitors, due to their ownership structures (Shiferaw et al., 2008; Wollni 
and Zeller, 2007), whereas others find no price differential (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Shumeta and 
D’Haese, 2016). Some studies find that results depend on the country and institutional 
background analysed. For instance, Sauer et al. (2012) find dairy cooperatives pay higher prices 
than IOFs in Armenia and Ukraine but not in Moldova. 
From a new institutional economics perspective, prices may be influenced by transaction costs, 
mainly including the costs of gathering and processing information needed to carry out 
transactions, reaching decisions, and negotiating and enforcing contracts (Staatz, 1987a). 
Whether transaction costs increase or decrease cooperative prices remains open, depending on 
circumstances. On the one hand, if cooperatives deal with multiple small-scale farmers, the total 
cost of organising multiple transactions may negatively affect their ability to pay the same 
prices as IOFs. On the other hand, if cooperatives have closer relationships to their members 
than IOFs to their input providers, mutual trust may decrease their costs for organising 
transactions. Moreover, cooperative cost structures may be affected by their lack of well-
defined property rights and consequent free-rider, horizon and portfolio problems (Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos, 2013; Nilsson, 2001). 
Studies analysing transaction costs have also generated mixed results. For example, Bernard et 
al. (2008) and Fischer and Qaim (2012) find that cooperatives pay higher prices than their 
competitors. However, Padrón et al. (2012), analysing Mexican coffee cooperatives, find that 
price differentials are related to specific products handled by cooperatives. Only processing 
cooperatives pay higher prices than IOFs, whereas cooperatives dealing with dry coffee paid 
lower prices than IOFs. To the best of our knowledge, this last study is the only one finding that 
cooperatives pay lower prices. 
Cooperative objectives can also have an effect on price volatility. Even if performing in 
increasingly volatile international markets, cooperatives may pay more stable prices and 
provide a safety net against price risks (Shumeta and D’Haese, 2016). Small-scale farmers may 
try to protect themselves from price volatility, because it increases their vulnerability to poverty 
(Jena et al. 2012). Additionally, price volatility can have negative effects on farmers’ costs for 
managing risks and possibilities for financing investments (Tothova, 2011). 
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Regarding price stability, Milford (2014) and Mujawamariya et al. (2013) find that cooperatives 
pay more stable prices than their competitors do. Analysing Mexico and Rwanda, respectively, 
since both studies refer to coffee cooperatives participating in the Fairtrade system, it remains 
unclear whether the results can be attributed to the cooperatives or Fairtrade.  
Overall, existing research on cooperative effects on price setting is more frequent than on price 
volatility. Most studies attribute cooperatives paying higher prices than IOFs to their ownership 
structures. However, in many cases, the linkage between theories and cases is only vaguely 
articulated. Unfortunately, as in the analysis of member characteristics, there are not many 
studies focusing on the same country and sector, which would allow comparing and contrasting 
of different studies’ findings. Consequently, analysis of member characteristics and price effects 
of cooperatives remain interesting topics for further analysis. Before presenting our study, the 
following section introduces the sector we have explored.  
4.3 The dairy sector in Argentina and the historical role of cooperatives 
Argentina’s dairy sector has national and international relevance. In 2015, the country generated 
around 2% of the world’s dairy production and it was the third largest exporter of whole-milk 
powder in the world (Ministry of Treasure and Public Finances, 2016). In 2017, there were 
9,955 milk producers, with 173 cows on average, and 87% of them were located in Buenos 
Aires, Córdoba and Santa Fe – the main dairy producing provinces (National Agri-Food Health 
and Quality Service, 2017)  
The Argentinean dairy processing sector is highly heterogeneous. In 2010, ten large high-
technology firms – with a daily processing capacity greater than 250,000 litres – produced 
multiple products for domestic and export markets. Meanwhile, about 25 to 30 medium- to 
large-sized firms (between 50,000 and 250,000 litres capacity) focused mainly on the domestic 
market, and 50 medium-sized firms (between 10,000 and 50,000 litres capacity) worked at the 
regional level. Lastly, around 700 small firms (less than 10,000 litres capacity) produced cheese 
with basic technology for local markets (Cappellini, 2011). Regarding market share 
concentration, in 2009, the top five firms processed 43.5% of the country’s milk, with the two 
main firms being Mastellone Hnos (IOF) and SanCor (cooperative), having 14.9% and 10.9% 
market shares, respectively (Cappellini, 2011).  
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In order to understand the development and former role of cooperatives, it is necessary to look 
closer at the Argentinean dairy cooperative system’s history. In 1930, four primary dairy 
cooperatives opened their own processing plant, creating the first dairy processing cooperative 
in South America (Olivera, 2008). In 1937, there were 78 dairy cooperatives, pooling milk to 
process or to sell to processing firms. At that time, farmers claimed that processing firms were 
paying low prices, cheating on milk quality, i.e., telling farmers their milk was lower grade than 
it actually was, and delaying payments (Olivera, 2008), so cooperatives were seen as a 
countervailing power.  
In 1938, SanCor, a second-tier processing cooperative, was created to service 16 primary 
cooperatives. By 1947, SanCor linked 155 cooperatives and represented 34.5% of butter and 
23.5% of casein production at the national level (Olivera, 2011). SanCor introduced modern 
processing technologies in the industry and drove implementation of new agricultural practices 
among farmers through primary cooperatives. Moreover, it acquired its own truck fleet to 
transport milk, invested in improving rural roads, and provided credit to its primary 
cooperatives to acquire new machinery (Olivera, 2013). In 1984, there were 355 cooperatives 
associated with SanCor, which had a significant share of the consumer market, with its own 
branded products and exporting part of its production internationally (Lattuada et al., 2011).15  
In 1990 an economic liberalisation process was set in motion, which included deregulating and 
opening markets (Gutman et al., 2003), and triggered a structural change in the sector. To gain 
presence in international export markets, firms had to comply with private quality standards 
and quality certification programs (Farina et al., 2005). Foreign investment led to efficiency 
gains in many firms and more competition in the domestic market. Yet, exposure to international 
dairy markets also introduced price fluctuations and external competition (Gutman and Ríos, 
2010). Consequently, some small processing firms disappeared, and the role of cooperatives in 
an increasingly internationalising market changed. They were no longer leading technological 
change and innovation but, rather, struggling with the new scenario. These external factors and 
internal problems associated with efficiency in management and decision-making resulted in a 
decrease of SanCor’s market share, from 18.4% to 14.9%, between the 1996 and 2004 (Ministry 
of Agroindustry, 2016; SanCor, 2001, 2005). In 2005, SanCor restructured as a first-tier 
 
15 There is no historical data for the total number of dairy cooperatives or individual records of other cooperatives 
besides SanCor, which would have allowed us to provide a more complete characterization of the Argentinean 
cooperative system.  
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cooperative with the aim of increasing efficiency by organising transactions directly with 
farmers and; therefore, decrease management costs (Ressel and Silva, 2008).  
The liberalisation process forced farmers to increase their scale and comply with higher quality 
standards or to disappear. These higher quality standards resulted in the introduction of new 
animal genetic and feeding technologies, among others, with a resulting increase in costs 
(Lattuada et al., 2011). Because of the need to increase scale to absorb such costs and growing 
competition for the use of land with more profitable agricultural activities, such as soybeans, 
between 1988 and 2002, 65% of dairy farmers abandoned the activity, although average herd 
size doubled (from 66 to 131 cows per farmer). This was accompanied by an increase in 
heterogeneity among farmers: whereas 20% of them remained working on a small scale (less 
than 50 cows), the number of large-scale farmers (more than 200 cows) increased by 800% 
between 1988 and 2002 (National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, 2002).  
Like in most other milk producing countries and as our brief history above has shown, 
Argentina’s dairy sector has developed a strong cooperative system; however, there have been 
some rather drastic changes since the 1990s. Whereas in 1991 cooperatives processed 24% of 
national volume (Fernández et al., 2004), in 2014 that share was estimated at 16% (Ministry of 
Agroindustry, 2016; SanCor, 2014). Between 1996 and 2014, the number of farmers delivering 
their milk to cooperatives decreased from 8,000 to 1,400, indicating that many farmers left the 
activity, with some leaving their cooperatives, while others retained membership (Ministry of 
Agroindustry, 2014). Although the cooperative system entail benefits for their members such 
as the representation – via SanCor – of their interests in negotiations with other actors in the 
value chain and the public policy arena (Lattuada et al., 2011), there is no information regarding 
the price effects of cooperatives and the characteristics of the members. The next section 
describes the two different data sets and methods of analysis we used.  
4.4 Data and methods   
4.4.1 Member characteristics 
To analyse member characteristics, we used two different methods and data sets. First, 917 
records of farmers from the Dairy Sector Survey conducted by the National Institute of 
Agricultural Technology (INTA) were used to estimate a probit model. The survey 
corresponded to the agricultural years 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, and 2005/2006, and was 
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performed in Córdoba, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires. This repeated cross-sectional survey 
represented around 3% of the farmers of each province.  
In our probit model, the explanatory variables related to farmers and their farms’ characteristics. 
Besides age and education, we included the relationship between agricultural and non-
agricultural income. Regarding farm characteristics, if farmers milk themselves and do not own 
a tie-stall barn, it may indicate a less professionalised and efficient farm structure (Cominiello, 
2016), which may also be indicated by the number of cows. The farm’s productivity may be 
related to the average daily number of litres obtained per cow. Lastly, the milk’s quality is 
indicated by the fat and protein percentage. Table 12 describes the variables used in the probit 
model.  
Table 12: Socio-economic variables and summary statistics of sampled farmers 
Variable 
name Description 
Members (N=400)  Non-members (N=517) 
Mean  Standard deviation 
Min/Ma
x 
 Mean  Standard deviation Min/Max 
Age Farmer age in 
years 
49.91 11.89 23/82  51.72 11.63 24/83 
Secondary 
or higher 
education 
= 1 if farmer 
has 12 or more 
years of 
schooling  
0.59 
 
0/1  0.71 
 
0/1 
Agricultura
l income 
larger than 
non-
agricultural 
= 1 if farmer 
agricultural 
income is 
larger than 
non-
agricultural 
income 
0.87  0/1  0.78  0/1 
Owner 
milks  
= 1 if farmer 
milks himself 
0.16  0/1  0.10  0/1 
Cows Number of 
adult cows 
129.2 84.25 15/1200  175.2 153.1 30/1,600 
Tie-stall 
barn  
= 1if farmer 
has a tie-stall 
barn 
0.52 
 
0/1  0.66 
 
0/1 
Daily litres 
per cow 
Average litres 
per cow per 
day 
20.33 4.90 7.4/35.3  20.20 4.96 4.84/35.06 
Average 
perc. of fat 
Milk’s average 
percentage of 
fat 
3.53 0.15 2.89/4.27  3.52 0.22 2.62/4.84 
Average 
perc. of prot 
Milk’s average 
percentage of 
protein 
3.19 0.13 2.74/4  3.20 0.14 2.5/4.29 
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Source: own calculations, based on data from INTA’s Dairy Sector Survey (2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, and 
2005/2006)  
Second, to analyse in depth farmers’ size, we examined a data set with 46,400 monthly records 
of milk sales between 6,620 farmers and 132 dairy processing firms at the national level for 
seven months during the 2013/14 agricultural year, provided by the Ministry of Agroindustry. 
This data represents 70% of the national volume transacted for that (Ministry of Treasury and 
Public Finances, 2016). It is important to highlight that only 5.3% of the respective farmers 
were simultaneously selling to two different processors, rendering side-selling or simultaneous 
sales as a phenomenon of limited relevance. We calculated Student’s T-tests to analyse, from a 
farm perspective, the size and heterogeneity of farmers according to their decisions to deliver 
to cooperatives or IOFs and, from a firm perspective, the size of the transactions performed by 
cooperatives and IOFs compared to other buyers in the same province. Both analyses seek to 
shed light on the attributes of farmers delivering to cooperatives and IOFs, respectively.    
4.4.2 Cooperative price effects  
We used 9,720 monthly records of milk sales between farmers and firms to analyse the price 
effect of cooperatives, taken from the already mentioned Dairy Sector Survey. To analyse milk 
prices’ determinants, we used a multilevel regression model. To analyse price volatility between 
different buyers (cooperatives and IOFs), we calculated prices’ coefficients of variation.   
In our multilevel model, the dependent variable was farm gate price. We compared prices 
according to buyer type (cooperative or IOF), but we did not have enough data to categorise 
sellers into members or non-members of cooperatives. Since cooperative members did not 
receive an end-of-season or end-of-year patronage refund (López and Vaudagna, 2017), prices 
paid by IOFs and cooperatives could be compared as such.16 Prices were deflated, using the 
Wholesale Price Index for milk provided by the Argentinean Ministry of Economics.  
The explanatory variables related to the product, buyer, and location of each transaction. 
Regarding the product, we focused on volume and quality (measured by milk’ average 
percentage of solids, which are composed by protein and fat), expecting they would have a 
positive effect on prices. Firms were categorised as large, medium and small, according to 
expert criteria; since larger firms could benefit from economies of scale, we expected them to 
 
16 No farmer was dealing simultaneously with a cooperative and an IOF.  
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pay higher prices.17 We introduced firm type (cooperative or IOF) to analyse whether there was 
a price differential between cooperatives and IOFs. By introducing the location of the 
transaction, we sought to account for the structural differences among the three provinces 
included in the analysis, such as cooperative performance levels. In 2008, dairy cooperatives 
processed 25% of the provincial production in Santa Fe and 32.9% in Córdoba, while they only 
processed 10.6% in Buenos Aires (Obschatko et al., 2011). In terms of firm type, whereas 
Mastellone Hnos (largest IOF in the country) concentrates its activities mainly in the province 
of Buenos Aires, SanCor (largest cooperative) does so in Córdoba and Santa Fe. Some variables 
were transformed to logarithms to improve their distributional properties. Table 13 describes 
the variables used in the multilevel model. 
Table 13: Economic and productive variables and summary statistics of sampled transactions 
Variable 
name Description 
Members (N=3,269)   Non-members (N=6,451) 
Mean  Std. Dev. Min/ Max   Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Min/Max 
Price Deflated price per milk litre in Pesos  1.23 0.14 1.00/3.23  1.30 0.22 1.00/3.56 
Litres 
sold 
Monthly milk 
volume sold in 
litres 10.78 0.61 8.17/13.32  10.98 0.080 7.09/13.74 
Ln solids 
Natural logarithm 
of the percentage of 
solids per milk litre -2.68 0.03 -2.8/-2.49  -2.69 0.05 -2.97/-2.36 
Firm 
medium 
= 1 if buyer is a 
medium firm 0.21  0/1  0.42 0.49 0/1 
Firm 
small 
= 1 if buyer is a 
small firm 0  0/1  0.22  0/1 
Prov Cba = 1 if province is Córdoba 0.40  0/1  0.10  0/1 
Prov Sta 
Fe 
= 1 if province is 
Santa Fe 0.58 
 0/1  0.45  0/1 
Source: own calculations, based on data from INTA’s Dairy Sector Survey (2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, and 
2005/2006) 
Our multilevel regression model acknowledges the different levels of aggregation in the data, 
which can only be partially achieved by introducing dummy variables to account for levels in 
an ordinary least squares regression (Robson and Pevalin, 2016). In comparison with ordinary 
least squares regressions, multilevel regressions render more properly estimated standard errors 
and corrected degrees of freedom (Huang, 2018). Here, the hierarchical multilevel model 
 
17 An expert from INTA provided the categorisation used here.  
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allowed us to acknowledge that observations correspond to different months that belong to 
different years. Grouping observations by month allowed us to consider price differentials due 
to seasonal factors, such as pasture availability, while grouping observations by year may have 
reflected macroeconomic changes, such as in domestic and international demand for dairy 
products (Gutman et al., 2003). The hierarchical or nested model for observation i in month j 
and year k was formulated as follows:   
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where the betas are coefficients to be estimated, ζ1j, ζ2k and ζ3jk are random intercepts introduced 
by month, year and the interaction between year and month. They are assumed to be normally 
distributed with a zero population mean and variances, ψj, ψk and ψjk, respectively; and each of 
them is uncorrelated across levels. The variable εijk is the residual at observation level, with a 
zero population mean, uncorrelated across observations, years and months, and with a constant 
variance, θ, interpretable as the within-observation variance (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 
2012). Having presented the data sets and proposed our forms of analysis and methods, the next 
section presents the results of our investigation.  
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Analysis of member characteristics 
Farmers delivering to cooperatives are more disadvantaged than farmers delivering to IOFs. 
Farmers with less education and those with larger agricultural income than their non-
agricultural income have a higher probability of delivering to a cooperative. In other words, 
they depend more on agricultural for their livelihood. Moreover, these farmers have a lower 
number of adult cows and are less likely to use a tie-stall barn, which indicates a lower 
technological level. Regarding production, there are no differences of productivity or product 
quality between farmers delivering to cooperatives and IOFs, at a five percent confidence level. 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of data, other quality parameters such as the level of bacteria could 
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not be analysed; therefore, the results regarding milk’ quality are restricted.18 Table 14 reports 
the results.  
Table 14: Member characteristics (probit model) 
Variables Coefficients Standard errors dF/dx (a) 
Age -0.0128*** (0.0039) -0.0047 
Secondary or higher 
education 
-0.2698** (0.1048) -0.1020  
Agricultural income larger 
than non-agricultural 
0.0095 (0.1387) 0.0352 
Owner milks  -0.2788** (0.1171) -0.0824 
Cows -0.0019*** (0.0005) -0.1030 
Tie-stall barn  -0.1870** (0.0934) -0.0703 
Daily litres per cow  0.0018 (0.0087) -0.0006 
Average perc. of fat  0.0812 (0.3662) 0.0302 
Average perc. of prot  0.4694* (0.2548) 0.1740 
Constant -1.1155 (1.151)  
Number of observations 917   
McFadden's R2 0.055   
Log likelihood -593.703   
Likelihood ratio χ2 68.857***   
* Significant at= 0.10, ** significant at=0.05, *** significant at= 0.01 
Note: (a) Marginal change in probabilities evaluated at the sample means 
Source: own calculations, based on data from INTA’s Dairy Sector Survey (2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, and 
2005/2006) 
The goodness of fit of our model, estimated by the McFadden’s pseudo R2, indicates that the 
model lacks high predictive ability. McFadden’s R2 values between 0.2 and 0.4 are considered 
as indicators of extremely good fit (Elder et al., 2012). This suggests that a model including 
variables for which we had no information such as farmers’ risk attitude and trust would 
probably render a better fit. Nevertheless, comparing this model to its alternatives by stepwise 
excluding each variable at a time, the highest drop in the goodness of fit happens when we drop 
the variable adult cows (from 0.055 to 0.040), indicating the relevant contribution of the 
variable to the model’s goodness of fit.  
Using the extensive data set from the Ministry of Agroindustry, we further explored and, again, 
find that farmers delivering to cooperatives are smaller than those delivering to IOFs. We 
 
18 Although statistically significant, valuated at the sample mean of all variables, the probability of delivering to a 
cooperative has a very small marginal change for a year increase in farmers’ age (0.047). Therefore, it was not 
interpreted as relevant.  
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calculated farmers’ average litres delivered per day. At the national level, the percentage of 
small farmers (less than 1,000 litres per day) delivering to cooperatives is almost identical to 
those delivering to IOFs. Regarding medium (1,000 to 2,000) and medium to large size farmers 
(2,001 to 4,000), the percentage of farmers delivering to cooperatives is larger than those 
delivering to IOFs. Therefore, the percentage of large farmers (more than 4,000) is smaller for 
cooperatives than for IOFs, indicating they prefer to sell to other organisations than 
cooperatives. Figure 8 shows these ratios in detail.  
 
Figure 8: Average daily milk litres delivered per farmer according to buyer 
Source: own calculations, based on data from Argentinean Ministry of Agroindustry (2014) 
At provincial level, we confirmed that farmers dealing with cooperatives are smaller and less 
heterogeneous in size than farmers dealing with IOFs. Two sample t-tests comparing the 
average daily deliveries showed that, in three provinces analysed, the average daily number of 
litres transacted with cooperatives is smaller than it was with IOFs, at the 0.01 significance 
level. Where cooperatives have higher market shares, these differences are smaller (between 
15.6 and 21% in Córdoba and 11.1 and 16.3% in Santa Fe) than in Buenos Aires (between 18.2 
and 28.8%), where they do not.  
To analyse heterogeneity, we calculated the range and standard deviation of farmers’ average 
daily litres of milk delivered (Höhler and Kühl, 2018). In each province, the range, which is the 
difference in the average daily deliveries between the smallest and the largest farmer, is less 
pronounced in cooperatives than in IOFs. The Levene test for equal variances showed that 
cooperative farmers have a smaller standard deviation than farmers delivering to IOFs, at the 
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0.01 significance level. Both observations, lower range and lower standard deviation, indicated 
that a particular group of farmers is delivering to cooperatives. This group of farmers is more 
homogeneous in size than farmers delivering to IOFs. Table 15 presents means and standard 
deviations’ comparisons in detail.  
Table 15: Mean and standard deviation comparisons in average daily milk litres delivered per farmer 
according to buyer and province 
Province 
Members (N=9,638)  Non-members (N=36,762) 
N Mean  Std. Dev. Min/Max Range   N Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Min/Max Range 
Buenos 
Aires   895 3,019 2,907 33/19,614 19,581 
   8,080 3,946 4,021 20/32,197 32,177 
Córdoba 4,761 2,340 1,992 23/29,684 29,661  11,119 2,864 2,674 22/35,058 35,036 
Santa Fe 3,982 1,792 1,416 21/23,428 23,407  17,563 2,078 3,030 20/45,465 45,445 
*** Significant at = 0.01 
Notes: (a) H0: mean (Cooperatives) = mean (IOFs) and H1: mean (Cooperatives) ≠ mean (IOFs) 
           (b) H0: standard deviation (Cooperatives) / standard deviation (IOF) = 1 and H1: standard deviation 
(Cooperatives) / standard deviation (IOF) ≠ 1 
Source: own calculations, based on data from Argentinean Ministry of Agroindustry (2013/2014) 
Table 16: Mean and standard deviation comparisons in average daily milk litres delivered per farmer 
according to buyer and province (continued) 
Province 
 Mean 
difference t-
test (a) 
 [95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
difference] 
 Standard 
deviation 
difference f-
test (b) 
   
Buenos 
Aires 
   8.6713***  718 1,138  1.9128*** 
Córdoba  13.6211***  448 598  1.8032*** 
Santa Fe  10.2799***  231 340  2.3491*** 
Notes: (a) H0: mean (Cooperatives) = mean (IOFs) and H1: mean (Cooperatives) ≠ mean (IOFs) 
           (b) H0: standard deviation (Cooperatives) / standard deviation (IOF) = 1 and H1: standard deviation 
(Cooperatives) / standard deviation (IOF) ≠ 1 
Source: own calculations, based on data from Argentinean Ministry of Agroindustry (2013/2014) 
At the firm level, the average cooperative transaction volume is smaller than the IOF’s. The 138 
processing firms that registered transactions during 2013/14 were categorised in four intervals, 
according to their daily processing capacity. For each province and interval, we compared the 
average size of transactions performed by cooperatives and IOFs.19 In 6 out of the 7 
 
19 As there were not cooperative transactions within each daily processing capacity interval and province, 
comparisons were only performed when possible. 
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comparisons, t-tests showed that the average cooperative transaction size is smaller than the 
average transaction size between a farmer and an IOF, at the 0.01 significance level. Table 16 
presents the complete data regarding these differences.  
Table 17: Mean comparisons in average daily litres of milk processed according to buyer, processing 
capacity and province 
Province 
Daily processing 
capacity (in 
litres) (a) 
Members 
(N=9,638)   
Non-members 
(N=36,762) 
 Mean difference t-
test (b) 
N Mean  N Mean   
Buenos 
Aires 
Large 704 3,431  6,160 4,583  8.9618 (0.0000)*** 
Medium to large    537 2,540   
Medium 192 1,507  944 1,769  2.5639 (0.0000)*** 
Small    439 1,406   
Córdoba 
Large 4,215 2,373  7,112 3,168  16.6507 (0.0000)*** 
Medium to large 413 2,454  2,447 2,425   
Medium    1,215 2,372   
Small 133 942  345 1,143  6.1415 (0.000)*** 
Santa Fe 
Large 3,933 1,810  14,017 2,153  11.8991 (0.000)*** 
Medium to large    2,047 2,023   
Medium    892 1,823   
Small 48 236  607 1,084  14.8835 (0.0000)*** 
*** Significant at = 0.01 
Notes: (a) Large = daily processing capacity larger than 250,000 litres. Medium to large = 50,001 to 250,000 
Medium = 10,001 to 50,000. Small = less than 10,000 
           (b) H0: mean (Cooperatives) = mean (IOF), and H1: mean (Cooperatives) ≠ mean (IOF) 
Source: own calculations, based on data from Argentinean Ministry of Agroindustry (2013/2014)  
4.5.2 Analysis of cooperative price effects 
Farmers delivering to cooperatives receive lower prices than farmers delivering to IOFs. Our 
hierarchical multilevel regression model analysed the determinants of milk prices at the 
farmgate level by introducing the variable Cooperative buyer (dummy equal to one when the 
buyer is a cooperative) to analyse whether there was a price differential between cooperatives 
and other firms, while controlling for quality, quantity, location and size of buyer. We find that 
farmers delivering to a cooperative have a negative effect on the price they receive, as 
cooperatives pay, on average, 3.5% less than IOFs. Moreover, our results show the expected 
outcomes in terms of quantity and quality. A one percent increase in litres sold by either group 
of farmers would increase the price paid for milk by 0.01% and increasing the quantity of solids 
by one percent would increase the price paid by 0.31%. In other words, product quality and 
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quantity have a positive effect on prices paid, regardless of the buyer’s type. A medium-sized 
dairy processor would pay 1.26% less than a large firm, and a small firm would also pay less 
than a large firm (though this coefficient was not significant). Lastly, we find that, regardless to 
whom they deliver, farmers located in Córdoba and Santa Fe receive 4.6% and 4.9% less than 
farmers in Buenos Aires. Table 17 reports the results.20 
Table 18: Price determinants (multilevel model) 
Variables Coefficients Standard errors  
Litres sold 0.0107*** (0.0018) 
Ln solids 0.3090*** (0.0274) 
Firm medium -0.0126*** (0.0038) 
Firm small -0.0038 (0.0024) 
Cooperative buyer -0.0359*** (0.0039) 
Prov Cba -0.0474*** (0.0052) 
Prov Sta Fe -0.0521*** (0.0040) 
Constant  -0.9971*** (0.0816) 
Random intercept year (ζ1j) 0.0361*** (0.0122) 
Random intercept month (ζ2k) 0.0306*** (0.0094) 
Interaction between year & month (ζ3jk) 0.0345*** (0.0050) 
εijk  0.1185*** (0.0009) 
Number of observations 9,720  
* Significant at= 0.10, ** significant at=0.05, *** significant at= 0.01 
Source: own calculations, based on data from INTA’s Dairy Sector Survey (2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, and 
2005/2006) 
The multilevel model regression introduced random intercepts for each month and year.21 
Following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), we calculated the coefficient of determination 
(R2) between the null multilevel model (including no covariates) and the full multilevel model 
(including all covariates). The coefficient indicated that 9% of the variance found is explained 
by the covariates in the ML model.22 Appendix 2 presents the residuals of the model.  
 
20 For reasons of space, the estimation results of an OLS model that corroborated the findings were omitted but are 
available upon request.  
21 Running a multilevel model without covariates and year as the only level variable explains 10.6% of the variance 
in the dependent variable (natural logarithm of the real price of milk), while month as the unique level variable 
explains 7.8%. Therefore, both variables appear to be suitable as levels. 
22 The subscript 0 indicates the null ML model (without covariates) and the subscript 1 indicates the full model 
(with covariates).  
𝑅𝑅2 = � �𝜓𝜓�𝑗𝑗0 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑘𝑘0 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘0 + 𝜃𝜃�0� − �𝜓𝜓�𝑗𝑗1 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑘𝑘1 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘1 + 𝜃𝜃�1��
�𝜓𝜓�𝑗𝑗0 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑘𝑘0 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘0 + 𝜃𝜃�0�  
𝑅𝑅2 = [ (0.01362 + 0.0092 + 0.00472 + 0.00092) −  (0.01222 + 0.00942 + 0.0052 + 0.00092)(0.01362 + 0.00092 + 0.00472 + 0.00092) = 0.09 
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Farmers delivering to cooperatives experience less price volatility than farmers delivering to 
IOFs. We measured the realised price volatility with the Coefficient of Variation (CV), which 
is the ratio of the standard deviation over the mean price per agricultural year (O’Connor and 
Keane, 2011). We find that cooperative milk prices are less fluctuant than prices paid by IOFs 
in three out of the four periods considered and in both Córdoba and Santa Fe. Table 18 details 
these results.  
Table 19: Price coefficient of variation according to buyer, period and province 
Province Period 
Cooperatives   IOFs 
N Mean Std. Dev. CV 
 N Mean Std. Dev. CV 
Córdoba 
2001/02 876 1.10 0.14 12.56  1,272 1.22 0.36 29.91 
2002/03 204 1.16 0.34 29.30  108 1.20 0.28 23.81 
2003/04 600 1.31 0.10 7.66  1,008 1.32 0.13 9.85 
2005/06 63 1.21 0.07 6.36  112 1.39 0.19 13.53 
Santa Fe 
2001/02 732 1.11 0.14 13.02  1,656 1.10 0.20 18.08 
2002/03 888 1.16 0.25 21.68  1,560 1.18 0.29 24.78 
2003/04 912 1.27 0.08 6.55  696 1.30 0.12 9.68 
2005/06 98 1.23 0.08 6.42   154 1.20 0.10 8.86 
Source: own calculations, based on Dairy Sector Survey (INTA) (2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, and 2005/2006) 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions  
In a context of structural change where some farmers had left their cooperatives, while others 
had chosen to stay, and aiming to understand the role of Argentinean dairy cooperatives and 
their effects on farmers, our paper set out to analyse two related questions: (1) what are the 
characteristics of farmers who continue supplying dairy cooperatives? and (2) what role do 
price differences between cooperatives and IOFs actually play for farmers’ membership 
choices? We find that farmer characteristics and differentiated pricing motivate their delivery 
decisions and that dairy processing cooperatives in Argentina generally deal with the more 
disadvantaged and smaller farmers. Analysing price determinants, we find that – ceteris paribus 
– cooperatives pay lower but more stable prices to farmer members than IOFs do.  
Our results both challenge and confirm theoretical claims in several ways. First, whereas theory 
suggests that better-off farmers are more likely to be cooperative members, we find that 
Argentinean farmers delivering to cooperatives are more disadvantaged compared to those 
delivering to IOFs in terms of education, number of adult cows and technological facilities. 
Moreover, they depend more on agricultural income than farmers delivering to IOFs.  
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Second, another theoretical claim suggests that middle-sized farmers may be more likely to 
participate in cooperatives, since smaller and larger farmers do not elicit enough benefits from 
membership to cover their participation costs. We, however, observe a quite similar share of 
small farmers in cooperatives and IOFs and a larger share of middle-sized farmers, therefore 
the share of larger farmers is actually much lower in cooperatives.  
Third, in spite of the vast literature suggesting that the heterogeneity of cooperative members 
is increasing, our case reveals a more and more consolidated and mature cooperative sector 
pattern in terms of size classes, in which cooperative members are rather more homogeneous 
as a group than farmers delivering to IOFs. 
Fourth, combining our results from the analysis of member characteristics and prices, we 
suggest that cooperatives’ lower but more stable prices may be related to cooperative farmers 
being smaller than those in IOFs. We believe this pattern to be the result of a “screening for the 
best producers” process (Crespi et al., 2012). Large dairies need to fill their capacity and 
compete among each other for “the best” (larger) milk producers. Large producers allow 
processors to realise economies of scale. The result of this competition is a price premium for 
larger processors. Cooperatives seem to be dealing more and more with another type of farmers, 
the small farmers to whom they cannot pay a competitive price, probably due to higher costs. 
Therefore, we suggest that effects on the cost structure of cooperatives may result from the 
particularities of cooperative members and not from the mentioned cooperative property rights 
problems.  
Finally, our results can contribute to the yet scarce empirical literature on developing countries, 
showing that cooperatives pay more stable prices than their competitors. However, the lower 
price volatility of cooperatives may simply reflect a non-random sorting of risk-averse farmers 
into them (Staatz, 1987b) and not actually indicate a cooperative feature. Nevertheless, even if 
this is the case, it certainly supports our argument that a separation of the market between more 
disadvantaged and less disadvantaged farmers has taken place, generating the observed pattern. 
Our research has some limitations and two key factors that may have affected the results. First, 
regarding information sources, although the transactions registered by the Argentinean Ministry 
of Agroindustry represent a very considerable share of the market (70%), it is likely that smaller 
farmers and firms have a lower propensity to register their transactions, because they probably 
operate with higher degrees of informality. If those farmers were to be considered, the size 
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differential between farmers delivering to cooperatives and IOFs could decrease. Second, the 
data we used to analyse prices corresponds to a period of severe social and economic crisis 
(from 2000/01 through 2003/04) and subsequent recovery (2005/06). It could be that, in those 
years, the unrestricted delivery right provided by cooperatives were of higher value for farmers 
than the lower prices being paid, enabling them to remain producing, despite contraction of 
dairy demand. This points to a need to increase the time span of the analysis. Unfortunately, our 
analysis could not be extended, due to the price stabilisation program implemented in 2007 
(Petrecolla, 2016). Lastly, most of the analysis focuses on the role of SanCor, the largest 
cooperative. However, in 2008, there were 26 medium to small processing cooperatives 
(Obschatko et al., 2011), for which there is scarcely any data or literature available.   
We suggest that, for the smaller and more disadvantaged farmers delivering to cooperatives, the 
value of the right to deliver entailed by membership – in concert with gaining a better bargaining 
position and access to public policy instruments, as revealed in section 4.3 – and lower levels 
of price fluctuation seem to outweigh their price disadvantages. Therefore, we conclude that 
cooperative membership may represent a way of ensuring small farmers against the hardships 
of structural change (Nilsson et al. 2016).  
To arrive at this conclusion, we developed an approach that takes into account the increasing 
heterogeneity among dairy farmers in Argentina, caused by the structural change process begun 
in the 1990s. In the course of this process, we claim that the role of cooperatives has changed 
over time. In order to better understand why some farmers continue to deliver to cooperatives 
that do not pay competitive prices, we integrated the observed growing segmentation among 
dairy farmers into our explanation of the role of cooperatives in dairy production.  
Future research should be directed at establishing causality between price differentials and 
cooperative transaction costs resulting from dealing with great numbers of small-scale farmers. 
The effects of particular features of farmers dealing with cooperatives on cooperative 
performance should be addressed. It could be important to establish whether smaller farmers 
choose cooperatives because of their particular benefits or because IOFs only benefit larger 
farmers, leaving smaller farmers without any choice but to deliver to cooperatives.  
Future theoretical developments could consider cooperative pricing and farmer attributes 
simultaneously, in order to contribute to a meaningful theory of cooperative change. The 
literature on the effects of cooperatives on farmer welfare has generated rather mixed results. A 
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context in which cooperatives pay lower prices than their competitors is generally seen, to a 
degree, as signalling cooperative failure. Our findings suggest that one of the reasons for the 
mixed record cooperatives have had in the literature is based upon problems in their 
conceptualisation and, consequently, we propose that many contexts in which cooperatives 
coexist with IOFs deserve a closer look at the roles that cooperatives and IOFs play. Situations 
that have been modelled as competitive may actually be ones in which, after a period of 
screening and segmentation, cooperatives and IOFs serve quite different actors in the market. 
At the same time, it needs to be considered that the role of cooperatives for market development 
may change over time and that these changes may have to do with the limited ability of 
cooperatives to discriminate against marginal producers. Because cooperatives have to serve 
all members, they may not be able to only retain the most productive farmer as members. 
Cooperatives may then choose to integrate small farmers into markets at the expense of lower 
efficiency and performance, due to their higher transaction costs. Though paying lower average 
prices, they may still convey benefits such as guaranteed delivery rights, lower price volatility 
and greater market access, thus helping farmers to survive in difficult conditions.   
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Abstract 
Policymakers and donors increasingly rely on farmer organisations (FOs)* when implementing 
rural development strategies, though research suggests that targeted groups such as poorer 
households tend to participate less in FOs than richer ones. Here we discuss mechanisms that 
may contribute towards inclusion of disadvantaged households, using primary data from 
Zambian FOs involved in implementing an agricultural subsidy programme and applying 
qualitative comparative analysis to identify individual and combined effects of four explanatory 
factors on inclusion. Our results suggest long-term commitment as a necessary condition. We 
further identify three alternative pathways that explain inclusion while within-case analysis 
describes their underlying causal mechanism: inclusion develops in FOs that show commitment 
and either provide financial services to vulnerable members, promote social identities or 
compensate disadvantaged members for not being able to access subsidised inputs. These 
results can explain why some FOs are more effective than others in reaching disadvantaged 
target groups. 
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives; Producer organisations; Smallholder farmers; Input 
subsidy programme; Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
* This article uses the term farmer organisations to maintain coherence with the local name. Nevertheless, these 
organisations orient themselves according to cooperative principles.   
 
23 The final publication is available at Springer Nature 
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5.1 Introduction 
In recent years, policymakers and donors have shown renewed interest in farmer organisations 
(FOs) to foster rural development (Berkhout et al., 2018; Gouet et al., 2009), expecting them to 
provide services that may reduce transaction costs and other market failures for smallholder 
households, thereby raising production levels and rural incomes (Grashuis and Su, 2019; Thorp 
et al., 2005). They are also considered a cost-effective tool for implementing poverty-reduction 
programmes and channelling external benefits to rural target groups (Chirwa et al., 2005; 
Markelova and Mwangi, 2010; Shiferaw et al., 2011). In this regard, it is often assumed that 
their voluntary and democratic character make FOs participatory for poorer households.  
The FO literature, however, suggests that their terms of membership may marginalise 
participation of poorer households (Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Chirwa et al., 2005; Thorp et 
al., 2005), which has also been observed in empirical studies describing participation through 
membership determinants (E. Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Francesconi and Heerink, 2011; 
Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2015).  
While these studies provide important insights regarding the participation patterns of different 
groups of farmers, we note that FOs are autonomous and member-owned businesses, 
responding to member needs. Thus, the ability and motivation of FOs to promote participation 
of poorer households may be limited. While this is particularly true for FOs in which the 
majority of members prioritise efficiency over equity objectives (Lutz and Tadesse, 2017; World 
Bank, 2008), the opposite may be true for those FOs involved in implementation of poverty-
reduction programmes. Here, the effectiveness of such programmes may partly depend on the 
ability of FOs to reach intended target groups, making inclusion or the participatory scope quite 
relevant. Such FOs may be required to extend their membership to households who are entitled 
to programme benefits but who may lack resources and abilities to participate as members in 
FOs. To describe this process, inclusion is defined as ‘removal of institutional barriers and 
enhancement of incentives to increase the access of diverse individuals and groups to 
development opportunities’ (World Bank, 2013: 256).  
The literature on FOs proposes a number of organisational factors that may shape inclusion in 
FOs (see section 5.2.3) but common among them is that they have been proposed on an 
individual basis when, in reality, inclusion is a multidimensional concept and may depend on a 
combination of factors (World Bank, 2013). Using comparative case analysis, our aim is to 
106 
 
identify individual factors or combinations of factors explaining inclusion in order to 
investigate the following question: What are the mechanisms contributing towards inclusion of 
disadvantaged households?  
We frame our analysis in the context of Zambia’s Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) that 
identifies and reaches its beneficiaries through local FOs. Yet, previous studies suggest that this 
programme is not fully reaching target groups, as inputs are being diverted to relatively better-
off farmers (Jayne et al., 2018; Mason et al., 2013; Mason and Tembo, 2015; Rickert-Gilbert et 
al., 2013), making this subsidy programme an interesting case for analysing inclusion within 
FOs. 
Beyond complementing the literature on the role of FOs in Zambia’s FISP implementation, this 
paper seeks to contribute to the discussion concerning whether and under what conditions FOs 
may serve as an appropriate tool for channelling benefits from development programmes to 
disadvantaged households. More broadly, we see this paper contributing to the discussion on 
the potentials, limits and conditions for FOs to act as drivers for inclusion. 
The section 5.2 presents conceptual considerations before discussing the state of inclusion in 
Zambia’s subsidy programme and introducing the explanatory factors identified from literature. 
Meanwhile, section 5.3 introduces our qualitative comparative analysis method, case selection 
and operationalisation while section 5.4 and 5.5 present results from cross-case and within-case 
analysis, respectively. We discuss our results in section 5.6 and offer conclusions. 
5.2 Concept of inclusion and empirical background 
5.2.1 Conceptual considerations 
The concept of inclusion seeks to describe a complex social phenomenon that remains relatively 
abstract and difficult to grasp (de Haan, 2011; Pouw and Gupta, 2017). The concept has two 
meanings, either understanding inclusion as a static and desirable outcome or as a process that 
takes place between different actors in society (A. Fischer, 2011). Empirical researchers have 
tended to prefer the first meaning, as it can be measured against predefined indicators via 
standardised quantitative methods. Most commonly, such studies analyse to what extent 
different types of groups are present in a respective programme (Khan et al., 2015). A major 
problem with such application of the concept is that results generated typically do not provide 
meaningful insight regarding underlying mechanisms contributing to observed outcomes.  
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Furthermore, researchers are challenged to identify individuals at risk of exclusion from 
development opportunities as, due to high levels of deprivation in many developing societies, 
it is not always clear who is more disadvantaged, relative to others (Sen, 2000; World Bank, 
2013). In many cases, it is not enough to compare individuals against their relative incomes; 
rather, a more contextualised and relational approach needs to be taken, because whether or not 
individuals are included or excluded often depends on their position in society (Gupta et al., 
2015). Inclusion may be able to correct for unequal power relations, but it may also require 
proactive behaviour towards individuals who lack resources to fully participate on their own 
(Khan et al., 2015). 
5.2.2 Contextualising inclusion in Zambia’s Agricultural Subsidy Programme 
5.2.2.1 Empirical background and programme targets 
Zambia is located in southern Africa and is well endowed with natural resources and relatively 
favourable climatic conditions. Agriculture is the main source of income for the majority of the 
rural population while subsistence farmers, cultivating on average 2.1 hectares of land and 
dedicating almost all resources towards maize production, dominate the agricultural sector 
(Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute, 2016). But there is a visible gender divide, with 
female-headed households cultivating smaller fields (80 versus 61% of female- versus male-
headed households cultivate less than 2 hectares), having lower maize yields (1.9 versus 2.2 kg 
per hectare), earning less (9,000 versus 20,000 Zambian Kwacha gross annual income) and 
being more likely to be poor (85 versus 76%) than their male counterparts (ibid). Overall, 
Zambian agricultural production lags far behind its potential, with food and nutritional-security 
issues remaining alarmingly high. 
Some argue that the country’s overdependence on mineral resources has impeded agricultural 
development (Üllenberg et al., 2017). As of 2016, Zambia held the second and ninth largest 
copper reserves in Africa and the world, respectively (Statista, 2018). Thus, copper production 
has historically evolved as the country’s economic backbone, which induced an early 
urbanisation process, making it today one of the most urbanised countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Historically, this has put additional pressure on the agricultural sector to supply the 
growing urban population with enough food at affordable prices, leaving the country with a 
long history of large-scale subsidy programmes to promote agricultural production and food 
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security. Because maize is both the main staple and commercial crop, it has been highly 
politicised (Mason et al., 2013).  
The current FISP applies a set of eligibility criteria to decide who has the right to benefit from 
the programme, targeting vulnerable but viable farmers who cultivate 0.5 to 5 hectares, can 
prove membership in an FO, have not defaulted on the previous credit programme and are not 
beneficiaries of the Food Security Programme (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 2014a). 
In practice, FISP is a rationed programme, meaning that subsidies are insufficient to serve all 
eligible farmers. Around 30% of all smallholder households receive FISP support, of which 
79% fulfil the eligibility criteria (Mason et al., 2013). Although ‘FISP performed fairly well in 
allocating subsidised fertiliser to eligible households’ (ibid: 617), it turns out that subsidies 
generally do not reach the poorest households but are, rather, diverted to households that 
cultivate relatively larger fields (above 2 hectares) and are less likely to fall below the poverty 
line (ibid). With subsidies going towards relatively better-off farmers, the effect of FISP on 
production levels, maize prices and poverty-reduction has been marginal (Jayne et al., 2018; 
Mason and Smale, 2013; Mason and Tembo, 2015; Rickert-Gilbert et al., 2013).  
5.2.2.2 Programme implementation and farmer organisations 
Since the early 2000s, there has been a new wave of African subsidy programmes with highly 
diverse forms of implementation (Jayne et al., 2018). Whereas targeted subsidy programmes in 
Malawi, Tanzania and Kenya use voucher schemes, Zambia’s FISP has mostly delegated 
implementation to local FOs, which provide the institutional link between the programme and 
individual farmers, possibly influencing patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Kabeer, 2000). 
To participate in FISP, FOs need to be fully registered, active for at least one year in crop 
production, and have written bylaws and a standing executive committee (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock, 2014a). They preselect potential FISP beneficiaries from amongst 
their members and have them approved by the local agricultural committee. Following a 
positive committee decision, FOs then collect and manage upfront payments for FISP inputs. 
The programme operates on a cost-sharing basis, meaning that it reduces the retail cost of 
fertiliser by, for example, up to 79% in 2011/12 (Mason et al., 2013), with beneficiaries required 
to make upfront payments to cover the remaining costs. After clearing liabilities, FOs collect 
inputs from the district centre and deliver them to their members. Although members can choose 
amongst different types of crops, subsidies generally go towards maize, the input packs for 
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which include 200 kg of fertiliser and 10 kg of hybrid seeds, enabling cultivation of 0.5 hectares 
of land. 
There is at present not much literature on the state of participation in Zambian FOs. In the 
2013/14 agricultural season, 44% of smallholders were FO members (Indaba Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute, 2016), although it remains unclear whether those who actually want 
to join may face barriers or adverse incentives.  
Several lines of evidence suggest that financial barriers may restrict participation. On paper, 
members pay entry fees, annual membership fees and are obliged to buy shares of the 
organisation. In the 2013/14 agricultural season, 21% of smallholders indicated non-
affordability of FO membership as the second most frequent reason for not benefitting from 
FISP (Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute, 2016).  Burke et al. (2012) further estimate 
that membership costs, together with FISP upfront payments, make up 20% of the gross annual 
income for 60% of rural households.  
5.2.3 A framework for studying inclusion in farmer organisations 
5.2.3.1 Inclusion in Farmer Organisations 
There is growing consensus that FOs often cannot successfully reach the most disadvantaged 
households in their regions (Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Chirwa et al., 2005; Thorp et al., 
2005). Empirical studies have shown that better-off farmers are more likely to participate in 
FOs, as likelihood of becoming a member increases e.g., with farm size, education and credit 
access (Bernard and Spielman, 2009; E. Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Francesconi and Heerink, 
2011; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2015). Evidence also indicates a gender gap, wherein female-
headed households are less likely to participate in FOs (Mojo et al., 2017; Wossen et al., 2017). 
This raises the question of whether external development programmes can induce inclusion of 
poorer farming households. To date, however, very few studies have investigated this 
relationship. Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014) found that Rwandan organisations with 
subsidised inputs generate higher income effects than those without. Although this increase 
expected benefits and, thus, incentives to participate, it also attracts a heterogeneous group of 
farmers to the group. In Senegalese community organisations, Arcand and Wagner (2016) found 
that membership has become more inclusive, in line with programme regulations. However, 
they also noticed dropout rates being higher amongst long-established members and women 
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dropping out even more disproportionally. These results confirm previous findings concerning 
community organisations in Kenya, where Gugerty and Kremer (2008) concluded that 
participation in public programmes rather attracts younger, better-educated and wealthier 
individuals into groups, who then assume leadership positions.  
5.2.3.2 Explanatory Factors 
The above-mentioned empirical results on inclusion highlight the need to better understand the 
underlying mechanisms shaping organisational barriers and incentives associated with FOs. 
Based on the evidence examined, we expect that financial and other barriers may discourage 
participation of resource-poor and especially female-headed households. Indeed, participation 
costs are differently perceived across households and tend to marginalise poorer farmers, 
especially when high-value markets are involved (Chirwa et al., 2005; Markelova and Mwangi, 
2010). Women tend to face even higher costs, as their household responsibilities and 
reproductive activities increase their opportunity costs (E. Fischer and Qaim, 2012). In Uganda, 
Meier zu Selhausen (2016) found that 88% of female non-members would like to become 
members of coffee cooperatives but lack sufficient resources or decision-making power to do 
so.  
Regarding possible incentives, the empirical evidence suggests that smaller and larger farmers 
benefit differently from their membership. While the benefit is relatively larger for smaller 
farmers (Fischer and Qaim, 2012), larger farmers benefit more in absolute terms, as they 
produce more and profit from economies of scale when dealing with FOs (Mojo et al., 2015). 
There is the perception that wealthier farmers are more interested in FOs that value business 
over equity objectives (Lutz and Tadesse, 2017; World Bank, 2008), but the effect of wealthier 
farmers on inclusion remains obscure. Some argue that the presence of wealthier farmers may 
improve leadership and performance while also reducing group coordination costs (Bernard 
and Spielman, 2009; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007), whereas others warn that rural elites may 
exert power over others to promote their own interests (Markelova and Mwangi, 2010). 
Irrespective of the presence of wealthier farmers, we expect that farmers are more likely to 
invest in organisations that offer tangible benefits. Therefore, long-term commitment may be a 
prerequisite for inducing inclusion in FOs.  
Against this background, we propose the following framework to study inclusion in FOs. Figure 
9 shows how organisations can proactively shape inclusion in four ways, related to participation 
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costs, access to benefits, long-term organisational commitment and participation of wealthier 
farmers. Although each of these four factors appears to have a direct effect on inclusion, it 
remains to be seen whether they induce inclusion by themselves or only in combination with 
each other.  
 
Figure 9: Framework for studying inclusion in Zambian farmer organisations 
Source: own graphic 
5.3 Data and method 
5.3.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
We used fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as our primary method, because 
it provides an iterative approach to data collection, model specification, case selection and re-
conceptualisation of inclusion factors and their outcomes (Ragin, 2000; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012).  
Unlike standardised quantitative methods, fsQCA does not rely on a correlational but set-
theoretical understanding of causation (Vis, 2012). To exemplify, correlation in quantitative 
studies implies symmetry in the sense that the presence of a variable can lead to a positive 
outcome while its absence should lead to a negative outcome. In contrast, fsQCA is based on 
set-theory and can have different conditions and their combinations explain the outcome and 
the absence of the outcome. In addition, quantitative methods typically analyse the individual 
effects of one variable on another while holding all others constant, while fsQCA identifies all 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions and their combinations that can lead to an outcome. In 
other words, the results can tell us whether a single explanatory condition (e.g., low-cost 
participation or benefit access), a combination of conditions (conjunctural causation), or even 
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multiple paths (equifinal causation) can explain inclusion. By identifying all possible 
configurations among the explanatory conditions associated with FOs, we expect to reveal their 
underlying inclusion mechanisms.  
The fsQCA method uses set theory to assign different cases to different sets, meaning theoretical 
constructs that represent conditions and outcomes under study. In our analysis, FOs were treated 
as individual cases. The method was originally developed to study crisp-set situations in which 
cases are assigned to conditions (e.g., low-cost participation) that are either present or absent. 
However, to allow for different degrees of membership in a set, we have employed fuzzy-set 
theory. Therefore, cases in our study could be assigned fully within a set (fuzzy value = 1), fully 
outside a set (fuzzy value = 0) or considered neither inside nor outside a set (fuzzy value = 0.5). 
Fuzzy values were then minimised, using Boolean algebra to generate a solution formula 
displaying all possible paths sufficient for inclusion in FOs (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012).We performed cross-case analysis, using the QCApro Package in the ‘R’ computer 
software. 
Various reasons make fsQCA appropriate for studying inclusion in FOs. Firstly, being member-
owned businesses with multiple objectives, FOs are highly heterogeneous and difficult to 
compare against each other. Therefore, researchers typically use the individual case study 
methodology, which has been criticised for lacking systematic comparisons and generalisable 
results (Shiferaw et al., 2011). To overcome this problem, fsQCA offers tools for systematic 
cross-case comparison of a small to medium number of cases, as it combines qualitative and 
quantitative elements, in other words, in-depth case knowledge with mathematical algorithms 
(Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Secondly, fsQCA can be used to generate new theoretical arguments 
(Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009; Marx et al., 2014), which would contribute to the rather 
scarce literature of inclusion in FOs. Finally, because it allows for complex causality, fsQCA 
performs particularly well in studying complex phenomena in the social sciences (Rihoux and 
Ragin, 2009), such as the process-oriented and highly contextualised concept of inclusion (see 
section 5.2.1).  
5.3.2 Data and case selection 
We used original data collected between October and December 2015 from FOs in Solwezi, an 
administrative district of the North-Western Province of Zambia. The study area was chosen for 
the relatively high importance of maize production there, its relatively low productivity (as a 
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proxy for fertiliser demand), and its average maize-farm sizes, which are close to the provincial 
average (Ministry of Agriculture and Central Statistical Office, 2015; Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock, 2015). 
We followed Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (2009) sampling approach to QCA, with the 
objective of seeking to ensure FO comparability while maintaining variability in the outcome 
and conditions. We set a district-level boundary for the study area to control comparability, as 
then the FOs would be likely to share ethnic identities, livelihood characteristics, access to 
markets and have similar quality natural resources and public extension services. 
Because fsQCA only performs well under variability of outcomes and conditions, cases were 
selected purposely, based on prior case information and knowledge from in-depth interviews 
with government officials and local experts. We identified 15 cases that exhibited acceptable 
degrees of variability, meaning that they had very low or high levels of inclusion or dissimilar 
conditions. 
We conducted semi-structured interviews to collect information about FOs and member 
characteristics, inclusion and conditions. Open questions were used to induce story-telling and 
unexpected answers. In the town of Solwezi, 35 interviews were conducted with representatives 
of the organisations, individual members and local experts to cross-validate case information. 
In addition, we conducted three focus-group discussions in local communities, with the support 
of translators. Case information was supplemented with organisational documents, including 
bylaws, minutes of meetings or cooperative inspection checklists. We also used quantitative 
data from the 2014 Solwezi district’s Cooperative Register (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock, 2014b) and the Fifth National Census of Population and Housing (Central Statistical 
Office, 2013) to define anchor points during calibration. 
5.3.3 Operationalisation of the inclusion framework 
We relied on case knowledge and discussions with local FO-experts to operationalise our 
inclusion framework within the context of Zambian FOs. Table 19 provides an overview of the 
outcomes, conditions, sub-conditions, indicators and anchor points used for cross-case analysis. 
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Table 20: Operationalisation of the outcome (inclusion) and conditions for farmer organisations in 
Solwezi, Zambia 
Outcome Indicator Anchor points 
Inclusion (INC) Share of widows amongst female members is […] than the average in rural Solwezi. 
1 = higher   
0.5 = equal    
0 = lower 
Condition Sub condition Indicator Anchor points 
Low-cost 
participation 
(LCO) 
Entry cost Registration fee is […] than the cost of a share. 
1 = lower       
0.5 = equal  
0 = higher 
Annual cost Price of a single share is […] than the average price in Solwezi. 
1 = lower    
0.5 = equal    
0 = higher 
Enforcement FO does not strictly enforce the buying of shares. 
1 = yes           
0 = no 
Pro-poor 
access to 
subsidies 
(SUB) 
Equal access FISP packs are shared equally amongst all members.  
1 = yes           
0 = no 
Loan 
availability 
FO offers loan service to cover upfront FISP 
payments. 
1 = yes           
0 = no 
Internal 
eligibility 
Participation in FISP does not depend on the 
buying of shares. 
1 = yes           
0 = no 
Long-term 
commitment 
(COM) 
Age FO was registered […] years ago. 
1 = >5         
0.5 = 2-5        
0 = <2 
Diversified 
activities 
FO offers […] activities in addition to 
providing access to FISP.  
1 = 2 or more       
0.5 = 1           
0 = 0 
Attractiveness FO grew by an additional […] of membership in 2014. 
1 = >10%    
0.5 = 4-9.9%  
0 = < 4% 
Presence of 
wealthier 
farmers 
(WEA) 
Wealth 
distribution 
The share of members who have bought 
commercial fertiliser in 2014 is […] 
compared to the average in the constituency. 
1 = higher   
0.5 = equal    
0 = less 
Presence larger 
farmers 
Membership includes farmers who cultivate 5 
or more hectares. 
1 = yes           
0 = no 
Absence smaller 
farmers 
The share of farmers cultivating 0.5 hectares 
or less is […] than the average in the 
constituency. 
1 = lower    
0.5 = equal    
0 = higher 
Source: own compilation 
5.3.3.1 Inclusion measure 
We measured inclusion (INC) against the membership of disadvantaged households in FOs. 
Based on discussions with government representatives and members of the selected FOs, we 
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identified widow-headed households as the most disadvantaged ones in rural Solwezi (Kabeer, 
2000).24 Zambia continues to be strongly affected by HIV/AIDS, having the seventh-highest 
prevalence rate in the world. This, in combination with an average fertility rate of 6.6 children 
per woman creates conditions of high vulnerability for widow-headed households (Harasty et 
al., 2015). Women who lose their husbands need to grow enough maize to feed their children, 
despite limited labour availability.  
Beside the share of widows, we initially considered three additional measures for inclusion. 
Consequently, we collected information on members’ participation in decision-making 
processes, benefits for non-members and community development activities, but some of the 
information presented contradictions that could not be resolved in the field or through data 
triangulation. For example, many representatives claimed their FO gave a voice to 
disadvantaged farmers while its written documents revealed low participation rates at annual 
meetings. Further, members stated that they were not interested in participating in decision-
making processes, especially if their FO provided only FISP support and no additional services. 
Meanwhile, some measures did not qualify for cross-case comparison. For example, around 
half of the FOs were involved in community development, but these activities were highly 
heterogeneous and did not seem comparable (e.g., comparing the building of a community hall 
against awareness-raising activities for HIV/AIDS or a one-time distribution of soap to orphans 
in the community). 
5.3.3.2 Conditions 
We assume that four explanatory factors may shape inclusion or, in other words, incentives for 
and barriers to FO participation. For analytical purposes, we transformed these factors into 
conditions, sub conditions and indicators (see Table 19).  
Firstly, to enhance inclusion of disadvantaged households, FOs may offer low-cost participation 
(LCO), which we measured as a composite of different costs. We expected, for example, that 
initial registration fees might act as an entry deterrent, while annual share costs could become 
an obstacle to membership continuity.  
 
24 We also considered the elderly as a disadvantaged group of farmers, as their physical capacity limits their 
performance of agricultural activities but decided not to use them as a measure of inclusion, as they tend to receive 
more support from their extended families than widows do. Consequently, the vulnerability of older people had to 
be considered case by case while their individual household situations were difficult for interview partners to 
evaluate. 
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Secondly, FOs can offer pro-poor access to subsidies (SUB) to increase incentives for 
disadvantaged households. Because all FOs studied were involved in FISP, we expected that 
gaining access to subsidised inputs would generally be the main motive for membership. We 
found that some organisations develop internal arrangements to redistribute the limited amount 
of subsidised inputs in a pro-poor way so that all members can somehow benefit. In contrast, 
others distribute subsidies on a first come, first served basis. Some organisations also offer loans 
to members who otherwise cannot afford FISP packs. Then again, access to benefits may be 
obstructed if an organisation sets up internal rules to limit participation in FISP by, for example, 
making annual buying of shares a pre-condition.  
Thirdly, we included each FO’s long-term commitment (COM) in our analysis, representing the 
benefits that FOs may offer beyond FISP provision. Although smallholder farming households 
continue to face various challenges in rural Zambia, many FOs choose not to offer additional 
services. But this overdependence on FISP make them less sustainable in the long-term, 
meaning that, if FISP were to end, such organisation would quickly collapse. In contrast, FOs 
with a diversified portfolio of activities demonstrate greater long-term commitment by 
generating additional member benefits. Another indication of FO commitment is the number of 
new members that it attracts. We found that FO services (e.g., processing, marketing or 
collective farming activities) generally require substantial investment, and FOs raise their main 
capital through member contributions, which means that committed FOs are likely to have open 
membership. Also, because farmers weigh expected benefits and costs against each in their 
membership decisions, we assume that new members are less likely to invest in FOs that are 
dormant, less active and do not seem to create any extra, tangible benefits. Lastly, long-term 
commitment is likely to be time-sensitive, meaning that, even if organisations decide to offer 
additional services, it will take time before benefits are realised. In this vein, we expect that 
younger FOs may be mainly preoccupied with establishing and improving the functioning of 
their own structure before they can offer additional economic or social benefits. 
Finally, the presence of wealthier farmers (WEA) was expected to shape inclusion, but the 
literature as well as local experts remain equally inconclusive about its effects. We expected 
that, on the one hand, wealthier farmers could assume leadership positions and professionalise 
their organisations, which would likely increase profitability and working capital. On the other 
hand, the presence of wealthier farmers bears the risk of elite capture and the crowding-out of 
disadvantaged households who do not feel their needs represented. Dominance of wealthier 
117 
 
farmers over others is not only visible in their presence but also in the absence of very small 
farmers, indicating crowding-out effects. We therefore included both measures in the analysis.  
5.3.3.3 Calibration process 
We applied a direct calibration method at outcome and condition levels (Ragin, 2000), which 
required setting three anchor points indicating how strongly a case was associated with a 
condition or the outcome. According to our calibration logic, if a condition is present in a case, 
then it receives a fuzzy value of 1, indicating that it is fully within the set. If the condition is 
not present in a case, then it receives a fuzzy value of 0, indicating that the case is fully out of 
the set. Meanwhile, a fuzzy value of 0.5 functions as a crossover point, where the condition is 
neither present nor absent. 
Anchor points were generated from statistics, case knowledge and natural breaks in the data; 
meanwhile, we used census data to establish external reference points for continuous indicators. 
In the calibration process at the outcome level, we considered a case fully within the set of 
inclusive FOs if its female members were 15% widows. Analogously, we applied a crossover 
point at 10% and fully out value at 3%.25 
We also calibrated the four conditions, each comprised of three sub conditions with 
corresponding indicators, as listed in Table 19. To obtain a single condition value, we 
aggregated the three indicators arithmetically, generating each condition value as the average 
of the indicators, which can be either present or absent (1 or 0, respectively) or higher (1), equal 
(0.5) or lower (0) than the average value in the constituency. Using the condition values, we 
applied a fully in value at 0.65 (generally cases exhibiting two out of the three indicators), 
crossover value at 0.34 (cases generally exhibiting one indicator) and fully out value at 0.01 
(cases with no indicator).  
5.4 Results from fsQCA 
5.4.1 Necessity analysis 
We first analysed our data to identify necessary conditions and combinations of conditions. In 
set theory, a condition is necessary if, whenever the outcome is present, the condition is present 
 
25 We used the average share of widows among rural women in Solwezi as a reference point to set anchor points. 
In 2010, 8.18% of the 36,935 women in the rural area of the district were registered as widow (Central Statistical 
Office, 2013). 
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too. This means that the condition is a superset of the outcome. Following (Schneider, 2019), 
we applied high consistency (0.9), coverage (0.6) and ‘relevance of necessity’ (0.5) thresholds 
to assess necessity and empirical relevance of necessary conditions.  
Table 20 reveals that only the presence of long-term commitment (COM) fulfils these criteria 
and qualifies as a necessary and not irrelevant condition for inclusion.26 This implies that 
inclusion can only be observed in FOs that show long-term commitment to their members. 
However, a necessary condition is not a guarantee for a positive outcome. There could be 
instances where COM is present but the outcome (INC) is not, suggesting that COM may not 
be sufficient to explain the outcome. Instead, other conditions and their combinations with 
COM are needed to sufficiently explain inclusion in FOs. 
Table 21: Necessity analysis for inclusion in Zambian farmer organisations 
 LCO SUB COM WEA 
Consistency 0.77 0.74 0.95 0.72 
Coverage 0.58 0.66 0.73 0.62 
Relevance of necessity   0.50  
Note: Ranging from 0 to 1, consistency indicates the degree in which instances of the outcome agree in also 
showing the condition, while coverage indicates the degree in which the instances of the condition overlap with 
instances of the outcome (Ragin, 2006). Coverage and the ‘relevance of necessity’ describe empirical relevance. 
Source: own calculations 
5.4.2 Sufficiency analysis  
To perform sufficiency analysis, we first generated a truth table for the outcome (INC) and the 
four conditions. Table 21 shows that 8 of the 16 possible combinations of conditions are 
empirically observable in the dataset, with 7 cases having the outcome present. The unobserved 
combinations were treated as logical remainders.  
 
 
26 To decide whether a necessary condition is also meaningful, its empirical relevance has to be assessed (Goertz, 
2006; Ragin, 2000; Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Ragin, 2006). The coverage and ‘relevance 
of necessity’ (RoN) indicator inform about the trivialness (the condition set is much bigger than the outcome set) 
and the irrelevance (the condition is close to a constant) of a necessary condition. Despite meeting the minimum 
threshold, the condition of long-term commitment scores relatively low on the RoN-indicator, making it difficult 
to claim it fully relevant as a necessary condition. Looking at the possibility of COM being a constant, our truth 
table (see Table 21) reveals that the condition is present in almost all the cases (12 out of 15). A possible explanation 
for this result may relate to our case selection where we relied on government officials to identify potential FOs. 
We suspect that officials may have subconsciously pointed us to FOs that were better known to them, possibly 
because they have shown stronger commitment in the past. Given the relatively low RoN-score, more cases would 
be needed to decide whether long-term commitment qualifies as a fully relevant necessary condition. 
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Table 22: Truth table for inclusion in Zambian farmer organisations 
LCO SUB COM WEA INC Consistency Cases 
0 0 1 1 1 0.90 13 
0 0 1 0 1 0.86 2, 3, 6 
1 0 1 1 1 0.83 1, 14 
1 1 1 0 1 0.82 11 
1 1 1 1 0 0.72 4, 8, 9 
1 0 1 0 0 0.70 7, 15 
1 0 0 1 0 0.65 10 
1 1 0 1 0 0.53 5, 12 
Note: 0 = Absence; 1 = Presence 
Source: own calculations 
We then applied Boolean algebra to minimise the truth table and to identify sufficient conditions 
and combinations of conditions. A condition is considered sufficient if the outcome always 
occurs when the condition is present. Therefore, sufficient conditions and combinations are 
subsets of the outcome.27 Table 22 presents the results of our sufficiency analysis.  
Table 23: Results on inclusion pathways in Zambian farmer organisations 
Inclusion paths ~LCO ~WEA*SUB WEA*~SUB*COM 
Consistency 0.91 0.82 0.84 
Raw coverage 0.27 0.37 0.36 
Unique coverage 0.03 0.17 0.08 
Case No. 2, 3, 6, 13* 11 1, 13*,14 
Solution consistency 0.88   
Solution coverage  0.57   
Note: * Case No. 13 is a multiply covered case 
Source: own calculations 
Following Schneider and Wagemann (2012), we applied a consistency threshold of 0.8, which 
renders the following parsimonious solution, where ‘+’ signifies OR, ‘*’ signifies AND, and ‘~’ 
signifies the absence of a condition:28 
~LCO + ~WEA*SUB + WEA*~SUB*COM → INC 
 
27 We performed a separate analysis on the absence of inclusion. We applied a consistency threshold of 0.8 and 
obtained the following parsimonious solution ~COM → ~INC, suggesting that the absence of commitment is 
sufficient for non-inclusion (solution consistency: 0.84, solution coverage: 0.44). This result is in line with our 
expectations as the opposite situation of a necessary condition is often found to be sufficient for explaining the 
negated outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). 
28 Three types of solutions exist, depending on how logical remainders are treated. According to Baumgartner 
(2015), parsimonious solutions reflect causal structures better than the conservative and intermediate solutions. 
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This solution identifies three inclusion paths that can individually and sufficiently explain 
inclusion in FOs: 
1) Absence of low-cost participation leads to inclusion (observed in four cases); OR 
2) Absence of wealthy members in combination with presence of pro-poor access to subsidies 
leads to inclusion (observed in one case); OR 
3) Presence of wealthy members in combination with absence of pro-poor access to subsidies 
and presence of long-term commitment leads to inclusion (observed in three cases). 
Our results proved to be robust to changes in the calibration strategy and consistency thresholds. 
Since the measures of fit and solutions (Wagemann and Schneider, 2015) remained 
substantively unaltered or in a subset relation with the original solution, we consider our results 
robust against different analytical choices. We provide the results from our alternative analyses 
in Table 23. 
Table 24: Results from sensitivity analyses 
Analysis  Inclusion path → INC  Consistency Coverage 
Baseline  1 
~LCO 
2 
~WEA*SUB 
3 
WEA*~SUB*COM 
 0.87 0.57 
Calibration 
thresholds 
moved 
downwards (a) 
 
● ●  
 
0.88 0.43 
Calibration 
thresholds 
moved upwards 
 
● ● ● 
 
0.87 0.63 
Consistency 
threshold 
reduced to 0.75 
 
● ● ● 
 
0.87 0.57 
Consistency 
threshold 
increased to 
0.85 
 
●   
 
0.91 0.27 
Notes: ● Path detected 
           ● Part of path detected 
           (a) We altered the calibration points at the condition level by moving crossover and fully-in thresholds by 
0.05 points downwards (0.01, 0.29, 0.6) and upwards (0.01, 0.39, 0.7). 
Source: own calculations 
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5.5 Results from within-case analysis 
The results from cross-case analysis only reveal patterns of associations which by themselves 
do not necessarily entail causation. We therefore present results from our within-case analysis 
to shed light on the underlying causal processes behind each inclusion pattern.  
5.5.1 Role of participation costs 
The majority of FOs in rural Solwezi operate at low cost and generally do not offer services 
beyond access to FISP benefits. Because members do not expect additional benefits, the FOs 
tend to set very low participation costs or disregard them altogether, echoing the impression of 
local experts that  
running a business per se is not the primary objective of the farmer organisations […]. People 
do not put much attention on the meaning of the shares as long as they can access the inputs. 
(National Government Official, Lusaka)  
Nevertheless, we have identified four cases suggesting that higher participation costs may 
actually lead to inclusion of disadvantaged farmers. Our within-case information reveals that 
higher participation costs typically stem from the need to raise capital for various forms of 
investment. To exemplify, FO#6 has decided in its annual general meeting to procure a peanut-
butter processing machine, to offer processing services to members for free and to non-members 
at a fee. To raise sufficient funds for their project, members have therefore agreed to double the 
price of a single share and make annual buying of shares obligatory.  
Our case information suggests that these four organisations use their additional funds to offer 
financial services assisting vulnerable members in paying their membership fees. In FO#3, 
members can pay participation fees in instalments, while FO#2, FO#6 and FO#13 allow for 
payment in-kind via loans. In this manner, these FOs successfully address barriers facing 
disadvantaged households.  
In addition, we have found that these FOs reserve parts of their capital to offer social services 
that help members in need. In FO#3, such funds are used ‘to assist the more vulnerable members 
of the group to buy their fertiliser and inputs in order to add to whatever little they might have’ 
(Chairman), while FO#2 also uses additional funds to offer funeral grants to widowed members. 
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Overall, we find that FOs with higher participation costs may use the available capital from 
member contributions to offer mainly financial services to vulnerable members. In this way, 
such FOs may attract proportionally more widowed members as compared to average FOs with 
no capital at their disposal. 
5.5.2 Role of wealthy members and pro-poor access to subsidies  
The second inclusion path suggests that absence of wealthy members in combination with pro-
poor distribution of subsidies may lead to inclusion. This pattern can be observed in one case.  
Initially, FO#11 was formed with the objective to  
help church members to raise funds/foodstuffs to maintain themselves and to enable the church 
[…] to support […] vulnerable children, the aged, the sick orphans and widows of (HIV/AIDS) 
deceased parents. (Minutes of meeting, FO#11, 2007) 
Although this objective implies that group benefits may be redistributed through the church, 
interview partners claimed that their FO operates independently.  
This objective makes FO#11 stand out against the majority of FOs, which were founded because 
‘government has announced the FISP. All in all, this means that some external force was driving 
them. The decision to form the organisation was not internally driven by them’ (Provincial 
Government Official, Solwezi). In contrast, FO#11 has formulated a clear mission, setting out 
to help members and non-members in the community, which is still visible today: 
It is good if there can be many in the FO. People in the area are not civil servants, they get into 
agriculture. If they are not members, they are forced to steal crops from others. (Chairman, 
FO#11) 
The FO is highly committed to its objective and, therefore, only accepts members sharing its 
views. According to the chairman, this has attracted ‘small-scale farmers that are alike and that 
feel unity’, whereas wealthier farmers are less interested in joining. Consequently, we assume 
that absence of wealthier members has contributed to a more homogenous group, meaning that 
members share livelihood strategies, objectives and may be open towards helping more 
disadvantaged households, who they feel close to.  
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In practice, FO#11 has made considerable efforts towards reducing participation barriers. On 
the one hand, the organisation actively invites non-members to sit in group meetings so that 
they can make informed decisions regarding possible membership. On the other hand, 
facilitating pro-poor access to benefits, the organisation offers a loan service to members who 
cannot pay their FISP contributions. Such members ‘usually pay back in money but they can 
also do it in kind’ (Chairman, FO#11). 
Additionally, the FO distributes input-pack allotments in favour of vulnerable members. 
Because there are not enough provided input packs for each member, they have agreed to share 
them accordingly. Although this is common practice in other Solwezi FOs, FO#11 considers 
member vulnerability in its distribution scheme. In practice, widows and the elderly pay the 
same normal-member price for FISP inputs but typically receive twice the amount of subsidised 
inputs as the average member. 
Overall, we find that FO#11 has made considerable efforts towards reducing barriers facing 
members and non-members and has increased incentives for favourable pro-poor distribution 
of subsidies, which is likely to have attracted more widows to the group. 
5.5.3 Role of wealthy members, non-poor subsidy allocation and long-term 
commitment 
The third inclusion path can be observed in three organisations, where our case information 
suggests that the presence of wealthier farmers coincides with restricted access to subsidies that 
is least favourable for poorer members. The combination of both conditions suggests some form 
of elite capture.  
For example, FO#14 redistributed its inputs packs on a first come, first served basis, with FO 
leaders agreeing on a date by which members should have paid their FISP contributions. The 
announcement was made on short notice, so the financially constrained farmers failed to pay in 
time and, consequently, did not receive input packs. This seems a clear case of ‘wealthy and 
powerful members tak[ing] advantage because they are in control. This happens because the 
members entrust them with the daily decision[s] of the operations’ (Provincial Government 
Official, Solwezi). This result is certainly not encouraging from an inclusion perspective, so a 
remaining question is why such FOs have nonetheless attracted widows to join them. In this 
regard, the fsQCA results suggest that inclusion only appears in combination with the third 
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element of long-term commitment in the solution. Therefore, looking at the combined effects 
of all the three elements may shed light on the inclusion mechanism here. 
One possible explanation may lie in the types of additional benefits that such FOs offer. In fact, 
the three cases considered for this path do offer social and economic services that respond 
particularly to the needs of women, including widows. To exemplify, FO#14 operates an open 
market on a weekly basis where farmers from around the community sell their produce to 
consumers and traders. Members use the infrastructure for free, whereas non-members pay a 
fee for their stand and storage facilities. While this service is open to all members, interview 
partners stated that female members use it more often. We find similar effects in FO#1, offering 
peanut-butter processing and adult education; in FO#13, engaging in poultry production; and 
again in FO#14, which also operates a grocery shop. These types of activities clearly require 
more sophisticated skills, as compared to the average FO activity of solely organising members 
for FISP distribution. Although leadership seems to matter, FOs in rural Solwezi have been 
challenged to 
find suitable managers […]. You will find that many members don’t know how to read or write 
[…]. And even if you find someone good […], you will find that the farmer organisation cannot 
offer very attractive incomes. You will find that a skilled person would only work for the purpose 
of charity or voluntary help. (Provincial Government Official, Solwezi)  
Against this background, we expect that wealthier members contribute their skills and 
knowledge to support FO management. In doing so, they compensate disadvantaged members 
who have not gotten subsidised inputs with alternative benefits that still meet their needs. 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has investigated mechanisms regulating inclusion – defined here as modifying 
barriers to and incentives for access to development opportunities – of disadvantaged 
households in farmer organisations (FOs). Using primary data from 15 Zambian FOs involved 
in implementation of the country’s Farmer Input Support Programme, we have identified 
widow-headed households as the most disadvantaged group of farmers in Zambian FOs. Our 
results from fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) indicate three alternative 
paths, which seem to both individually and sufficiently explain the emergence of inclusion. 
Because results from fsQCA only suggest patterns of association, rather than causation, we have 
relied on within-case analysis to shed light on the underlying processes involved. 
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The fsQCA results indicate cost of participation as the only factor exerting an effect on its own, 
although we also unexpectedly found an inverse association between low-cost participation and 
inclusion. Consequently, our findings do not seem to support the common argument that higher 
participation costs may discourage participation of widow-headed households (Burke et al., 
2012; Selhausen, 2016). Meanwhile, our within-case analysis results have generated additional 
insights, suggesting that offering financial services to vulnerable members such as widows may 
be the missing causal link between higher participation (~LCO) costs and inclusion. 
Our fsQCA results also offer a second inclusion pattern associated with the absence of wealthy 
members (~WEA) in combination with pro-poor distribution of subsidised inputs (SUB). Here, 
within-case analysis revealed that the particular FO under study redirected its input packs to 
vulnerable members whom others shared their livelihood strategies with and felt close to, in the 
absence of wealthy farmers. This implies that this combination of conditions (~WEA*SUB) 
can be seen as standing for the higher-order construct of shared identities between widows and 
other members. We therefore assume that shared identity could also be sufficient to explain 
inclusion on its own, whereas ~WEA and SUB are functional equivalents of the shared identity-
construct. 
The third inclusion pattern provided by our cross-case analysis revolves around a complex 
combination of three explanatory factors, pointing to the presence of wealthy members (WEA) 
in combination with restricted access to subsidies for the poor (~SUB) and presence of long-
term commitment (COM) leading to inclusion. At first sight, this pattern could be seen as 
indicating elite capture (Markelova and Mwangi, 2010), whereas our within-case analysis 
suggests that providing alterative benefits in order to compensate vulnerable members such as 
widows for not being able to access subsidised inputs may forge a link between this combination 
of conditions (WEA*~SUB*COM) and inclusion. Clearly, however, this inclusion process 
would appear to be less preferable from a development-programme perspective.  
Finally, we have identified long-term commitment (COM) as a necessary condition, suggesting 
that inclusion only develops in committed FOs. However, as we have sought to show, long-
term commitment is not sufficient for explaining inclusion, which additionally relies on one of 
the three inclusion processes described above. Nevertheless, because these processes require a 
certain amount of financial capital or tangible benefits, we consider commitment a precondition 
for inclusion. To exemplify, long-term commitment is likely to have incentivised FOs to 
increase their participation costs so as to increase their capital for future investments (first path) 
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or allowed them to secure enough benefits to compensate vulnerable members and widows for 
not being able to access subsidised inputs (third path). The role of commitment as a necessary 
condition can add another perspective to the discussion of trade-offs between equity and 
business-orientation in FOs (Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Francesconi and Heerink, 2011; Lutz 
and Tadesse, 2017; World Bank, 2008). Although it has been proposed that FOs can only 
promote either of these objectives, our results suggest that they are not exclusive and that COM, 
by offering tangible benefits that go beyond the provision of subsidies, could be considered a 
prerequisite for achieving equity objectives such as inclusion.  
Our results are clearly context-specific but may, nevertheless, offer some important insights 
regarding inclusion in FOs. First, they indicate multiple ways in which FOs can enhance 
inclusion, by reducing costs and increasing benefits for particularly disadvantaged households, 
highlighting the need for FOs to provide targeted interventions to households that otherwise 
may not find participation rewarding, because their expected costs exceed associated benefits 
(Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Khan et al., 2015; Shiferaw et al., 2011).  
Second, our results may help to explain why some FOs are more inclusive than others, which 
may be particularly relevant in contexts where FOs are used as development instruments to 
channel external benefits. In line with previous findings (Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Chirwa 
et al., 2005; Shiferaw et al., 2011), our results indicate that government and donors should not 
expect to automatically reach their intended target groups of disadvantaged households simply 
by involving FOs in their programme implementation. Rather, our results suggest that inclusion 
develops along multiple mechanisms that can be fostered according to the willingness and 
ability of FOs to reach out to such target groups. 
Finally, our methodological approached has allowed us to underpin and complement the 
patterns obtained via fsQCA with case-specific information. We leave it to future research to 
investigate the individual and combined effects of financial services, shared identities and 
compensation, which we have proposed as additional explanatory factors for inclusion. 
Important to note, however, is that our highly contextualised operationalisation of the inclusion 
concept may create the impression that some conditions are incomplete or missing. 
Consequently, we wish to clarify that some measures and conditions have been dropped during 
the research process. For some measures, we could not detect enough heterogeneity between 
cases (e.g., regarding internal rules formulated in FO by-laws, as the majority of them use the 
same template), whereas others turned out to be generally irrelevant in the Zambian context 
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(e.g., regarding price effects or collective marketing in FOs, as members sell their maize to the 
Food Reserve Agency at fixed prices). Our approach has also been subject to certain limitations. 
Data collection was restricted by the availability of information (e.g., regarding exact farm sizes 
or wealth groups of members) and the fact that some topics required approaches different than 
the ones we chose for data collection (e.g., elite capture or adverse power relations within FOs 
may require observational data or interviews with individual members).  In the end, because 
case selection was purposely restricted, our findings should not be taken as representative of all 
Zambian FOs but, rather, as a starting point for future research seeking to help make the idea 
of inclusion a reality for disadvantaged groups.   
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
From both theoretical and empirical perspectives, whether cooperatives provide their members 
with benefits remains open to debate. Under the present conditions of economic globalisation 
and modern agricultural markets, which are simultaneously imposing new challenges on 
cooperatives as well as renewed interest in promoting them as a development tool, better 
understanding and analysis of cooperative effects in developing contexts is needed. In the work 
presented in this thesis, I have sought to addresses this knowledge gap by performing a 
systematic literature review of cooperative effects and member characteristics, and empirical 
analysis of cooperative effects in two particular domains: prices received by farmers in 
Argentina and inclusion of disadvantaged farmers in Zambia. The literature review has allowed 
me to establish in which domains there is greater evidence of positive, negative or non-
significant cooperative effects and whether disadvantaged farmers participate in cooperatives. 
Meanwhile, my empirical research has shed light on two crucial aspects. First, for farmers 
selling their produce to agricultural cooperatives, prices are very important because agriculture 
is generally their main income source. Second, for disadvantaged farmers who are struggling 
to join or remain in a cooperative due to their lack of resources to pool, cooperative inclusion 
strategies may be a key determinant of their participation. I hold that the findings presented 
here can contribute towards enhancing our knowledge on cooperative effects on their members 
in development contexts.  
In the following, I first recapitulate and synthesise the key findings and contributions of the 
thesis and, then, develop policy recommendations based upon them. In closing, I present the 
limitations of the thesis and identify areas for future research on cooperative effects.  
6.1 Key findings and contributions  
6.1.1 Paper One: Systematic literature review 
Paper One conducts a systematic literature review of cooperative effects on members in 
developing contexts by identifying and screening potentially relevant articles according to 
defined inclusion criteria and then performing a critical appraisal of the scientific rigour of the 
70 articles selected. As a result, it provides a descriptive analysis of countries and sectors 
studied, along with identified functions of cooperatives and sources of support. After analysing 
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member versus non-member characteristics, it analyses the cooperative effects found in articles 
considered most rigorous. 
The review finds that the 70 articles are by large concentrated around a small set of countries 
and sectors and that cooperatives perform multiple functions, mainly including marketing. 
Around 64% of articles report external support, including some from multiple organisations. 
Governments are the main support providers, generally initiating cooperatives and, to a lesser 
extent, supporting their regular activities.  
Regarding differences in member and non-members characteristics, it appears that farmers who 
are better off – in terms of education, farm size, access to credit and income levels – are more 
likely to be cooperative members; however, this does not hold for variables such as farm 
equipment, information and communication technology assets, or access to extension services. 
Nevertheless, regardless of their membership status, in most cases where analysis has been 
possible, all studied farmers tend to own less than 1 hectare of land. This means that, even 
though from a statistical perspective members’ farms are relatively larger than those of non-
members, from a socio-economic perspective they should all be considered very small or 
subsistence farmers.  
Concerning cooperative effects on their members, the most conclusive evidence corresponds to 
the categories studied by a meaningful number of articles, exhibiting the largest shares of 
positive results: access to and use of inputs, income, prices, and women’s status and agency. 
Moreover, there is a group of promising effects, meaning categories studied by few articles but 
with a large share of positive findings: financial services, profit, social capital and technical 
efficiency. Regardless of the effect category, since there is a meaningful share of results for 
which there is not enough evidence of an effect, we conclude that such positive effects are 
probable but need further confirmation.  
6.1.2 Paper Two: Cooperative price effects in the Argentinean non-varietal wine sector  
Motivated by contrasting theoretical propositions, Paper Two explores the price effects of 
processing cooperatives and Investor-Oriented Firms (IOFs) in the Argentinean non-varietal 
wine sector. It uses a unique data set of 5,042 records of the sale of bulk non-varietal wine 
during 2007–2012 and runs a multilevel regression model to explain prices according to farmer 
delivery decisions.  
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The paper finds that on average cooperatives pay 3.4% lower prices than IOFs. Nevertheless, 
the price differentials between cooperatives and IOFs in a particular administrative department 
depends greatly on the strength of the respective cooperatives, measured by their surface, grape 
and wine share handled in each department. In other words, the size of the identified discount 
falls as cooperative strength increases. The regression results indicate that, while sufficiently 
high cooperative strength – the data suggest a dividing line at about 30% – will generally lead 
to a premium over IOF prices, it does not lead IOFs to pay higher prices. In the department with 
the highest cooperative strength, the premium reaches 2.4%. Thus, cooperatives effectively only 
offer a price premium to the growers who sell them their produce, a premium which is not 
extended to growers selling to IOFs. 
I suggest that the general inability of cooperatives to pay a price equal to or greater than that 
paid by the IOFs can be explained by the market structure for non-varietal wine in Argentina. 
There is evidence that cooperatives fulfil different functions and serve different producers than 
their IOF counterparts. In particular, there is some support in the data for the argument that wine 
cooperatives serve as the market of last resort for many producers. In 10 out of the 11 
departments analysed, the vineyard size of cooperative members is considerably smaller than 
the average size of producers in the department. Related to that, the average volume of a 
cooperative wine purchase is 25% smaller than the average IOF purchase. Cooperative 
members are smaller and have older and less-efficient technology, which means they may have 
fewer options when it comes to marketing their output and hence less ability to access buyers 
offering higher prices. These structural features can be expected to result in higher costs for the 
cooperatives, reducing their ability to pay higher prices. 
Despite the lower prices paid by Argentinean wine cooperatives, I argue that farmers are still 
patronising them because they offer some kind of value. Producer selling decisions may be 
influenced by other factors apart from price, such as other services offered by cooperatives. In 
the case of Mendoza province, for example, these services might include political representation 
through the federation of cooperatives, access to extension services and unlimited delivery 
rights.  
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6.1.3 Paper Three: Cooperative price effects in the Argentinean dairy-processing 
sector 
Paper Three aims to better understand the role of Argentinean cooperatives during a period of 
rapid structural change. Since the 1990s, Argentinean dairy-processing cooperatives have lost 
considerable amounts of members and market share. Their current role is analysed here by 
investigating the characteristics of farmers who continue delivering to them and price 
differentials between cooperatives and IOFs. Member and non-member characteristics are 
analysed with a probit regression model applied to 917 farmers. Then, farm-size differences are 
further studied with t-tests on data representing 70% of national milk volume. Lastly, price 
differences are analysed with a hierarchical multilevel regression model applied to 9,720 
transactions among farmers and processors and price volatility is analysed with prices’ 
coefficients of variation.  
The paper finds that dairy-cooperative members are more disadvantaged than farmers 
delivering to IOFs in terms of education, farm size and productive technology. Moreover, their 
daily deliveries to cooperatives are between 11% and 29% smaller than those received by IOFs, 
depending on province. Regarding prices, the model shows that, after controlling for quantity 
and quality, on average cooperatives pay (3.5%) lower but more stable prices than IOFs, which 
may be related to cooperative farmers being smaller than those in IOFs. It could be that this 
pattern is the result of a “screening for the best producers” process (Crespi et al., 2012). Large 
dairies need to constantly fill their capacity and compete among each other for “the best” 
(larger) milk producers, which allows processors to realise economies of scale. The result of 
this competition is a price premium for larger farmers. Cooperatives, however, seem to be 
dealing more and more with small farmers to whom they cannot pay a competitive price, 
probably due to higher costs. 
For smaller and more disadvantaged farmers delivering to cooperatives, it seems that the value 
of the right to deliver entailed by membership and higher price stability outweighs the price 
disadvantages involved. Consequently, cooperative membership may represent a way of 
ensuring small farmers against the hardships of changing markets.  
6.1.4 Paper Four: Cooperative inclusion mechanisms in the Zambian maize sector  
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Paper Four conceptualises and operationalises mechanisms that may contribute towards 
inclusion of disadvantaged households in Zambian cooperatives within the framework of the 
governmental Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP), which relies on cooperatives to 
organise farmer access to subsidised inputs. Employing primary data collected in 2015 from 15 
cooperatives, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) identifies all necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions and their combinations that can lead to an outcome, in this case, the 
inclusion of widow-headed households – identified, using case knowledge, as the most 
disadvantage farmer group. Through cross-case analysis, three patterns of association are 
revealed, which seem to both individually and sufficiently explain the emergence of inclusion: 
a) absence of low participation costs, b) absence of wealthy members in combination with 
presence of pro-poor access to subsidies, c) and presence of wealthy members in combination 
with absence of pro-poor access to subsidies and presence of long-term commitment.  
Meanwhile, within-case analysis sheds light on the causal processes behind each of the three 
inclusion patterns. First, cooperatives with higher participation costs may use the available 
capital from member contributions to offer mainly financial services to vulnerable members. In 
this way, such cooperatives may attract proportionally more widowed members as compared to 
average cooperatives with no capital at their disposal. Second, the cooperative with absence of 
wealthy members in combination with presence of pro-poor access to subsidies seems to attract 
a more homogenous group, meaning that members share livelihood strategies, objectives and 
may be open towards helping more disadvantaged households, who they feel close to. Third, 
the presence of wealthier farmers coincides with restricted access to subsidies that is least 
favourable for poorer members. The combination of both conditions suggests some form of 
elite capture; nevertheless, the presence of cooperative long-term commitment and case 
information suggest that these cooperatives offer social and economic services that respond 
particularly to the needs of women, including widows. 
The results are context-specific but offer some important insights regarding inclusion in 
cooperatives. First, they show that cooperatives can be inclusive. Second, they indicate multiple 
ways in which cooperatives can enhance inclusion. Therefore, inclusion in cooperatives can 
hardly be induced by a single factor but, rather, requires a systemic approach in which 
cooperatives provide targeted interventions to households that otherwise may not find 
participation rewarding, because their expected costs exceed associated benefits. 
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6.1.5 Joint contribution: Synthesis of contributions regarding multiple cooperative 
effects and disadvantaged member characteristics   
Analysing the contributions of each paper together here will enable me to address the research 
questions set out in the introduction. My first question is related to the socio-economic 
characteristics of farmers who participate in cooperatives. According to the findings discussed 
above, cooperatives are likely to serve the interests of the most disadvantaged farmers.  
In the 17 articles from the literature review (Paper One) where relevant information was given, 
I see that, regardless of whether they are cooperative members or not, in most cases farmers 
have less than 1 hectare. Therefore, they can hardly be categorised as anything but very small 
or subsistence farmers.  
Turning to my own empirical research, it can be said to support the general findings of 
cooperatives working with the most disadvantaged farmers. First, in the Argentinean non-
varietal wine and dairy sectors, cooperative members are smaller in farm size than non-
members. In addition, in the non-varietal wine sector, due to their small size cooperative 
members may have difficulties maintaining their own productive infrastructure, while in the 
dairy sector members are more likely to have lower technological levels. Meanwhile, in 7 out 
of the 15 Zambian cooperatives I have investigated, the number of widowed female members 
– considered the most disadvantaged farmers there – was double the average for the rural areas 
of the studied district.  
My second question and its sub questions are related to the specific effects of agricultural 
cooperatives on their farmer members. The evidence indicates that cooperative effects are 
multiple and, even though a large proportion of them are positive, there is also a significant 
share of cases in which there is not enough evidence to satisfactorily prove a particular effect.  
On average, each article deemed to be of moderate or high scientific rigour included in the 
systematic literature review reports 3 effects belonging to different categories. Quantitative 
articles present 30% of statistically non-significant effects, and 20% of the searched-for effects 
are not found in the qualitative articles at all. As a possible explanation, I propose that there 
might be a publication bias against negative effects which, consequently, are rarely reported so 
as not to scare off funding bodies. Nevertheless, I do not rule out their existence, especially 
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since my empirical research in Argentina has identified effects that, when individually analysed, 
can be considered negative.  
Related to my sub question regarding price effects, my empirical research on the Argentinean 
cases shows that cooperatives can provide effects in different directions. In the non-varietal 
wine sector, cooperatives pay lower prices, but such discounts are reduced as cooperative 
strength increases. I suggest that, even if cooperatives do not offer prices as high as those offered 
by IOFs, their presence can nevertheless enhance competition and result in prices higher than 
what would otherwise be the case. Meanwhile, in the dairy-processing sector, I have observed 
that cooperatives pay lower but more stable prices than IOFs.  
My findings with regard to the relationship between cooperatives and prices challenge the state 
of the art presented in the systematic literature review, where most evidence points towards 
positive or non-significant price effects. First, I have shown that cooperative price effects are 
multiple, as they can include individual prices received by members, price levels for all farmers 
and/or price volatility. Second, since members continue delivering to cooperatives in the 
presence of other buyers who would likely pay more, I suggest they derive benefits from 
cooperatives that compensate for lower prices, such as unlimited delivery rights, which secure 
a market for their produce and support their survival as farmers. Consequently, I suggest that 
assessment of cooperative effects should be based on combination of their multiple effects and 
not on individual ones seen in isolation.  
With reference to my sub question regarding cooperative effects on inclusion, according to my 
literature review, this has not yet been reported on. By showing that Zambian cooperatives can 
be inclusive, my empirical study sheds light on a field that, to the best of my knowledge, has 
been little explored, therefore broadening the range of cooperative effects. It is also worth 
noting that this investigation does not focus on multiple cooperative effects but, rather, on 
multiple strategies to reach one effect. In this light, it shows how methods other than 
quantitative, particularly regression analysis, may be more suitable for unpacking complex 
phenomenon such as inclusion in cooperatives.  
Confirming the multiple effects of cooperatives, the literature on both Argentinean sectors 
shows that cooperatives can have political effects. They are due to FeCoVitA and SanCor, the 
federation of wine cooperatives and the largest dairy-processing cooperative, respectively, 
which represent member needs and interests in their respective value chains and policy spheres, 
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with a resulting improved access to extension services and other public policy benefits, such as 
in the Zambian case access to subsidised inputs. These political effects were not found in the 
literature review. 
To sum up, I have found that cooperatives are likely to serve the interests of the most 
disadvantaged farmers; in Argentina, these were relatively smaller farmers, whereas in Zambia 
they were female widows. Cooperatives can provide their members with multiple effects, which 
in most cases are positive, but there is also a significant share of cases with lack of sufficient 
evidence regarding effects. Moreover, negative effects cannot be ruled out. Based on my 
empirical research, I suggest that, first, cooperatives, as organisations with multiple functions 
and effects, should be assessed in accord with their complexity and variety, rather than by 
studying isolated effects. Second, cooperatives should be assessed in the light of the 
particularities of their farmer members, meaning that their effects may reflect farmer needs or 
characteristics and not organisational features per se.  
6.2 Policy recommendations 
From the literature review, I derive the general policy recommendation that there is evidence to 
be optimistic about cooperatives as appropriate means for rural development but, at the same 
time, governments and donors should still be cautious. The review highlights the existence of a 
large share of cooperative positive effects in economic but also social dimensions, reflecting 
the dual nature of cooperatives as social groups and business enterprises. Nevertheless, the 
significant share of cases lacking sufficient evidence regarding effects should keep governments 
and donors cautious about their suitability or efficacy in all cases. Moreover, the fact that 
cooperatives are less involved than they could be in activities such as access to credit and 
processing of agricultural produce may indicate a need for other strategies than collective action 
via cooperatives. Lastly, theoretical claims regarding potential cooperative failure and the fact 
that cooperatives have actually failed many times suggest that governments and donors should 
encourage the analysis of negative results, in order to understand what can be improved, instead 
of promoting cooperatives based upon studies that only display positive and non-significant 
results without further considerations.  
Based upon my empirical research, I have formulated specific recommendations for each 
country studied. Since the survival of disadvantaged farmers is being compromised by global 
agricultural markets, the role of cooperatives in providing a market of last resort in the 
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Argentinean cases and inclusion in public policies in Zambia should be highly relevant for 
governments fostering rural development. Therefore, the major challenge for those 
governments and many others is to avoid repeating unsuccessful paths of intervention, misuse 
and dependency while supporting the development and competitiveness of cooperatives 
(Shiferaw et al., 2011) – in other words, their survival.  
Governments may implement four different types of policy measures (McDonnell and Elmore, 
1987). First, mandates are the rules governing the actions of individuals and agencies. Second, 
inducements are transfers of money to individuals or agencies in return for production of goods 
and services. Third, capacity building is the transfer of money to individuals or agencies for the 
purpose of investment in future benefits via material, intellectual, or human resources. Lastly, 
system changing is the transfer of official authority among individuals and agencies.   
In both countries analysed, there are mandate measures in place, including the existence of 
cooperative laws and public organisations devoted to promoting and facilitating the formation 
and growth of cooperatives. I suggest both countries could benefit from additional mandates 
and capacity-building measures. 
In a context where specific policies for small-scale farmers are scarce or have very limited scope 
and budgets, Argentinean cooperatives act as a defensive means for small-scale farmers dealing 
with the hardships of structural changes and their consequences. As a result, cooperatives may 
have greater additional costs which prevent them from paying competitive prices. Members 
may compensate for price-differential losses involved through other benefits from cooperatives 
and, therefore, continue delivering to them. Nevertheless, cooperatives could be supported via 
tax exemptions, increasing the capacity of cooperatives to pay better prices and, consequently, 
improving farmer wellbeing. Additionally, more competitive prices paid by cooperatives might 
then attract larger-scale farmers, helping cooperatives decrease their costs of operation due to 
handling larger volumes per transaction and reaching more easily economies of scale.   
In the Zambian case, the allocation of subsidised inputs to cooperatives does not follow pre-
established rules besides allocating each organisation some of them. Hoping for the chance to 
be allocated at least some subsidised inputs, cooperative members tend to split themselves into 
smaller cooperatives. Consequently, many cooperatives lack a minimum number of farmers 
paying their membership fees and have no financial capital to carry out any other activity 
besides potentially providing access to subsidised inputs. The national government should 
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consider mandate measures establishing more transparent rules for the access to subsidised 
inputs related to the number of members to prevent this situation.  
In both countries, capacity-building measures should be directed towards improving the 
business orientation and competitiveness of cooperatives, with special attention to the inclusion 
of disadvantaged farmers. In the Argentinean cases, since domestic demand for non-varietal 
wine is decreasing and demand for dairy products is already at very high levels, further 
opportunities for growth will probably be associated with international markets. Therefore, 
cooperatives need support that can enable them to insert themselves in those markets or find 
future niches in national markets, where small-scale farmers can still play a role.  
In the Zambian case, 7 out of the 15 cooperatives proved to be inclusive of disadvantaged 
farmers. Therefore, the government should carefully assess the ability and willingness of 
cooperatives to reach out to disadvantaged households and, when necessary and appropriate, 
support cooperatives in reorienting their incentives and removing barriers to participation via 
training, such as through peer learning from cooperatives with higher inclusion levels. 
Moreover, the only source of capital for most cooperatives comes from the shares paid by 
members, which constrains the possibilities of cooperatives for involving in productive 
activities which could enhance their survival beyond simply providing access to subsidised 
inputs. Thus, capacity-building measures should also focus on supporting the business 
orientation of cooperatives by granting them information about access to credit and 
development projects conducted by donors, together with agricultural-product urban market 
characteristics and functioning.  
Unfortunately, there is no evidence-based best practice regarding the types and levels of support 
for cooperatives that could help them to improve their performance (Brusselaers et al., 2014; 
Iliopoulos et al., 2012). Therefore, governments should design their support measures based on 
their own needs and the premise of no interference in the autonomy of cooperatives.  
6.3 Limitations and future research  
A general limitation of cooperative-effects studies thus far is that they have been unable to 
establish the mechanisms through which cooperatives operate (Fałkowski and Ciaian, 2016). 
They have rarely, if at all, relied on impact-assessment approaches, which present a theory of 
change regarding how given inputs lead to intended outputs (White and Raitzer, 2017). At best, 
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such studies have revealed correlations between two variables – cooperative membership and 
effects on farmers – based on theoretical considerations that may have not been properly 
assessed or corroborated at the case level. Lacking context-specific conceptual frameworks or 
in-depth case-study knowledge, causal relationships have consequently remained poorly 
explained by previous research.  
Although most articles from my literature review include some reference to the enabling 
properties of the components of the conceptual framework I presented in the introduction to 
explain cooperative effects, they rarely seek to explain using case-specific empirical 
information how the functions and services provided by cooperatives (inputs) lead to the 
impacts found (outputs). Consequently, based on the literature review, I have been able to sort 
categories of effects according to their directions and shares within the evidence found and the 
number of articles that provide that evidence, but I cannot validly inform future research or 
policy about the mechanisms causing those effects.  
This limitation is also related to the cooperative evaluation or assessment perspectives adopted 
by the reviewed articles (Apthorpe and Gasper, 1982). Although most of the articles reviewed 
successfully avoided taking an essentialist perspective, which shows a positive commitment to 
the matter evaluated and a consequent advocacy function, they nevertheless tended to rely on 
an instrumentalist perspective that asks whether effects exist rather than how they are attained. 
Moreover, a transcendence perspective dominates, with researchers employing their own 
analytical criteria in selecting effect categories, without any reference to the perspectives of the 
assessed subjects – cooperative members – or their welfare. Although I do not advocate for an 
immanence perspective, which would mean self-evaluation of cooperatives, I do suggest that 
the diversity of cooperative objectives and functions could be better analysed if researchers 
were to use a participatory approach (Bergold and Thomas, 2012). Researchers could engage 
with cooperative members and managers to find out what effects are the most important for 
them. In addition, they could provide information about how effects are generated that 
researchers could test, leading to potential elaboration of theories of change.  
My own research also has certain limitations resulting from the methods of analysis employed 
or data-access issues. The vote-counting procedure, used for the literature review, has been 
primarily criticised for only considering the direction of effects and not their magnitude and 
failing to take sampling error into account, with effects from smaller samples deviating more 
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from population effects than those from larger samples. Future research should focus more 
precisely on particular effects and use more sophisticated methods, such as meta-analysis. 
Due to the large volume of data available, the empirical research for the Argentinean cases 
relied on multilevel regression models that account for data structure: in the non-varietal wine 
sector, the years and administrative departments of each transaction and, in the dairy-processing 
sector, the months and years of each transaction. Though interviews with experts were 
performed to better understand the sectors, I could not carry out interviews with farmers, which 
might have further corroborated or challenged my analysis. My doctoral studies were performed 
during a period of high conflict between farmers and the national government in Argentina, due 
to price stabilisation and restrictive international trade policies, which limited the possibility of 
performing interviews, since farmers would most probably have refused to be interviewed.  
In the Zambian case, my partner interviews were with experts and cooperative managers, which 
enabled me to understand the inclusion mechanisms of the studied organisations. This approach 
was not, however, useful for analysing variables such as elite capture, assuming that 
cooperatives which are less prone to elite capture may be more inclusive of disadvantaged 
farmers. In such cases, interviews with members from different socio-economic backgrounds 
and attendance at assemblies would have been needed.  
To conclude, in addition to the need for acknowledging and combining different features of the 
assessment perspectives expressed above, based on my empirical research, I propose here that 
cooperative effects can only be understood and assessed in light of the particularities of their 
associated members. Future cooperative theory should consider cooperative effects and farmer 
attributes simultaneously. In this way, situations that have so far been modelled as being 
competitive may turn out to actually be segmented markets where cooperatives and IOFs serve 
quite different actors, providing them with unique services. Within the historical framework of 
globalisation and the modern agricultural markets, combined with the pressing needs of 
disadvantaged farmers in the face of drastic change, understanding the multiple functions and 
unique services provided by cooperatives may lead to a more realistic reconceptualisation and 
assessment of their potential.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Systematic literature review specificities  
Search specificities 
Table 1: Specificities and examples of the search algorithms 
Search 
parameter 
Specific 
parameter 
Search database 
Agecon British 
Library 
Degruyter Jstor Oxford 
Academics 
Place of 
search 
Only full text     x     
Only title x x   x   
Only abstract x x   x x 
Time 
frame 
from 1997 until 
2018 
x     x   
Publication 
type 
Articles   x       
Journals x     x   
Journals/Yearbooks     x     
Research papers x       x 
Language English x x   x   
Country Developing           
Keywords 
All the words (ex.: 
agricultural AND 
cooperative) 
x   x   x 
Exact words (ex.: 
"agricultural 
cooperative") 
  x   x   
Wildcards 
? (a) x         
* (b) x x     x 
Notes: (a) It stands for s or z. If not possible, both alternatives were introduced, e.g.: organisation and organization 
          (b) It stands for different endings of a word, e.g.: agricultur* implies agriculture and agricultural, among 
others 
Source: own compilation 
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Table 1: Specificities and examples of the search algorithms (continued) 
Search 
parameter 
Specific 
parameter 
Search database 
Science 
direct 
Scopus Springer Taylor 
and 
Francis 
Wiley 
online 
Place of 
search 
Only full text     x x   
Only title x x     x 
Only abstract x x     x 
Time 
frame 
from 1997 until 
2018 
x   x x x 
Publication 
type 
Articles           
Journals x x x x x 
Journals/Yearbooks           
Research papers           
Language English   x x     
Country Developing   x   x   
Keywords 
All the words (ex.: 
agricultural AND 
cooperative) 
  x x   x 
Exact words (ex.: 
"agricultural 
cooperative") 
x x x x   
Wildcards 
? (a) x x     x 
* (b)       x x 
Notes: (a) It stands for s or z. If not possible, both alternatives were introduced, e.g.: organisation and organization 
          (b) It stands for different endings of a word, e.g.: agricultur* implies agriculture and agricultural, among 
others 
Source: own compilation 
Search algorithm example: 
"producer group" in Article Titles OR "producer group" in Abstract AND “effect” in Abstract 
between years 1997 and 2018. 
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Critical appraisal 
Table 2: Questions and results for quantitative studies (N=52) 
Criterion Question Answers Yes No 
Reliability Does the study control for selection bias? 40 12 Does the study perform post estimation tests? 29 23 
Internal 
validity 
Does the study provide information on the cooperative? 39 13 
Does the study spell out hypotheses or suggest a causal 
mechanism for the findings? 
38 14 
Does the study discuss the limitations of the findings? 13 39 
External 
validity 
Does the study apply random sampling of 
cooperatives/villages? 
25 27 
Does the study apply random sampling of members and 
non-members? 
41 
 
11 
Is there a discussion of how findings have contributed 
to knowledge and understanding? 
43 9 
Source: own compilation based on Heale and Twycross (2015) and Ryan et al. (2013). 
Table 3: Scale and overall assessment for quantitative studies 
Rigour Scale Reliability Internal validity 
External 
validity 
Overall 
assessment 
Low 0 0 0-1 0-1 0-2 
Moderate 1 1 2 2 3-4 
High 2 2 3 3 5-6 
Source: own calculations 
Table 4: Questions and results for research using qualitative methods (N=18) 
Criterion Question Answers Yes No 
Dependability 
Does the study use corroborating evidence to cross-
validate findings? 
10 8 
Does the study describe the processs of field work? 7 11 
Credibility 
Does the study provide information on the 
cooperative? 
15 3 
Does the study spell out hypotheses or suggest a 
causal mechanism for their findings? 
13 5 
Does the study discuss the limitations of their 
findings? 
3 15 
Does the study indicate the sampling strategy? 10 8 
Are the findings supported by the data? 15 3 
Does the study provide direct quotations regarding 
the cooperative effects on members and their 
systems? 
10 8 
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Transferability 
Is there a discussion of limitations on drawing 
wider inference? 
3 15 
Is there a discussion of how findings have 
contributed to knowledge and understanding? 
15 3 
Source: own compilation based on Hannes et al. (2011) and Spencer et al. (2003) 
Table 5: Scale and overall assessment for qualitative studies  
Rigour Scale Dependability Credibility Transferability Overall assessment 
Low 0 0 0-2 0 0-2 
Moderate 1 1 3-4 1 3-4 
High 2 2 5-6 2 5-6 
Source: own design 
Classification of effects  
Table 6: Overview of effect dimensions, categories and variables 
Effect 
dimension Effect category Variables 
Environmental 
effects 
Environmental 
performance 
Field management practices 
Improved natural resource management (soil fertility, soil 
erosion, water conservation 
More environmentally friendly inputs (pesticides, organic 
fertilisers, mulch) 
Economic 
effects on 
members 
Financial services Access to credit, bank account, insurance 
Income 
Gross margin  
Farm income  
Gross farm revenue 
Net income 
Farm profit 
Women income  
Share agricultural income of total income 
Market participation 
Commercialised/processed share of produce  
Quantity commercialised  
Participation in collective marketing 
Prices Average price per kg Price per unit 
Wealth 
Housing quality 
Asset holding 
Subjective household well-being  
Economic 
effects on 
production 
systems 
Access to and use of 
inputs 
Use of seeds, tissue-culture plantlets, chemical fertilisers, 
feed, spray pumps, pesticides 
Value of inputs used  
Reduced time lag to adopt inputs  
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Access to and use of 
technology 
Use of innovative farming techniques 
Reduced time lag to adopt a practice or technology 
Farm size Plot/farm size Increase in plot/farm size 
Labour Family labour used Hired labour used 
Technical efficiency Technical efficiency 
Yield and quantity Production volume  Productivity and yield 
Social effects 
Health Use of protective equipment (face mask) 
Human capital Skills and knowledge Trainings and access to information 
Food security Household basic needs Food security 
Social capital 
Commitment 
Membership in other groups or associations 
Trust  
Reciprocity 
Satisfaction 
Women’s status and 
agency 
Domestic/farm related work load 
Decision making power 
Source: own compilation  
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Appendix 2: Residuals 
Residuals  
 
Source: own graphic  
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